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ABSTRACT 
This project places itself within the tradition of Christian theology which has 
sought to think about its thinking of God.  In so doing, the tradition has seen it necessary 
to do this thinking in light of one’s contemporary situation.  Thus, this project carries this 
line of thought through by thinking the thinking of God within the contemporary context.  
The thesis of the project is that theology is improvisation.  This thesis is advanced 
through an analysis of the idea of attunement in both theology and improvisation.  
The project articulates the nature of theology as improvisation by analyzing the 
nature of attunement within theological thinking and how this opens certain possibilities 
for theology.  There are three broad steps.  The first is a philosophical step that 
accomplishes two things: first, an articulation of the current situation of theology within a 
post-metaphysical world and, second, a sketch of the idea of attunement through an 
analysis of the work of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.  The second step in the 
project’s argument is an examination of improvisational music and the way that 
attunement works within the thinking that takes place within this musical form.  Third, 
the project makes an explicitly theological turn by proposing a way of thinking for 
theology in light of the analysis of attunement in the first two steps.  The result is 
twofold.  First, the project takes up the work of David Tracy on theological fragments
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and uses this to show the multiplicity of forms available within theological thinking.  
This leads, second, to an analysis of St. Augustine of Hippo and his unstructuring of 
theological form.  He does this through a hermeneutic of love which resulted in a 
plurality of forms used to think theologically because the object of theology—God—
necessitated this plurality.  The end goal of the project is a proposal for a way of thinking 
in theology that is attuned to the multiplicity of forms necessary for thinking God.
 1 
INTRODUCTION:  
THINKING THE THINKING OF GOD 
The following project places itself within the broader Christian tradition by 
attempting to think about how it is that theology thinks God.  The goal is to do what a 
myriad of thinkers before has done—from Origen, Pseudo-Dyonisius, Thomas Aquinas, 
Meister Eckhart, Martin Luther, Freidrich Schleiermacher, Soren Kierkegaard, etc.—
which is to think the thinking of God within one’s contextual milieu.  The Christian 
theological tradition has consistently attempted to think God in light of one’s historical 
and cultural context.  When thinking God, theology has used the metaphors and ways of 
thinking available in one’s world.  The goal of this dissertation is to find an idiom in the 
contemporary world that allows for a thinking that is part of the cultural milieu while also 
being faithful to the broader Christian tradition.  The way that this is done in the 
following is through an analysis of what form(s) shows itself to be able to think God in 
the contemporary, postmodern world, where plurality, multiplicity, instability, and 
fragmentation are markers of the current context. 
This project analyzes what form(s) is appropriate and adequate for Christian 
theology by asking of the question “what is theology?”  Through an examination of 
thisquestion, the nature of theology as a discourse that contains certain forms begins to 
come into view.  The question also allows new opportunities for the exploration of 
theological thinking within the current cultural milieu.  This is to continue within the 
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tradition of asking what theology is.  Through this concern with the question of theology 
this project is able to open the way that (various) form(s) works to open the kind of 
thinking—and, thus, content—able to be appropriated within theology.  The question 
“what is theology” breaks down to asking how it is that form conveys content and how 
this content is appropriated in thinking theologically, specifically when thinking God. 
Within the current theological milieu, one could argue that there are two broad 
streams of the nature of theology.  The first group answers that theology is ultimately a 
descriptive discourse meant to repeat the content of the Christian tradition.  This 
approach can be seen in Barthians, postliberals, and the theological turn to aesthetics, 
among others.  In these groups the goal is to re-peat the belief of the believing 
community.  The second group answers that theology is a prescriptive exercise that is 
concerned with saying something about God and the way that theological beliefs are 
expounded and appropriated in a cultural and historical setting.  For these theologians, 
theology attempts to say something “new” by offering forms and ways of thinking that 
may not have been appropriated and approved by the tradition.  Theologians in this group 
would include correlationalists, revisionists, and liberationists.  It would be a mistake, 
though, to believe that these groups did not intermingle or were mutually exclusive.  
Those favoring description also say something new at times and want to make statements 
that are intelligible to one’s culture and setting while those favoring prescription are still 
aware of the tradition and try to be faithful to said tradition in their theology.    
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This project finds itself within the latter category.  This prescriptive task does not 
neglect the tradition but offers a corrective to those theologians favoring description.  
Prescriptive theologies advance a thesis that interprets claims in light of current forms 
and ways of thinking.  This is a corrective to descriptive theologies that pass on a 
tradition (or multiple traditions) while not thoroughly engaging the broader world in 
which a tradition lives.  The way that this project proposes to think theology otherwise is 
by arguing that theology is improvisation.  This thesis is presented by arguing that an 
attunement to an/other is what concerns both theology and improvisation.  By putting 
forth the idea that the nature of thinking is attunement, this project shows a place of 
interaction between improvisation and theology.  This place of connection shows that the 
point of contact between the two allows for more similarity than dissimilarity by showing 
how attunement is at the center of what it means to think both while also being the center 
point for beginning to do both improvisation and theology.     
There are three broad concerns that underlie the argument as it is advanced 
throughout this project.  The first is with offering a way of thinking theologically that 
makes room for the “new” or “newness” in theology.  Since their goal is repetition and 
the continued life of a tradition, descriptive theologies tend to avoid saying anything 
“new”;1 while prescriptive theologies are concerned with articulating theological belief 
within historical settings while using the forms and ways of thinking made available 
through those settings.  The prescriptive approach to theology offers a corrective by 
articulating how it is that the theological tradition can be thought within other forms and 
                                                 
1
 This is a constant refrain in the work of Thomas C. Oden.  See Thomas C. Oden, The Living 
God, Systematic Theology: Volume 1 (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1987).  
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modes of thinking than those available strictly from the tradition.  For the prescriptive 
theologian this opens various possibilities and avenues for insight within theology, 
offering ways of thinking where plurality, multiplicity, and fragmentation can occur.  By 
turning to improvisation, this project offers a form for theology to deal with the new. 
The second basic concern undergirding much of the argument in this project is the 
importance of attunement.  The first two chapters show how thinking is built around the 
idea of attunement.  This path leads into the way that attunement works in the thinking of 
improvisational forms of music and theology.  The argument is that attunement allows 
unique ways of opening ways to reinterpret the tradition and provides a way for 
advancing newness in different forms of thinking.  The concern with attunement is to 
show a way of being passive-active in one’s reception of the other, that it is not just 
listening but also a concern for translation and making apparent the new.  This is apparent 
in music as one is attuned to the music, composer, other musicians, and the audience in 
order to play well.  In theology one is attuned to the divine while also being in-tune with 
the tradition and culture in order to do theology in a way that says something.  Thus, this 
notion of attunement offers an alternative to some of the proposed ways of thinking in 
descriptive theologians.2   
The third concern at work in this project is that of taking the idea of God seriously 
in one’s treatment of theological language.  This concern follows from the previous two: 
if this proposal is concerned with making new statements theologically because of one’s 
                                                 
2
 See Nathan Crawford, “Pursuing an Ontology of Attunement through St. Augustine’s 
Christology,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 179-96.  Kathryn Tanner makes a 
similar proposal in Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 8ff. 
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attunement to the divine, then it would follow that the result would be to make new 
statements about the divine or God.  While this is in some respect true, attunement to God 
ultimately brings out that there is an aspect of God that is unsayable in that God is 
ultimately non-conceptual or in-conceivable.  Since God is not able to be conceptualized 
or said, theological language struggles to say anything meaningful about God.  This 
project proposes a way of doing theology that is similar to the way that an 
improvisational musician works, dealing with the multitude of possibilities for how one 
can hear a piece of music or how it may be interpreted.  The theologian also must play on 
the names of God or ways of thinking God in a way that opens the infinite possibilities 
for thinking God and needs to find forms available for allowing an endless exploration of 
God due to the inability of the human to offer conceptualizing statements about God.   
The intellectual and ecclesial context out of which this project arise is that of 
contemporary Protestantism.  The project offers a response to the current “Barthian” 
nature of much of contemporary Protestant theology through a turn to the form of music 
for thinking theologically.  Both Barthian theologians and this project hold to a beginning 
point of the revelation of the Word in the person of Jesus Christ.  However, Barthian 
theologies tend to emphasize the spokenness of the Word while this project emphasizes 
the musical nature of the theology that arises from the revelation of the Word.  Barth 
wants to offer a way of “hearing the Word” and how this is the impetus to theology.  This 
project, on the other hand, offers an account of the originary encounter3 that enables the 
                                                 
3
 Within the argument of this dissertation, I rely upon language from the phenomenological 
tradition.  The idea of an “originary encounter” derives from this tradition, talking about the experience one 
has that gives rise to “thinking/understanding” an object.  However, this “thinking” is always in 
relationship with the object, so that there is no subject-object split; rather, the originary encounter is an 
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hearing of the Word through the notion of attunement.  The result of Barth’s theology of 
revelation was a dogmatics.  This project, on the other hand, pursues a non-dogmatics 
that is interested in theological forms outside of the strict speaking of the Word.       
With this context and these three concerns initially articulated, the goal for the 
rest of the introduction is to give a cursory overview of the scope of the rest of the 
project.  This will entail outlining both the type of theological thinking that this project 
seeks to engage within as well as articulating the scope of the terms being used.  Also, it 
will be important to briefly offer a point of contrast with theologies primarily concerned 
with the descriptive task.  Thus, the introduction will include four subsequent sections.  
The first will outline the nature of the theological task as it has been rooted in the 
tradition of Christian theology.  The second section will be a brief analysis and rebuttal of 
various descriptive theologies, mainly those from the postliberal and aesthetic theology 
camps.  The third section will begin to set forth the terms and how they are used in the 
project.  The last section will offer a brief outline of the project by detailing how each 
chapter works to put forth the thesis that theology is improvisation.  
A.  The Theological Task in the Christian Tradition 
In this section of the introduction, the goal is to articulate a line of thinking within 
the Christian tradition that formulates some of the earliest questions with which this 
project is concerned.  This section will briefly analyze the way that different theologians 
have used form to shape how it is that theology thinks the thinking of God.  The turn to 
these theologians will help establish a tradition for the kind of theological thinking this 
                                                                                                                                                 
experience that gives rise to a pre-understanding of an experience that causes one to begin to think through 
the nature of the experience.  I describe this language and way of thinking more thoroughly in the first 
chapter through the discussion of Heidegger. 
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project is pursuing.  It does so by showing that the concern of this project is not new but 
part of the Christian tradition.  By rooting itself within this tradition, this project builds 
upon what has already come in the tradition while also opening new avenues for thinking 
God.   
I begin with a discussion of the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius as he is a common 
place to begin thinking through how language and form relate to thinking God.  In his 
two most famous texts—Divine Names and Mystical Theology—Pseudo-Dionysius 
addresses the same problem as this project: How is one able to think and name God?  In 
his various writings, he roots this problem in the way that God has created the world and 
that through this God has revealed Godself to the world.  The goal for thinking God is to 
be able to notice God in creation.  Through this experience of God one is able to begin 
thinking God.   
For Pseudo-Dionysius, to say that God is the Creator of all the cosmos implies 
that God is in some way wholly other than the creation.  God is the Infinite that gives rise 
to the finite.  Since God is creator, then Pseudo-Dionysius says that all being “derives 
from, exists in and is returned toward” God.4  He argues that the creator, as transcendent, 
has been “clothed in the terms of being.”5  Creation acts as the source for the symbols 
that are available for humanity to use for the things of God.  The symbols he chooses to 
use are part of a broader culture or society in which Pseudo-Dionysius resides.  These are 
                                                 
4
 Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, ed. and trans. 
Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 79/ 705D.  The page number refers to first the page in 
Luibheid’s translation, while the second refers to the Migne edition.   
 
5
 Ibid., 52/ 592B.  
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what are used to think God.  He can say this because he understands creation to be 
infused with the presence of God which allows people to think God as one becomes 
aware of God as Creator in the creation.6  Language about God derives from creation.  
And, for Pseudo-Dionysius, the first language used to speak of God is that of praise.  
Thus, all the language of our praise is brought forth from an awareness of God’s trace in 
creation.7  By paying attention to this, the human can begin to develop a language that 
can speak adequately of God and think the reality of God rightly. 
However, Pseudo-Dionysius does not believe that the reality of our language 
necessarily corresponds to God through the symbols used from creation.  He says there 
should be an awareness of the fact that God is not confined by a form; God is the one 
who creates, giving form to that which had none.  God is the one who gives form but God 
is unconfined by form since the creation shows a multiplicity of forms that exist.8  For 
Pseudo-Dionysius, the way to begin talk of God is from the place of naming God “Good” 
as this points to the unconfined nature of God.  He argues that God is the one from whom 
all forms come—all of creation is given form by the one who has no form, God.9   All 
attributes come from God, but God is not reducible to any one of these attributes or shape 
or beauty or form; rather, God is all of these together in a unity, a beautyless and formless 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., 53/ 592B.  
 
7
 Ibid., 56/ 597A.  
 
8
 Ibid., 73/ 697A.  
 
9
 Ibid., 79/ 705D.  
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unity that is the source of all.10  Pseudo-Dionysius argues that the only way one can think 
and name God is to use the forms God has created.   
Pseudo-Dionysius overcomes the problem of what form to use for thinking God 
by offering a multiplicity of forms.  As one looks at his corpus, there is his desire to sing 
a hymn of praise to the one who creates in Divine Names,11 offering a prayer to begin 
thinking of God in Mystical Theology, while also pursuing his thinking in the form of an 
exhortation to think God rightly through a letter to Timothy.12  Through the use of these 
different literary forms in three different treatises, Pseudo-Dionysius offers a multiplicity 
of ways to think God.  This comes for him because he believes that the proper response to 
the encounter of God is silence.  This is because as one moves into deeper knowledge of 
God one realizes that this is an unknowing where one enters the darkness of God.13  The 
darkness of God is key here for Pseudo-Dionysius, as this is where the clarity of language 
to speak to the reality of God falters.  As one moves deeper into the darkness, one 
realizes that God is beyond darkness, is beyond assertion and denial, beyond truth and 
error.14  By moving into this deeper knowledge of God as beyond all, Pseudo-Dionysius 
shows the necessity of using a plurality of forms to speak to the reality that is God.  The 
way that this is done is through a certain disposition of prayer and praise, which leads to 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 101/ 842B. 
 
11
 Ibid., 96/ 816B.  
 
12
 Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, ed. and 
trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 135/ 997A-1000A. 
 
13
 Ibid., 139/ 1033B-1033C.  
 
14
 Ibid., 141/ 1048A-1048B.  
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openness to the reality of God, which allows the movement beyond truth and error, 
assertion and denial, into the Good that is God. 
Thomas Aquinas continues on the same path as that begun by Pseudo-Dionysius.  
The first sections of Aquinas’ Summa Theologica15 struggle with the same issues as 
Pseudo-Dionysius, mainly how it is that the finite can know and name the infinite, God.  
Dealing with this problem, Aquinas first elucidates what count as sources for allowing 
one to think God properly.  He shows that the thinking of God which results in knowing 
and naming is part of sacred doctrine, which takes as one of its sources the “authority of 
philosophers” as they relate to “natural reason,” but only as this is in concert with the 
canonical Scriptures and “the authority of the doctors of the Church…”16  Like Pseudo-
Dionysius, Aquinas allows for the fact that creation, through natural reason, is able to 
point towards God and that the way humanity sees God in creation is through the 
knowledge acquired by interacting with Scripture and the tradition.17  Through this idea 
of creation, Aquinas finds the importance of including the symbols and understanding of 
the world in which he lives to be part of the way theology thinks God.  This leads him to 
a prescriptive theology that makes certain claims about God in light of and in response to 
the world in which he lives.    
                                                 
15
 All references referring to the Summa Theologica will follow the standard citation of part, 
question and answer, and will be to the following translation: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1948). 
 
16
 ST I.1.8. rep. obj. 2. 
 
17
 ST I.2 demonstrates how Aquinas would see the ability of natural reason to see God in creation 
through his famous “Five Ways.” 
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Aquinas begins his thinking through an attempt to understand how it is that 
people can connect with God in a way that makes knowledge of God possible.  For 
Aquinas, this comes through participation.  Participation is concerned with being tuned 
into the nature of God and the way that this occurs is through the practice of charity.18  
He argues that since God is concerned with charity then when people practice charity 
they are participating in the divine.  Thus, humans are able to be tuned more and more 
into God.  The way that one is able to be tuned into God is through one’s “deiformity,” or 
how one is made like God.19    This knowledge does not occur through a knowing of the 
divine essence but through attachment (or participation) to the divine essence, always 
inaugurated by God.  Aquinas says, “Those who see the divine essence see what they see 
in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect.”20  
Thus, attachment to God is the beginning and end of humanity’s knowledge of the divine.   
For Aquinas, a person can never know the essence of God fully.  This is because 
God exceeds human ways of knowing.  Thus, God is beyond humanity’s knowing of 
God.21  However, humanity can know God by being tuned into God through God’s giving 
                                                 
18
 There needs to be a distinction made between a weak sense and a strong sense of participation.  
The weak sense refers to the fact that all of creation, by the fact of being created, participates in some weak 
way in God by existing.  The use of participation here refers to a strong sense where there is a conscious 
effort on the part of the person to participate in the divine.  This resonates with what the project calls 
attunement.   For an elucidation of this understanding of participation, see Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key, 
8ff. 
 
19
 ST I.12.6. pt. 1. 
 
20
 ST. I.12.9.  Within Aquinas’ discussion here, he posits two different ways of knowing: knowing 
things as they are appear as an object and knowing things as they appear within their “similitudes pre-
existing in God.”  The first type of knowledge is purely objective knowledge while the second is to know 
something as it is and exists within God.  When I discuss knowledge for Aquinas I am referring to the 
second as this is complete and true knowledge for him.   
 
21
 ST. I.12.1. rep. obj. 3. 
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of Godself to humanity.  God’s gift leads to understanding God as the creator of all.  
Humanity cannot know God in the divine essence but can know God as the creator and 
through this knowledge the human intellect can begin to form conceptions about God.22  
These conceptions, though, are made proportionally because the intellect understands that 
as creator, God is beyond the different ways that humanity understands God in creation.  
Humanity can say God is good or God is love, but God is always beyond people’s 
understanding of these.23  This is the famous way that Aquinas says that it is through 
analogy that humanity can speak of God.  This way of naming God comes from creatures 
as a term used for God “is thus used in a multiple sense sign[ifying] various proportions 
to some one thing.”24 God is known through the way that the creation points toward God, 
not in the divine essence itself. 
The way humanity knows God is from creation.  Creation represents God so that 
humanity can see that the only way creation is or has goodness is because of the divine.25  
For Aquinas, this comes from the primary name for God, which, derived from Exodus 
3:14, is HE WHO IS.  By understanding God in this way, Aquinas sees that the very 
essence of God is to exist.  God’s essence is existence; thus, all existence is dependent 
upon God.26  Aquinas wants to think God in such a way as to take into account all of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22
 ST I.13.1. rep. obj. 2. 
 
23
 ST I.13.4. pt. 1.   
 
24
 ST I.13.5. pt. 1. 
 
25
 ST I.13.2. pt. 1. 
 
26
 ST I.13.11. pt. 1. 
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existence as pointing toward the divine.  This is only possible as one is attuned to the 
divine that is the creator, which allows one to see the essence of divinity in creation.  If 
one is not tuned into this, then knowledge of God escapes the person.  From this, then, 
Aquinas can be seen as advocating a similar path as Pseudo-Dionysius, where as 
important as the type of argument one makes for naming God is that one is disposed 
rightly: for Aquinas, this means participating in God in a way that leads to attunement 
through charity. 
This tradition is continued in the thought of Martin Luther.  He approaches 
thinking God in a way that seeks to remove itself from many of the forms of his day in 
order to retrieve parts of the Christian tradition, especially the thought of Augustine.  
Luther argues one must approach thinking God in a way that avoids anthroporphization.  
In order to avoid this, he insists on the otherness and hiddenness of God.  Thus, Luther 
thinks God in God’s otherness and hiddenness from humanity.  His embrace of God’s 
otherness leads to the various approaches to thinking God that he embraces. 
Luther begins his thinking by reimagining the nature of the dominant theological 
sources: scripture and the Christian tradition.  He begins with Christian scripture due to 
his belief that all of scripture points to the work and glory of God.27  Because it elucidates 
the work and glory of God scripture gives knowledge of God.  The knowledge of God 
given by scripture is good news.  This knowledge is that God offers forgiveness of sins 
and, the correlate of this, that God is merciful.  The forgiveness of sins and mercy of God 
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are the central proclamation and the divine promise given in scripture.28  Luther’s 
reworking of scripture is built upon the doctrine of God and who God is, not upon the 
tradition or thought of the church.  This is seen explicitly in his critiques of the 
canonization of the book of James.  His criticism of James is twofold: first, Luther says 
the book does not ascribe the work of salvation to God alone in justification, but also to 
works; and, second, he argues that the book does not teach about Christ, but drives the 
believer to the law and works.29  Luther’s critique of James shows his impatience with 
any ways of thinking God that do not focus on the grace, mercy, and forgiveness of God.  
In his mind, to do otherwise is to take away from the nature of God.       
The second theological source for thinking God in Luther is that of tradition.  His 
interpretation of the nature and message of scripture already shows how he will approach 
tradition: mainly, tradition is subservient to scripture.  Luther’s approach to tradition 
shows where theology needs to break with the tradition in order to do theology in the 
service of God.  He even makes mention of this, saying that the mass is part of the 
gospel, but not the whole gospel.  The mass, a locus of the tradition of the church, is 
critiqued because it is simply “play” and a “mockery with allegorical human 
ceremonies.”  Instead, the mass should simply be a reiteration of the gospel proclamation 
of God’s mercy and the forgiveness of sins.  The mass should point to this instead of 
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upholding the numerous rites and ceremonies.30  One such example of the tradition 
holding to rites and ceremonies over the gospel for him is the way that Holy Communion 
is taken.  Luther’s critique says that the Roman view of Holy Communion is misguided 
because it does not follow the gospel but the teachings of the “Romanists.”31  He points 
to the use of both elements in Paul’s explanation of the Lord’s Supper (1 Cor. 11).32  
Thus, he feels justified in saying that the tradition does not necessarily speak to the reality 
that is God, but at times simply perpetuates itself. 
The critique of the tradition leads into a critique of the nature of the church.  From 
his talk of the church, one gets the sense that Luther believes that it has become an idol 
that is leading people away from the gospel.  In his view, the church is not able to 
dispense grace or divine promises.  The church is not God but is the place where God 
dispenses Godself to God’s people.  The church is brought into existence through the 
work of the Word of God.  As such, the church does not rise to the importance that the 
Word of God does in terms of means of connecting with God.  The church is able to 
distinguish what is the Word of God and what is the word of humanity.  This is due to 
God’s work in and through the church though and not because of some special power.  
The only reason the church can see what is the Word of God is because it knows the 
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gospel of the forgiveness of sins and the mercy of God.  Through the mercy of God, the 
church is founded upon the promises of God.33   
Luther’s reassessment of the traditional theological sources leads him to a 
reevaluation of ways of thinking God.  Most notably, Luther thinks God through the 
difference that arises between the power of God and the power of humanity.  For Luther, 
to deny or ignore this difference is to be ignorant of God.  The difference between the 
two lies in the complete otherness of God from humanity.  Luther takes up an equivocal 
understanding of power here, saying that the power of God is completely other and 
different than the power of humanity.  He believes that when one is aware of this 
difference one can then understand the nature of God’s work.  Luther argues that when 
one is ignorant of the power and works of God then one “cannot worship, praise, given 
thanks, or serve [God]…”34  This leads Luther into a discussion of the otherness of God’s 
knowledge from humanity’s, saying God’s knowledge is not contingent but God 
foreknows things.  Luther says, “[God] foresees, purposes, and does all things according 
to [God’s] own immutable, eternal, and infallible will.”35  God’s knowledge is tied to 
God’s will.  Whereas a human cannot necessarily will what one knows, God’s knowledge 
is predicated upon God’s will and God’s will is predicated upon what God knows.   
The only power the human person has is to respond to God through one’s own 
faith, even though the power to do this comes from God’s grace.  For Luther, each person 
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either embraces the divine promise or not: to embrace the forgiveness and mercy of God 
is to have faith.36  The mercy of God is what actually merits salvation.  God’s extension 
of mercy is what works salvation in a person and is what ultimately allows a response on 
the part of the person to God.  A person’s will, though, does not choose God as much as 
respond through faith.37  This work of God is what ultimately allows humanity to know 
God.  One only knows God in and through God’s mercy.  One cannot know God’s mercy 
unless one has experienced it.  The only way that one experiences the mercy of God is if 
God extends it to a person when God justifies through God’s righteousness.38  The mercy 
of God is the only possibility for one’s knowledge of God.  If God was not merciful in 
God’s forgiveness of sins then no one would be able to know God.  The human 
knowledge of God is, thus, entirely dependent upon the work of God.  There is nothing 
that the person can do to have this knowledge until God has first extended Godself to 
humanity.      
Friedrich Schleiermacher continues in the tradition of Martin Luther when it 
comes to thinking God.  Both Luther and Schleiermacher share a concern with thinking 
God in God’s otherness from humanity but pursue this line of thinking in quite different 
ways.  Whereas Luther attempts to keep a large separation between the human and 
divine, Schleiermacher will close this gap through his famous “feeling of absolute 
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dependence.”  Schleiermacher will do this through an understanding of God that, while 
Wholly Other, still has contact with humanity in the very nature of humanity. 
The beginning point for understanding Schleiermacher’s theology is his 
elucidation of the feeling of absolute dependence.  The feeling of absolute dependence 
comes from humanity’s core realization that one cannot exist without being dependent 
upon something Wholly Other; or, that, as finite, the whole of creation must depend on an 
infinite other for its existence.39  He begins to elucidate this feeling by pointing to the 
essence of religion in intuition and feeling.  In his lectures On Religion: Speeches to its 
Cultural Despisers, he says, “Religion’s essence is neither thinking nor acting, but 
intuition and feeling.”40  The reason that he turns to intuition and feeling is because he 
believes that these are universal in humanity.  He argues that all people have a natural 
desire to intuit the infinite.41  He says this because of his belief that there is an immediate 
nature to how one experiences and perceives religion.  For Schleiermacher, the way that 
one knows religiously is through one’s initial feeling of the divine.  As such, intuition is 
the beginning of religious knowledge since it is “individual, set apart, the immediate 
perception, nothing more.”42  Intuition begins religious knowledge because it is an 
immediate knowledge that relies on its feeling and perception.     
                                                 
39
 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1928), 3-93. 
40
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. and ed. 
Richard Crouter (Cambridge and New York: 1988), 22. 
 
41
 Ibid., 24. 
 
42
 Ibid., 26. 
19 
 
Intuition is important for Schleiermacher’s thinking God because he believes all 
thinking about God begins from human self-consciousness.  Thinking God begins here 
because self-consciousness leads to the feeling of absolute dependence.  The feeling of 
absolute dependence comes from the awareness that one is not alone on the earth, but that 
there is some other outside of oneself.43  Thus, for Schleiermacher, “In self-consciousness 
there are only two elements: the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the 
other its co-existence with an Other.”44  Since human self-consciousness is a part of what 
it means to be human, the feeling of absolute dependence is also part of the “general 
nature of [humanity].”45  The feeling is the same experience for all people as all people 
feel themselves dependent upon something absolutely other.  He believes that this feeling 
is present in every religion as it gives rise to God-consciousness.  Since this feeling gives 
rise to God-consciousness, it overshadows all other feelings and, thus, all other relations.  
Self-consciousness makes one aware of oneself as subject and gives awareness of others 
outside of the self; when one has a feeling of absolute dependence upon the Wholly 
Other, then all other relationship are subordinate to this one as this one gives “colour” 
and “tone” to the nature of relationship.46   
In order to complete his sketch of what it means to know religiously, 
Schleiermacher connects intuition with feeling.  He says that “every intuition is, by its 
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very nature, connected with a feeling.”47  If one wants to know in a religious way, one 
has to connect one’s intuition with one’s feeling.  Schleiermacher says that the intuition 
that one has of religion is its infinite nature.  For him, in all respects religion is infinite, 
whether in matter and form, of its being, of its vision, or of the knowledge possible there 
within.  This intuition leads to the feeling of the infinity of religion.48  Due to the intuition 
of religion in its push towards infinity, religion shows that things cannot be understood 
strictly within the bounds of the awareness of this world’s existence.  Through the fact 
that the creation is an “absolute undivided unity,” Schleiermacher says that one can also 
have an awareness of the one who makes this unity—God.  When one intuits the God 
who brings all into unity, then one begins to have the feeling of absolute dependence.49  
This feeling stems from the fact that there is more to existence than just what one can be 
aware of within the present world.  The transcendence of the world, then, gives 
Schleiermacher the impetus to ground knowledge of God in the feeling of absolute 
dependence.50   
Schleiermacher roots his understanding of the feeling of absolute dependence in 
the Christian doctrine of creation.  The doctrine of creation is the first one that he turns to 
when trying to explicate humanity’s religious self-consciousness as expressed in the 
relation between world and God.  Within the argument of The Christian Faith, the 
doctrine of creation is the most important doctrine for thinking the relationship that exists 
                                                 
 
47
 Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural Despisers, 29. 
 
48
 Ibid., 27. 
 
49
 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 132. 
 
50
 Ibid., 17. 
21 
 
between world and God and how this affects one’s feeling of absolute dependence.51  The 
reason that Schleiermacher turns to the doctrine of creation as the basis for his theological 
grounding of the feeling of absolute dependence is because if God was not the creator, 
there could not be such a feeling.  Also, if God had created out of something instead of 
nothing, there would be no feeling of absolute dependence.52   Thus, the doctrine of 
creation carries two important aspects: first, God created the world and, second, God is 
what sustains the world.53  
Schleiermacher’s doctrine of creation opens up thinking about God because it 
places all things in reliance upon God.  This is because he argues that the origin of the 
world is dependent upon divine activity and that the world continues because of the 
divine.54  He roots this belief in the Christian idea that creation is “out of nothing.”  His 
argument is that nothing could have existed outside of God before the creation of the 
world.  If this had happened, then there would be something coequal with God and 
humanity would have a split feeling of absolute dependence.  However, this is not 
possible.  Instead, God created out of nothing because God is the one eternal and nothing 
existed beside God when God began to create.55  The feeling of absolute dependence 
arises here because all of the creation is actually dependent upon God for its existence.   
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Due to the fact that God creates out of nothing, the doctrine of creation does not 
place God under any conditions or antitheses that are part of the created world.56  While 
God is active in the creation, God is other than the creation.  The work of God in creation 
gives rise to the feeling of absolute dependence and this feeling becomes part of one’s 
own self-consciousness.  If God were under the conditions and laws of the creation this 
would hurt the development of the subject’s self-consciousness.  This is because it would 
take away from the feeling of absolute dependence since God, who one is absolutely 
dependent upon, would actually be dependent upon something else that was finite.  This 
would destroy one’s own feeling of absolute dependence.57  Schleiermacher says that 
God’s work in creation is of God’s own free will and decree.  God is not compelled by 
anything to create.58  This freedom on the part of God to create gives rise to the feeling of 
absolute dependence as  it shows that one depends upon God wholly. 
The way that Schleiermacher thinks God is through the feeling of absolute 
dependence.  For him, this occurs in the self-consciousness of the subject who 
understands oneself as wholly dependent upon an Other for one’s existence.  This is 
undergirded for him in the doctrine of creation.  Schleiermacher ultimately offers the 
development of one’s self-consciousness as the prescription for theology.  Karl Barth will 
take a somewhat similar and, yet, quite different approach.  While Barth will continue to 
emphasize the difference that exists between God and humanity, he will root his 
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argument in the revelation of the Word of God instead of in the development of one’s 
self-consciousness.59 
Barth begins thinking God by stressing the complete otherness of God from 
humanity.  The implication of this for him is that humanity cannot know God through 
anything other than God.  The only way that humanity is able to think God is through a 
participation in God.  He says, “Only God conceives of [God]self.”  The correlate of this 
is that any human concept of God and God’s Word is an indication of the limits of human 
thinking about God.60  However, this is not to make a negative statement about humanity 
as much as to show the complete otherness of God from humanity.  For Barth, this 
otherness of God is where God reveals Godself.  He points to the unveiling of God in and 
through God’s mystery and hiddenness.  Both of these show the unveiling of God, where 
God’s mystery and hiddenness are what actually unveil God.  Human knowledge of God, 
and the ability to think God, come through God’s unveiling of Godself in mystery and 
hiddenness as these point to the otherness of God.61 
The way that God unveils Godself is in the revelation of the Word of God.  The 
only way to think God is through this revelation.  The revelation of the Word of God is 
the person of Jesus Christ.  This is where God is made most manifest.62  The Word of 
God is what gives rise to faith.  This faith comes from preaching and hearing the Word of 
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God.  The reception of the Word comes through the grace of God.63  When one receives 
the Word of God, this event points to the Lordship of God through and in Jesus Christ.  
For Barth, the idea of God as “Lord” is important because it allows him to think God 
through the revelation of the Word of God in Jesus.  The revelation of God as Lord 
comes through the person and work of Jesus Christ.64  For Barth, revelation allows 
humanity to know that there is a Lord.  The revelation of God’s Lordship comes in the 
person of Jesus Christ because Barth believes that when one acts as Lord one acts as God 
in God’s revelation to humanity.65  The place that one can know God’s Lordship is in the 
Church, where Jesus reveals himself as Lord.  This revelation comes in the Church’s 
belief that Jesus is the Son of God as an equal of God.  Jesus is, then, afforded the same 
Lordship as the Father while being the one to reveal this Lordship.66 
Barth believes the Church is the place of the revelation of Jesus Christ because 
“[t]he being of the Church is Jesus Christ.”67  For Barth, the Church carries the revelation 
of the Word of God.  In doing so, it is the place where there can be knowledge of the 
Word of God because of the relation that exists between humanity and the Word of 
God.68  This knowledge comes in the person of Jesus Christ whose being has been 
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extended to the Church.  As such, this revelation gives the Church its structure of belief.  
The Word of God as revealed in Jesus Christ also is the condition of the possibility of 
being able to speak God as Triune as well as being able to know the Triune God.69  The 
Church is called and brought into existence by Jesus Christ.  To be with others as Church 
is to be in Christ.  When one acts in the Church one is obedient to the call of Jesus and it 
is this obedience to Christ that gives rise to faith.  Theology, as dogmatics, is built upon 
the act of faith that comes with being obedient and listening to Jesus Christ.70 
For Barth, theology is always dogmatic.  His prescription for theology, to correct 
the problems he sees in liberal theology that stems from Schleiermacher, is that it should 
be descriptive.  He says, “Dogmatics is the self-examination of the Christian Church in 
respect of the content of its distinctive talk about God.”71  Barth argues that theology is 
dogmatics and, specifically, one that is reflective upon the nature of what it is the Church 
confesses.  He argues that one cannot divorce, or even do, theology apart from the 
Church.  This is because theology is a reflection upon the Word of God and the Word of 
God is only revealed in the Church.  Thus, theology is concerned with understanding how 
it is that it can confess God or talk about God.72  The question of truth for theology then 
is based upon the agreement that exists between how the Church talks about God and the 
actual being of the Church.73  Within this conception, theology is based upon faith since 
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faith is what allows one to be part of the Church and to bear witness to the revelation of 
the Word of God in the Church.74  The revelation of the Word of God, then, is self-
authenticating.   
The way that Barth has moved to this point leads him to set up a series of eight 
conditions for theology to occur if it is to live up to its descriptive task.75  First, he says 
that theology is a positive science that extends and explicates the beliefs of the Church: 
this is its primary task.76  The second condition of theology is that it cannot go beyond its 
limit, which is the belief of the Church.77  Third, he says that all theological statements 
are inadequate expressions of the object of theology—God.  The reason for this is 
because of God’s otherness which shatters any attempt to speak God, even though 
theology, through the revelation of the Word of God, can speak to the positive reality of 
God.78  Stemming from the third, the fourth condition says that there are no final 
statements in theology except those that are set down by biblical authority and mandate.79  
The fifth condition says that theology can make progress but this is only on account of 
God’s wisdom which reveals to humanity certain things when it is good for humanity to 
perceive them.80  The sixth condition of theology says that its ultimate authority lies in 
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scripture in that no theological proposition may contradict the Bible.81  The seventh 
condition for doing theology is that one actually has faith as this is what allows one to 
give knowledge to the faith of the Church.82  The eighth and last condition for theology is 
the connection that exists between theology and prayer.  Following Anselm’s Proslogion, 
Barth says that one prays for two things: first, one prays for God to grant knowledge of 
God83 and, second, one prays that God would instruct one’s heart to see God’s face and 
God’s very self.84  These conditions all point to Barth’s emphasis on the fact that 
theology is an exercise in describing what the Church believes and what it has always 
believed.   
B. Post-Barthian Descriptive Approaches to Theology 
Within the Protestant tradition, Barth sets the agenda for theological thinking 
within the twentieth century.85  The trajectory of Barth’s thinking leads into a number of 
descriptive theologies.  In this section I offer a (brief) account of some of these 
theologies.  The streams dealt with here include that of postliberalism and theological 
aesthetics.  Both of these have been very influential within the Protestant tradition, 
especially in the last twenty-five years.  In what follows, I show how each of these 
streams advance the Barthian thesis that theology is a descriptive enterprise in that it 
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simple comments on the belief of the Church.  These theological streams take this thesis 
further than Barth may have felt comfortable with, but each finds itself in the Barthian 
line.   
1.  Postliberalism 
The first group is that of postliberalism.  Within this group, the account set out 
here will deal with George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine as well as Robert Jenson’s first 
volume of his Systematic Theology.  The choice of Lindbeck is obvious, as it could be 
argued that his The Nature of Doctrine is the foundational text for understanding 
postliberalism.  As well, Lindbeck, along with Hans Frei, is seen as the “founder” of the 
Yale school within theology that is often associated with postliberalism.  Jenson, 
however, is not as obvious.  However, his theology finds itself in the same trajectory with 
a similar thesis to that of Lindbeck—mainly, that theology is “an enterprise of the 
church” and is engaged in Christian self-description.86 
George A. Lindbeck begins the discussion of postliberalism.  For him, postliberal 
theology is defined by its “cultural-linguistic” or regulative approach to the nature of 
doctrine.  Here, Lindbeck sees doctrine through the prism of “rules” that regulate belief 
and life.  He chooses a regulative approach because “[r]ules, unlike propositions or 
expressive symbols, retain an invariant meaning under changing conditions of 
compatibility and conflict.”87  Rules are used because they are invariant as they always 
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apply.  As such, the nature of doctrine is to give a set of rules that place an “invariant 
meaning” at the heart of religion, in this case Christianity.  Part of what this regulative 
approach does to the task of doctrine “is to recommend and exclude certain ranges of—
among other things—propositional utterances or symbolizing activities.”88  Thus, while 
rules may vary from place to place, there are still basic rules at the heart of language.  
The reason that Lindbeck also calls this approach “cultural-linguistic” is because the rules 
that he derives from doctrine are linguistic rules.  As such, religions are like languages 
that regulate what one says and how it can be said.  For Lindbeck, while the experiential 
value may change, the languages are able to maintain a sameness amid various 
transformations that occur through experience and/ or affirmations of certain elements 
that are other to the language.89   
Lindbeck believes that his innovation is the turn to a regulative, cultural-linguistic 
approach to theology.  He says this because he argues that the only “job” that doctrines 
have is to give shape and form to the language of what the church teaches.90  For him, 
this is because doctrines are an example of a second-order discourse within theology.  
These second-order discourses are affirmations of what it means to be Christian rather 
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than first-order accounts of the experiences that give rise to this second order discourse.91  
Lindbeck shows this difference in the nature of theology discourses in his elucidation of 
what takes place at the councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon.  For him, these are second-
order reflections made by the church on the original experience of Jesus as 
communicated by the apostles.  Nicaea and Chalcedon do not speak to that original 
experience but give the form of the language needed to speak “Christianly” about Jesus 
as God.  The doctrines of Nicaea and Chalcedon are, thus, not necessarily tied to the 
conceptual apparatus in which they are communicated.  Instead, the doctrines at the heart 
of these councils are distinguishable from the concepts in which they are communicated 
because one can “state these doctrines in different terms that nevertheless have equivalent 
consequences.”92  As a language, religion is a second discourse that regulates the nature 
of belief. 
Thus, in Lindbeck’s account, “religions are seen as comprehensive interpretive 
schemes, usually embodied in myths or narratives and heavily ritualized, which structure 
human experience and understanding of self and world.”93  As a language, religions give 
meaning to human existence through the structuring of human existence through the 
telling of stories and/ or myths.  In doing so, religions make certain kind of truth claims.  
While a religion may make a claim to some ultimate truth (usually God), Lindbeck 
argues that it is “the conceptual vocabulary and the syntax or inner logic which determine 
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the kind of truth claims the religion can make.”94  The syntax and inner logic of a 
language point the nature of truth at work in this account: Lindbeck embraces an 
intrasystematic approach to truth.  Intrasystematic truth is not limited to either 
epistemological or ontological conceptions of truth.  Something has intrasystematic truth 
when in coheres within a linguistic framework.95  For Lindbeck, theology is descriptive 
when it focuses on intrasystematic truth.  This is because one can only describe what 
happens in the regulative elements of a language, which is what doctrine functions as.  
The theologian describes doctrines with their interconnection with other doctrines in the 
system in which they are put forth.  The theologian simply describes the function of the 
doctrine in its position within a system.96 
The postliberal school of thought continues with the work of Robert Jenson.  
Jenson also begins by placing theology within the realm of a second order discourse.  As 
a second-order discourse, he argues it is best described as being a “grammar.”  This 
theological grammar is spoken by the church.  He says, “The church…is the community 
that speaks Christianese, and theology formulates the syntax and semantics of this 
language.  Doctrinal statements function as accepted rules of proper usage; theological 
opinions of individual theologians or schools are attempts to point out such rules.”97  
Theology is that which shapes the language of the church in its speaking of Christianese.  
As such, theology sets the rules in which doctrines can be used and how they function 
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within the language.  Jenson says that this is a prescriptive activity;98 however, he makes 
no attempt at articulating what the move to grammar prescribes for theology.  In fact, it 
seems that his prescription is to simply keep theology within the realm of the self-
description of the story the church tells about the Triune God.  This is because, for 
Jenson, the primary locus for the formation of Christian grammar is in the narrative of the 
Triune God.  Jenson’s hermeneutic for reading doctrine and the Bible is to see how it 
reflects the story of the Triune God.  The church speaks falsely if it speaks in a way that 
does not cohere to the story that gives rise to the doctrine of the Trinity.  Likewise, the 
church properly speaks when using this story as what regulates its language.99      
The way that the grammar of theological language is formed is through the 
tradition of the apostles.100  In this tradition the church has been given the story of the 
Triune God.  The tradition of theology “depends on the chain of witnesses who have 
brought the news from the first witness to those who now hear.”101  The work of the 
church, partly, is to live within the tradition that has been passed on by these witnesses, 
beginning with the apostles.  The church lives the gospel.  Due to this, the church’s work 
is to live within the tradition that is Christianity while also communicating the gospel to 
others through the various institutions that are constitutive of the church’s life.102  These 
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institutions have been set up through second-order reflection upon the gospel and, so, 
work to point those outside and within to the story of the Triune God.  The story of the 
Triune God is what is perpetuated in and through the tradition.  The apostles 
communicated the story of the God who raised Jesus from the dead as being the same 
God who brought Israel out of Egypt and the same one is continually the hope of 
Israel.103  For the New Testament, the way of identifying God is as the One who raises 
Jesus from the dead and whom Jesus calls “Father.”104  The church tells this story and 
theology develops it through second-order reflection that comes through how the apostles 
bore witness to the life of Jesus.  Thus, within this approach, the way that one reads the 
Bible is through the story of the God revealed in and through Jesus, in that the Old 
Testament is read in light of Jesus’ life and leading to this life while the New Testament 
points to Jesus through the retelling of the story of the Old Testament.105        
The institution that continues to perpetuate the tradition of Christianity is the 
church.  Doctrine resides within the realm of the church, being what Jenson calls 
“churchly instruction.”106  Doctrine is that which instructs the church on how to believe 
and how to act.  The church’s mission is to be responsible for how the gospel is spoken, 
whether that is an apologetic way that brings the message of salvation or within a way 
that brings an appeal and praise to God in worship.  For Jenson, “Theology is the 
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reflection internal to the church’s labor on this assignment.”107  Thus, the church is the 
locus where reflection upon the story of the Triune God, as told through the story of 
Jesus, takes place.  Without the church, there would be no way of perpetuating the 
tradition as it is the church that shapes how the story is told.  The theological reflection 
upon doctrine that occurs in the context of the church gives an inner logic to Christianity 
that is based upon the logic of the story of Jesus.  It is this logic that constructs the 
biblical witness, which is the primary source for theological reflection since the Bible is 
what sets the trajectory for the tradition.  However, for Jenson, one cannot interpret the 
Bible outside of the church because one only learns the inner logic of the Bible within the 
church.  Thus, without the church, there would be no Bible.108 
This brief discussion on postliberalism shows how such a descriptive theology 
works by offering second-order discourse upon the doctrines of the church.  Similarly, 
this theology is interested in constructing theology as a grammar that gives rise to the 
ability to give coherence to the doctrines that construct the grammar.  In light of this 
approach to theology, I make four brief critiques of postliberalism.  The first is that 
postliberalism does not offer any reflection upon the nature of the experience that gives 
rise to the theological reflection that gives rise to the second-order discourse.  Within the 
context of this project I argue that attunement does such.  However, postliberalism seems 
to be content to allow the originary experience that gives rise to theological reflection, 
whether this is in the New Testament or for the theologian working in the twenty-first 
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century, to be assumed.  In so doing postliberalism cannot account for the kind of 
experience which gives rise to the various theological languages.  Without any discussion 
of what actually gives rise to theological reflection, postliberalism does not have any way 
of thinking theological reflection in its originary moment, thus making it difficult to 
account for what kind of discourse arises from this moment. 
The second critique I offer is aimed at postliberalism’s claim to be a prescriptive 
theology.  Within the elucidation of the nature of theology offered by both Lindbeck and 
Jenson, the task of theology is to construct a grammar through reflection upon doctrine 
that makes sense of the Christian language.  Within this proposal, there is a tendency to 
revert to theological reflection as simply repeating what came before.  While Lindbeck 
and Jenson both acknowledge that this repetition takes place in new contexts and 
cultures, for both the goal is still simply the repetition of the Christian grammar.  In my 
view, the implication is that theology has exhausted itself in what it has to say about God 
and, thus, needs to simply repeat.  However, if theology is truly reflection upon God then 
it can never be finished or closed.  Both Lindbeck and Jenson would agree with this 
statement but their theological system implies otherwise. 
The third critique I make is in reference to the idea of an “invariant meaning” at 
the heart of doctrine.109  This is aimed more at Lindbeck than Jenson as Lindbeck is the 
one who argues that an exposition of Nicaea and Chalcedon must retain that “invariant 
meaning” at heart of the doctrines while changing cultural contexts.  The critiqued 
offered here is twofold.  First, can there be such a thing as an “invariant meaning”?  What 
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does this look like?  The meaning of Nicaea and Chalcedon, even within the contexts in 
which they took place, never was established definitively—which is why the church still 
needed more councils to think through the issues that were not settled here if they were 
settled at all.  By pointing to an “invariant meaning”, Lindbeck implies that there is some 
kernel that must be kept safe within these reflections.  This leads to the second critique of 
an attempt at invariant meaning.  While Lindbeck wants to keep this kernel of truth, the 
problem arises as to whether this kernel changes as it is placed within new contexts and 
cultural situations.  Lindbeck wants to argue that the “invariant meaning” stays, even 
when one strips away the Greek metaphysical assumptions at work in Nicaea and 
Chalcedon.  However, as soon as one does this, the kernel of truth is placed in a new 
form or context and this begins to change the way that that the kernel is thought.  This is 
because, as this project will intimate, the kernel of truth is never fixed but always opening 
up further possibilities to be explored.    
The last critique made here has to do with the way that the church functions 
within the thought of postliberalism.  For Lindbeck and Jenson, the church is the 
beginning and end of theological reflection because the church is the place that holds the 
inner logic and syntax which is used in the grammar of Christianity.  The problems with 
this are multifaceted.  First, this begs the question as to what constitutes the church and 
what constitutes the church logic.  Since both theologians are Protestant, they should be 
aware of the fractured nature of the church and that there is no “Church” as it is now 
constituted.  They seem to believe in one unified reality that is “Church.”  In reality, there 
are only “churches” and this is not taken into account.  In the same vein, they never say 
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why it is that theological reflection cannot take place outside of the church.  If one stays 
with the idea of grammar, one can learn the various grammars that exist outside of one’s 
home grammar.  One can even learn to live within it even though it is not one’s own 
grammar.  Similarly, it seems possible for some to reflect on Christianity who do not 
believe themselves part of the church.  Also, the church is the regulative authority that 
constitutes the Christian grammar.  If one takes into account the nature of grammar and 
language, however, there is no authority except how it is used and how it then changes, 
how words come and go as well as how their meanings change.  If this is the case, the 
church’s attempt to control how doctrine functions is futile as one cannot control 
something as amorphous as grammar.     
2.  Theological Aesthetics 
The next approach to thinking theologically taken up here is that of aesthetic 
theologies.110  These theologies look to forms from the world of the arts as ways of 
thinking theologically.  While there are many theologians who do this, the following 
exposition focuses on two.  The first is Kevin Vanhoozer who uses drama to think about 
what it means to think God.  He believes that the form of drama gives him a 
hermeneutical lens through which to approach the various sources used for thinking God, 
primarily Scripture.  The second theologian is Jeremy Begbie, who turns to the form of 
Western, classical music.  His approach uses various musical pieces and ideas to think 
through the nature of God. 
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Let us begin with Kevin Vanhoozer.  He offers a proposal for what he terms a 
theo-dramatic approach to theology.111  In this approach “the task of theology is to ensure 
that we fit into the action so that we are following rather than opposing Jesus Christ.”112  
For Vanhoozer, this follows from the idea that Christianity is not about morals or a 
system of beliefs, but is a “five-act theo-drama in which God’s speech and action play the 
decisive parts.”  The first three scenes refer to the passion, Easter and resurrection, while 
the church as currently constituted is the fourth.  The eschaton would be the fifth.113  This 
means that at this moment, the fourth act is being “acted out” so that theology is 
constantly being constructed.  This construction of what it means to think theologically 
focuses on constructing what he calls a “canonical-linguistic” theology, which he sees as 
moving the focus from ecclesial practices (as in the cultural-linguist model of Lindbeck) 
to that of Scripture.  The canonical-linguistic model, for Vanhoozer, ensures that 
theology follows the revelation of Jesus Christ through the knowledge of the speech and 
action of God.   
Scripture is the primary source for thinking theologically in the canonical-
linguistic approach.  This is because Scripture is a source that helps to form the 
theologian—and the church—to be able to have knowledge of the speech and action of 
God.  For Vanhoozer, the reason that there is a focus on being formed through the canon 
of Scripture is because Scripture is the “result of God’s communicative work” and, thus, 
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shares in the perfections of God without being the same substance.114  Vanhoozer 
summarizes his approach when he says, “Theology relates to Scripture for encountering 
God in communicative action and for being communicants with Jesus Christ.”115  As 
God’s communicative work, Scripture “is to be obeyed and trusted, but not 
worshiped.”116  This is because Scripture is the place where God offers a “theologically 
thick description of Jesus Christ.”  Through this thick description, God invites the 
believer(s) to respond so that this thick description is transferred to the human as one is 
related to Christ.117  The bible’s goal is to create a covenantal relationship offered by God 
to humanity through the multi-faceted communicative action that occurs here.118  In this, 
God is “the doer, the essential content, and the dynamic effect of the diverse speech-acts 
that make up the Bible.”119  A canonical-linguistic approach to theology focuses on 
Scripture because this is the place to see God at work.   
Thus, Vanhoozer has placed Scripture at the heart of his theological endeavor.  
The issue now becomes how one interprets.  Vanhoozer posits that the analogy best 
available for thinking through the canonical-linguistic approach is that of drama.  He 
looks to drama because he views doctrine as the director, teaching people to rightly 
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participate in the drama of redemption through covenant.  Doctrine also assumes that 
“one can participate rightly only if one has an adequate understanding of what the drama 
is all about.”120  One must be able to make theological and creedal statements that are 
able to be traced back to their relationship with the Bible.121  Vanhoozer looks to drama 
because its central component is concerned with performance, and specifically the 
construction of an adequate performance of a piece.  He also turns to drama because of 
current theories’ focus on the active role of the audience.122   
There are three consequences of this for Vahnoozer: first, a reinvigoration of 
theological imagination;123 second, an ability to see one’s daily life as full of “tension and 
urgency,” giving great importance to the day-to-day; and, third, a renewed vision of 
biblical authority in terms of performance, where interpretation is action and acting is 
interpretation.124 This view of the drama of doctrine is both passive and active, engaging 
one in contemplation and active participation.125  Vanhoozer reinforces his understanding 
of theology as consistently trying to rethink itself in a new context while being faithful to 
the “script” of the bible.126   
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For Vanhoozer, what is needed then is to improvise the gospel faithfully in new 
cultures by being able to offer a contextualization of the gospel in new places and times.  
This leads him to the conclusion that theology embraces a “polyphonic truth” because 
Scripture’s engagement with reality comes in different ways, embracing a variety of 
forms of theological truth.127  This comes from the multiplicity of forms at work in 
Scripture which render reality in different ways.128  Some forms are better 
communicators of certain content while other forms are better with other content.  This 
number of Scriptural forms could result in a number of different ways of acting out the 
gospel.129  For Vanhoozer, the goal is always to produce a “script” for the drama of 
theology that is faithful to the canonical witness by seeing and tasting “everything about a 
situation that is theologically relevant.”130  The construction of Christian doctrine is the 
means whereby this is possible.131  This is because doctrine can improvise certain 
judgments about content while still being tied to the canonical script.  Thus, for 
Vanhoozer, doctrine is the central theological form because it offers a faithful witness to 
the canonical script. 
Jeremy Begbie continues in a similar vein to that of Vanhoozer by seeking an 
analogy for theology in an art form; however, Begbie finds the most adequate art form for 
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thinking God to be music.  Begbie finds in music a place where a form of questioning can 
occur which allows one to connect to the broader culture.  His goal is to connect music to 
the gospel so that through the turn to music he can allow the gospel to affect the broader 
world.132  He connects the two by turning to orientation as a way of thinking.  For him, 
thinking theologically begins from a certain orientation that the theologian possesses, 
where being rightly oriented leads to thinking God correctly.  He says, first, that the goal 
of theology is lived knowledge, or wisdom.  This wisdom comes through a lifestyle that 
is “in tune” with God by living in a way that “resonates” with the intentions of the 
Creator.133  The result is an orientation of the theologian as one who is turned towards 
God.  Theology’s truthfulness lies in this orientation toward God and not in a proposition 
or system.134  The way that he thinks theologically, then, is through an analysis of the 
various ways that a turn to music is able to reorient one’s thinking around certain 
Christian doctrines, most notably that of creation.135 
Begbie outlines how he sees music and theology interacting through what he 
terms a “cosmological viewpoint.”  This is in contrast to what much of contemporary 
theology has done, which he argues begins from an “anthropological viewpoint.”136  He 
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turns to some of the earliest philosophies of music in order to begin to think through this 
cosmological viewpoint, most notably those produced by Pythagoras and the Neo-
Platonists.  First, he takes from Pythagoras the idea that at the center of the universe is a 
harmony brought through a ratio that gives the universe rationality.  He continues his 
engagement with Pythagoras by taking up the idea that the mind can catch this 
rationality.  Begbie says that one way this is mediated to humanity is through music.137  
Within this view, to be someone who played or understood music was to be one who was 
attuned to the rationality—or harmony—of the universe.138  After Pythagoras, he turns to 
the Neo-Platonists.  From them he extends Pythagoras’ idea that the universe has an 
inherent harmony through its rationality by showing that the Neo-Platonists use this 
concept to address how it is that the soul can move through an ascent to God.  Begbie 
argues that for the Neo-Platonists the chief aim of the inherent beauty and rationalization 
of the universe is for the soul’s ascent to God.  The ascent of the soul, for Begbie, occurs 
because God is perfect harmony and beauty and all music in the world comes from 
God.139  The soul that has tuned into the rationality and harmony of the world is the one 
able to ascend to God.   
Drawing from this approach to God, Begbie articulates a way of understanding 
the whole cosmos as harmonious.  He develops this understanding through an analysis of 
various pre-modern understandings of the philosophy of music.  This leads Begbie to 
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argue that for a theology to be “musical” it should understand what kind of cosmos a 
music may lead it toward thinking.  Turning to Bach, Begbie shows that his music has 
certain theological resonances and that it opens possibilities for thinking theologically.  
There are two major reasons Begbie finds this within Bach.  First, he turns to Bach’s 
music as a way of understanding creation as a gift of love directly from God.  Begbie 
uses this statement to counter the “philosophical schemes” which say that God first 
creates ideals and forms and then goes on to actually do the creation.  Second, he wants 
to follow David Bentley Hart in grounding the doctrine of creation in the Trinity.  He 
does so by saying that that the creation is a place where the music of the Trinity rings 
eternally throughout the creation.  This “stimulates” one to have a certain vision of the 
cosmos where it “reflects and shares in the life and love of the Triune God.”140  The 
imaginative construction is one where all of the creation dwells in God and resonates the 
music of God.  For Begbie, the result of his musical approach theology is a preferencing 
of the doctrine of creation as a way to think theologically.141   
There are three problems with the move to art forms brought forward by 
Vanhoozer and Begbie.  The first is that both put forward doctrine as the central, and 
somewhat dominating, form for thinking theology.  In doing so, they mitigate the 
multiplicity of other forms available for thinking theologically, whether they be aesthetic 
forms—like literature, sculpture, or movies and photography—or explicitly theological—
like liturgy, narrative, or homiletics, among others.  For both, doctrine is the form for 
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doing theology.  This is because doctrine gives content to the form of belief they are 
endorsing.  The problem is that both choose art forms that are not content driven, but 
evocative.  The goal of both drama and music is to evoke, not to give an explanation of 
reality.  Thus, the art forms they choose become secondary to what they really want to 
talk about, which is doctrinal constructions and methodological issues.142  One can see 
this in Vanhoozer’s over-emphasis on the place of doctrine in the canonical-linguistic 
approach as well as in Begbie’s choice of theologians and composers—he does not 
choose theologians who do not talk about music and does not choose composers who are 
not in some way religious.143   
A second critique I make is of their account of how one knows God.  For both, 
there is an implicit assumption that one simply knows God and that this is necessary to do 
theology.  Vanhoozer says that one needs to know the speech and action of God in 
Scripture, while Begbie says that one has to know that rhythm and harmony of God.  
Neither one makes the case for how this knowledge is possible.  Vanhoozer scans over 
the issues regarding the interpretation of Scripture, seeming to suggest the need for a 
“pure” interpretation.  The problem is that this is not possible.  Even when one 
acknowledges these hermeneutical issues, there still exists the problem of how Scripture 
relays knowledge of God.  Vanhoozer wants to avoid propositional accounts of knowing, 
but does not make the case for how knowing God in and through Scripture occurs.  In a 
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similar manner, Begbie extends how one knows God to include creation, but does not 
make the case for how one can actually know God in Scripture or in creation.  It is 
always assumed that this is possible and necessary.  In the absence of such an account, 
though, their approaches to theology become quite problematic because there is no 
originary moment that gives rise to theological thinking. 
Lastly, a critique of Vanhoozer’s sole focus on Scripture is important.  
Vanhoozer’s project of canonical-linguistic theology is meant to counter the focus on 
ecclesial practices in the cultural-linguistic approach by turning the focus back to 
Scripture.  However, he focuses exclusively on Scripture to the detriment of other 
traditional, theological resources.  In so doing, Vanhoozer gives the implication that the 
only way God communicates with people is through Scripture; however, this would place 
a major limit on God as well as ignore the very nature of God in Scripture to 
communicate with God’s people in more than ways than through the written text.  He 
wants to view Scripture as a “canonical script” and tie doctrinal reflection to this.  But, in 
so doing, he never explains what events give rise to the script that offers the revelation of 
God in Scripture—is it the kerygma?  The acts of the drama?  What events are primary 
and which ones are secondary?  He also fails to acknowledge the fact that part of the 
nature of Scripture is its place as a product of the tradition.  This all undercuts 
Vanhoozer’s account by showing that theology is more than just commentary on 
Scripture or the church, but needs to take into account a number of issues.      
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C. The Prescriptive Approach of this Project 
The previous sections have given an implicit understanding of a prescriptive 
approach to thinking theologically while offering a critique of two contemporary 
versions.  This section examines three concepts that are important to the argument I make 
in the rest of the project: attunement, improvisation, and form.  Throughout the project, I 
make use of these concepts extensively.  Thus, it is important to give a cursory 
understanding of these in order to enter into the argument of this project.  This will also 
help one gain an initial understanding as to the prescriptive approach to theological 
thinking put forward in this project. 
The most used and important term in the project is “attunement.”  The idea of 
attunement is at the center of the argument that follows.  I make the case that the 
originary moment that gives rise to thinking is that of attunement.  This term is explored 
significantly in the next two chapters through an analysis of Martin Heidegger’s proposal 
for thinking and Jacques Derrida’s approach to interpretation through deconstruction.  
The initial use of the idea, though, is religious, in that it talks of one’s attunement to the 
Wholly Other.  This is why it is important here to take up the thought of the Jewish 
theologian Michael Fishbane and his analysis of attunement in Sacred Attunement: A 
Jewish Theology.144    
Fishbane’s account of attunement is rooted in musical terminology.  Most 
notably, he utilizes the idea of rhythm to convey how one is tuned in.  He says that when 
one notices the inherent rhythms within one’s world, one is able to discover various 
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patterns and possibilities that are available through one’s doing and hearing.  Being 
attuned to the world means understanding the place of the self in relation to the rest of the 
world, building relationships through the use of right words and gestures, or repairing 
these relationships through conciliatory language and gestures.  Fishbane sees attunement 
as focusing on one’s interaction with all things, saying, “In short, the vast phenomenal 
world is the setting for ongoing interactions between the private self and the many public 
happenings we encounter from moment to moment.”145  This interaction is not limited to 
the outside world alone.  Fishbane also extends attunement to how one is able to interpret 
a text, most notably Scripture.  He says that the ability to be attuned to a text comes from 
the interaction one develops with it and how this leads one to become aware of the 
various rhythms and pace at work in the text.146  In doing this, he shows the place of 
attunement as that which puts one in relation with the other (or Wholly Other).  
He furthers the understanding of attunement by turning to what he sees as two 
moments of attunement in the life of Moses.  The first moment of attunement in Moses is 
a personal event where becomes awakened from the “mindlessness of habitude.”147  This 
awakening happens because God’s call and voice interrupt his life, telling him to leave 
his family business of being a shepherd.  Instead, God calls Moses to lead the people, 
which is something that is outside of the realm of possibility for Moses.  God is calling 
Moses out of the depths of his human consciousness to enter into the possibilities 
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available to God.148  This models the attunement that takes place in the covenant, as this 
is a personal covenant that God makes with Moses.  God promises Moses that “I [God] 
shall be.”  In saying this, God is saying that God will be there and available to Moses and 
the people that Moses leads.149  This is only possible through the attunement that takes 
place in the personal covenant between God and Moses.  Attunement is exemplified 
when, later, Fishbane says, “Without ever denying one’s natural self, the self of covenant 
theology tries to be ready to hear and do whatever the moment demands—with a heart 
and mind cultivated by a tradition of value and a life of thoughtfulness.”150  Moses is the 
example to follow. 
The second moment of attunement in Moses’ life is in the communal event of 
God’s call to Moses and Moses’ subsequent speaking to the people.  The logic at work in 
Moses’ speech is that of “if…then.”  Moses tells the people that if they follow God, then 
God will be with them.151  This is a communal call to all of Israel.  The entire nation has 
been brought into a covenant with God that is based upon this “if…then.”152  Israel must 
be attentive to the covenant by following the way that God proposes.  The laws that God 
gives are meant to give a religious shape to people’s lives by structuring the being of the 
world and their interaction with it.  In this covenant, God “shall be” and will continue to 
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be with the people.  In being with the people, God continues to develop and revise the 
structure of the community in response to the people.153  The people need to act in line 
with this covenant in order to be God’s people.     
   Through the examples at work in the life of Moses one can see how attunement 
works.  For Fishbane, attunement consists of “becoming aware.”  In this one realizes that 
the world is not a static, fixed place.  Rather, it is a dynamic happening that one knows 
through the irruptive and caesural event that is the contingency of worldly existence.  
Attunement to the world is becoming aware of this contingency and seeing the irruptions 
and caesura that make existence contingent.154  This allows Fishbane to bring the 
metaphor of music to bear on his understanding of attunement.  He says, “Music is thus a 
training in attentive hearing, a cultivation of a certain mindfulness.”155  The “becoming 
aware” of attunement allows one to hear attentively.  As well, attunement seeks to 
cultivate a certain type of person by allowing one to be mindful of one’s interaction with 
the world.  This is because a large part of attunement is the cultivation of a self who is 
capable of being attuned to the other however that other may come.156  Part of this 
cultivation of the attuned self is the development of one’s ability to listen with attention 
and humility.157  Fishbane believes that this cultivation of an aware, mindful, listening 
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person is what prefigures theology by showing the interaction between the Other and the 
world.158       
Fishbane’s discussion to this point paints attunement as a mostly passive concept.  
However, he and this project see attunement as a passive-active idea.  The active part of 
attunement comes in the response.  While attunement does involve listening and hearing 
and taking in the other, it also actively engages the other through listening and 
responding.  Responsiveness is a necessary part of what it means to be attuned.159  
Fishbane brings out the responsive element of attunement in his discussion of how one is 
attuned to a text.  He argues that the attunement to a text is not only one’s patient 
attentiveness but also the active subjugation of the self to the text in the formation of an 
interpersonal relationship where one picks up on the nature and work of the characters 
and themes in the text.160  One is attuned to the text in the interpersonal relationship that 
is formed with the text.  This allows the ability to respond by carrying out the action that 
the text points to.161  The responsiveness of attunement comes in the transformation of 
the self.  For Fishbane, in relation to one’s interpretation of religion, the attunement of 
one to God calls the person to become like God, being a Giver of Life, doing mercy, 
embodying a living theology that responds as one cultivated by God.162 
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Fishbane’s discussion of attunement begins to lead into the type of thinking that is 
involved in this project.  It seeks ways of thinking that are passive-active in their desire to 
listen, hear, become aware, be mindful, as well as respond and be transformed.  All of 
this goes into the thinking that the theological proposal that follows will embrace.  I find 
improvisation as a concept that helps to think theology in this way.  Unlike Vanhoozer 
and Begbie, I do not propose art forms that merely reinforce certain doctrinal positions.  
My thesis is that theology is improvisation in that it is concerned with attunement and the 
way that thinking proceeds from there.  Thus, the second concept that is important to 
begin to describe is that of “improvisation.”   
Gary Peters’ The Philosophy of Improvisation163 provides a helpful guide to 
understand the way that improvisation is being used in this project.  His helpfulness 
comes through his use of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, among other continental 
philosophers, to think through the nature of improvisation.  In doing so, his project shares 
many affinities with the current project.  However, there is a twofold difference.  First, 
Peters is engaged in philosophical analysis while mine is a theological proposal.  Second, 
the current project uses the idea of attunement to think the nature of improvisation.  In so 
doing, my project offers a point of connection between theology and improvisation by 
arguing for their shared way of thinking in attunement.  Peters fails to develop such a 
point of connection between philosophy and improvisation.  Due to this, Peters’ account 
tends push the very limits of his ability to think improvisation because he has not 
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explored the share ways of thinking in improvisation and philosophy.  This is a limitation 
to his otherwise helpful proposal. 
However, Peters’ work shares many similarities to my argument.  The first such 
similarity is that improvisation is a way of thinking that avoids closure.  In so doing, its 
way of thinking texts or pieces of music is constantly concerned with transforming them 
to be heard or read otherwise and anew.  Peters points to the fact that it is difficult for an 
improviser to bring together a beginning and an end to an improvisation.  The problem 
comes because the form of improvisation resists closing and, yet, the improviser needs to 
“end.”  The result is not a final end but an end that simply delays the piece until it is 
picked up again.  For Peters, part of the task of the improviser is to protect “the 
homelessness of the productive imagination from the conceptual structures that would 
limit its play.”164  The work has an “incessant self-interruption that constantly opens [it] 
to another beginning and another…”165  Thus, the improvised work is one that gives itself 
to be interrupted and begun anew always.  This leads to the work’s resistance to any form 
of closure.     
The second shared similarity is how one liberates a piece of work as a basis for 
improvisation; this allows a piece to be improvised upon by someone.  For Peters, the 
way that one liberates a piece is to free it from “the cramped intentionality of the singular 
artist.”  In so doing, the improviser ensures the “presence of the origin in the unfolding of 
the work.”166  Peters points to the fact that the author no longer dominates a piece within 
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an improvisation.  However, the improvisation still wants to capture the original moment 
that allowed the work to be produced and to be repeated.  Thus, the improviser works 
with what is given in order to allow it to be heard otherwise.  The piece cannot be 
contained wholly within the life of the author but is freed to do something different.  An 
improvisation does not just rehash what has been given in a piece but seeks to interrupt it.  
In so doing, the improvisation produces difference within the piece.167  The improviser 
looks to create difference by exploring the piece for the otherness at work within it.  This 
creates tension within the performing of the piece and opens various caesuras to be 
explored within the piece.168  This all contributes to the way that a piece is opened to be 
improvised upon.    
The third shared similarity between Peters and this project is the way that the 
interaction between saying something “new” and being faithful to a tradition occurs.  The 
question of how one is faithful to the original piece while interpreting it in new ways is at 
the heart of improvisation.  Peters argues that improvisation is a way of mediating the old 
and the new through “entwinement and entanglement.” 169  For him, this means that in 
order to say something new in an improvisation one must rely on the old piece while 
attempting to repeat the old piece almost always results in doing something new with it. 
Peters says, “It is not so much working together to make something new out of the old 
but, rather, the more solitary act of ‘standing-within’ the old, occupying it in such a way 
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that its own opening onto being or ‘thrust into the Open’ is preserved.”170  Thus, the 
interpretation of the old in the improvisation actually leads to new things if one allows 
the piece to always be open for exploration.  Peters describes this further by pointing to 
the fact that improvisation is involved in the interplay between destruction and 
reconstruction.  He argues that the improvisation finds the new in what has been obscured 
by the old.  Thus, a reconstruction takes place through the destruction of the piece by 
mining what the old is obscuring.  The reconstruction results in new ways of hearing and 
playing the piece.171  
The question of improvisation opens up the issue of what form(s) gives itself to 
being improvised upon.  In order to explore this question within the context of the 
project, it is first necessary to gain an initial understanding of the idea of form.  In order 
to do so, the last section takes up the account of form at work in Catherine Malabou’s The 
Plasticity of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction.172  Within a discussion of 
this work, one can gain an understanding of the malleable nature of form and how this 
opens possibilities for theology. 
Malabou’s thought revolves around her development of the idea of “plasticity.”  
For her, plasticity refers to the “spontaneous organization of fragments.”173  The model 
she uses for this process is the way that the human nervous system organizes data.  She 
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says that the way that the brain takes in data and the way that various biological 
mechanisms function open ways of thinking about how humans interpret and organize 
information.  She says this because these mechanisms are places that collect and gather 
seemingly disparate information and organize it.  In an experience, the person takes in 
multiple sources of sensory data through the senses that are fragments of the experience.  
The brain wants to make this experience intelligible in some way.  In order to do so, the 
brain gives some organization to these fragments, but it could change depending on how 
the brain orders and reorders the data.174  For Malabou, plasticity is best viewed “as a 
structure of transformation and destruction of the presence and the present.”175  It pays 
attention to the self-deconstruction of forms and texts through this spontaneous 
organization.  She says that plasticity, as a form of reading, is based upon a text’s own 
deconstruction.  She argues that a “plastic reading of a text is the reading that seeks to 
reveal the form left in the text through the withdrawing of presence, that is, through its 
own deconstruction.”176  The plastic reading defies the logic of presence by allowing that 
exteriority of the text that cannot be interiorized as signification to come to the fore.  
Plasticity “is the condition of meaning” that looks for this exterior other in the fragments 
of a text or way of thinking and the subsequent organization and reorganization of 
these.177       
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Malabou’s thinking on plasticity opens an analogous way of thinking form.  
Within a plastic approach to various phenomena, the way that form functions is quite 
important.  The deconstruction that she wants to allow is based upon the plasticity of 
form.  In saying this, however, she wants to undo the forms that dominate a discourse, 
text, or way of thinking.  She argues that in order to find the exterior to a text one needs 
to exceed the form that the text is in.  But, for her, form cannot be undone unless one 
calls on the “support of form.”  The plasticity of form allows for the exceeding of form 
and also its convertibility into other forms or ways of thinking.178  For her, “The structure 
or form of thought—the alterity of philosophy to both its tradition and its own 
destruction—is both the specter of its history and the outline of something within it that is 
not yet born, something innate in the true sense.”179  Thus, the possibilities inherent to a 
form include the entire history of how it has been used along with the ways that it has not 
been used but are part of the nature of form.  Thus, for Malabou, form disrupts and 
transgresses itself.  This is what gives way to “trans-formation,” which she believes 
opens the depth of a new referentiality or another body in both the structure and in its 
dislocation.”180  The form is ultimately something that exceeds itself through its own 
fragmentation and continued dislocation.  This opens up new and various possibilities 
inherent to the form. 
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D. Conclusion: The Outline of the Argument 
The discussion of attunement, improvisation, and form work as an entry point into 
the way that the argument that follows will proceed.  These terms are basic to the nature 
of the argument.  I make my argument by first offering an analysis of attunement through 
the philosophical resources I find in the work of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.  
Then I connect my analysis of the philosophers with the way of thinking in 
improvisation.  By doing this, I construct a way of thinking that is predicated upon the 
notion of attunement.  In the last part of the project, I show how theological thinking as 
attunement ultimately leads to the fragmentation and dislocation of form in theology.  
The result is a way of thinking theologically that is, at its core, improvisational as it is in 
a mode similar to that of the jazz musician improvising upon a piece. 
The first part of this project outlines an understanding of attunement through an 
engagement with the philosophers Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.  The first 
chapter offers an account of Heidegger’s Destruktion of Western metaphysics.  The 
current proposal outlines how this “destructive” way of thinking relies on and leads to a 
new understanding of attunement.  The chapter makes its argument through three 
sections.  The first section follows Heidegger in his attempt to pursue a path that reorients 
the nature of thinking.  The way he does this is to critique metaphysics as onto-
theological.  He then says that thinking begins with one’s disposition.  This leads him to 
the step back, which is dealt with in the second section.  In the step back, Heidegger 
argues that what is needed for thinking is a step back out of metaphysics.  He makes this 
argument by embracing the path of thinking that was first pursued by the Pre-Socratic 
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Greek thinkers.  He also shows how onto-theological metaphysics ends up closing 
thinking.  The last section of the argument of the chapter analyzes how Heidegger 
understands thinking as attunement.  This section follows the progression of Heidegger’s 
thought on attunement from Being and Time to What is Philosophy?.  Through this 
analysis, one can see the centrality of attunement for thinking rightly.  This chapter clears 
the conceptual ground which this project will traverse along with beginning to shape an 
understanding of attunement. 
The second chapter continues this train of thought developed in Heidegger by 
turning to Jacques Derrida.  I argue that Derrida’s notion of deconstruction is predicated 
upon attunement.  This is justified in the chapter by arguing that Derrida always seeks to 
open a text to the other and that in doing so, one becomes attuned to the other to interpret 
otherwise.  This chapter makes its argument in four steps.  The first outlines the idea of 
deconstruction as attunement through an analysis of the use of “rhythm” within Derrida’s 
corpus, most notably Psyche and “Différance.”  In this section, I argue that Derrida’s idea 
of reading is predicated upon one finding and being in rhythm with the text.  Finding this 
rhythm is predicated upon attunement.  The second section turns to the idea of hospitality 
in Derrida and how he uses this to further his understanding of attunement.  For Derrida, 
hospitality is attunement because of its concern to be for the other, welcoming the other.  
This welcome is only able to occur if one is attuned to the other.  Thus, hospitality is built 
upon attunement.  It is this hospitality that allows one to be aware of the deconstruction 
taking place in texts.  The third section deals with Derrida’s notion of translation.  
Translation is the outcome of one’s attunement as it not only welcomes the other but also 
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wants to speak with the other.  Translation transforms a text and risks an interpretation, 
one which may be inaccurate.  However, for Derrida, deconstruction must translate as 
this is part and parcel of what happens in interpretation.  The chapter on Derrida further 
solidifies the understanding of attunement at work within this project as well as 
projecting the way that the argument will take place in the final three chapters. 
The third chapter focuses on expanding the understanding of attunement through 
an analysis of improvisation in Western forms of music.  In doing so, the chapter shows 
how attunement is the way of thinking practiced in improvisation.  The first section of the 
chapter focuses on the importance of listening for attunement and improvisational music.  
Listening is the central practice at the heart of attunement because it is both passive and 
active, allowing one to not only take in but also respond.  Listening also keeps open the 
possibilities available for thinking.  The second section of the chapter deals with the way 
attunement works in music through the interaction that occurs between piece and 
musician, musician and tradition, musician and other musicians, and musician and 
audience.  In order for improvisation to occur, attunement must be at the heart of each 
one of these relationships.  The third section makes the case that improvisation is 
concerned with transformation through the breaking of musical form.  This idea follows 
the thought of Derrida in the previous chapter by arguing that interpretation requires 
translation or transformation of the form.  Improvisation does this through the move to 
not allow closure, never ending a piece.  Improvisation leads to the piece always being 
heard anew in different ways through different contexts and situations.  This chapter, 
61 
 
then, offers a way of thinking that is based upon attunement through listening, with the 
result being a transformation of a piece.    
The fourth chapter focuses on the work of David Tracy.  This chapter begins by 
outlining Tracy’s overall project of thinking theology as conversation.  In doing so, Tracy 
believes that he is able to counter two problems that be thinks plague theology: the 
problem of totality and that of plurality.  By turning to conversation Tracy puts forward a 
way of thinking that is able to deal with both problems: first, a conversation is never 
closed so it should not slip into a totalizing form; and, second, a conversation includes a 
plurality of voices.  The next section of the chapter examines how it is that Tracy thinks 
and names God.  Focusing on his later work, the chapter turns to his recent interest the 
form of fragments.  Tracy’s use of the form of fragments helps theology think God in a 
way that is non-totalizing as well as in a way that deals with the plurality of forms 
available for thinking God.  The third section shows how Tracy deals with the plurality of 
forms.  In order to think through how one goes about bringing various forms for thinking 
theologically together, he turns to the idea of the gathering.  The gathering is the place 
where disparate discourses and forms can come together and critique each other while 
still being together.  This turn to the gathering leads to the fourth section of the chapter.  
This section uses the gathering to show the importance of ethics within Tracy’s thought.  
In a manner similar to Derrida, Tracy offers an ethics of resistance.  This chapter 
ultimately shows the need in theology for a non-totalizing discourse and a thinking of 
forms for naming and thinking God that are based upon the fragment. 
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 The last chapter focuses on Augustine of Hippo.  The uptake of Augustine is to 
show how he sees the necessity of multiple forms to think and name God.  The three 
forms dealt with in this chapter are music in De Musica, rhetoric in De Doctrina 
Christiana, and narrative/ autobiography in Confessions.  The first section of the chapter 
outlines his use of music in constructing his theology.  The importance of music to him is 
that it offers a way of viewing the world and God’s interaction with the world.  The 
second section deals with the rhetoric he puts forward in De Doctrina Christiana.  This 
text shows the importance of one’s disposition and orientation for thinking theologically.  
In this text, Augustine shows the necessity of attunement to God to do theology.  He 
thinks this through a hermeneutic of love.  The last section deals with the use of narrative 
and autobiography in Confessions.  In this text, Augustine uses narrative to unstructure 
any forms that dominate thinking on God.  He does this through a meditation upon how 
God creates by giving form, but consistently stays formless.  In so doing, Augustine 
shows the unstructured form of theology.  In his use of multiple discourses, Augustine 
shows the need for theology to engage a multiplicity of ways of thinking God, with no 
“one” way dominating in order to think God in a way that actually correlates to the belief 
in God.
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CHAPTER ONE:  
HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF THINKING 
The first chapter of this project outlines the way of thinking that will be pursued 
in the following project through an analysis of the thought of Martin Heidegger.  The 
project finds in Heidegger someone who articulates a path to understand what it means to 
think,1 especially to think God.2  Heidegger’s account of thinking leads this project into a 
more originary ground for the type of thinking that occurs in theology.  Heidegger offers 
this unique position because through his critique of philosophy he shows the way to first 
think the origins of thinking from their very roots while, second, pursuing a line of 
thinking that grows organically from these roots. 3  The focus of the chapter will be on his 
account of the Destruktion of metaphysics as it is broadly laid out in his text What is 
Philosophy?4  This text offers the insight necessary to understand how attunement stands 
                                                 
1
 “To think” here is a phenomenological term that refers to the intuition that begins thinking about 
something, the pre-understanding and subsequent thinking through that occurs.  Dominique Janicaud says, 
“In order to think, one must break away from ‘evidence’ that objectifies every noetic correlate into an 
object of representation.”  Janicaud also encourages the idea of “free play” at work in Heidegger’s thought 
so that the philosopher thinks instead of represents.  See Dominique Janicaud, “Heideggeriana,” trans. 
Michael Gendre in Dominique Janicaud and Jean-Francois Mattéi, Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 29.  
 
2
 Here, a brief listing of both philosophers and theologians who use Heidegger to think religion 
would include the likes of Karl Rahner, Paul Ricoeur, David Tracy, John D. Caputo, Mark C. Taylor, 
Thomas Carlson, and Charles Winquist, to name but a few.  
 
3
 This is not to articulate a foundationalism or, even, an anti-foundational foundationalism.  As 
will become clear in what follows, the goal here is to get back into the originary ground of thinking, which 
is found in the term “attunement.”  John D. Caputo echoes this sentiment and metaphor in his The Mystical 
Element in Heidegger’s Thought (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978), 57. 
 
64 
 
at the center of thinking.  My analysis of Heidegger offers both a critique of onto-
theological thinking while laying a (non)foundation for the kind of thinking that I believe 
should take place within theology.  
The path (weg) of the chapter consists of three steps.  The first is to follow 
Heidegger’s Destruktion of philosophy through an internal critique which opens the path 
for thinking to take.  Second, it follows Heidegger in analyzing how the “step back” 
contributes to a reconstitution of the nature of thinking through his account of the 
ontological difference between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiende).  Lastly, Heidegger 
shows that to think Being as the ground of thinking, one must be attuned to Being.  From 
this argument, the chapter broadly accomplishes the following: first, it shows the critique 
of onto-theology5 by Heidegger and how this opens the possibilities for thinking;6 
second, it begins to outline what is meant by attunement in the project; third, the chapter 
gives a preliminary understanding of multiple terms which articulate attunement, like 
Destruktion, Befindlichkeit, Bestimmung, dia-logue and thinking-through; and lastly the 
chapter shows how the orientation to musical forms taken up in subsequent chapters 
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opens through Heidegger’s thinking.  Thus, this chapter sets the trajectory for how the 
rest of the project will articulate how theology is “improvisation.” 
A.  Pursuing the Path of Thinking 
There is an initial problem when one begins to think one’s thinking: one is already 
involved in whatever it is that one tries to think.  Thinking thinking is aporetic.  
Heidegger offers a way to navigate the aporia through an embrace of the problem.  By 
embracing the aporia of thinking Heidegger opens a path to pursue a more originary 
thinking that is the ground upon which one thinks.  For Heidegger the way to the ground 
of thinking is through an internal critique of philosophy.   
The internal critique that Heidegger performs is a Destruktion of Western 
metaphysics.  This Destruktion of philosophy begins by asking the question “what is 
philosophy?”  He says that “the aim of [the] question is to enter into philosophy, to tarry 
in it, to conduct ourselves in its manner, that is, ‘to philosophize.’”7  The path for asking 
the question of philosophy takes the form of an internal critique of philosophy through 
doing philosophy.8  The internal critique comes from standing within philosophy while 
being open to alternative paths that arise from the foundations of philosophy but were 
overlooked or ignored by Western philosophy, beginning with Plato.9    Heidegger 
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believes that this is an internal critique because it comes from the very foundation of 
philosophy through doing philosophy.  This is to cut through the “philosophy” that has 
been built upon the ground of what Heidegger seems to term metaphysics10 and to come 
to a place of a more originary thinking.  This is the movement of Destruktion for 
Heidegger. 
For the moment, however, it is necessary to point to how Heidegger opens the 
path into this Destruktion,11 Dominique Janicaud says that as a task, Destruktion shows 
“the connection between the interpretation of Being as question and the reinterpretation 
of the Being of beings within its history [through analysis of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, 
and Kant].”12  The Destruktion of Western philosophy performs the internal critique of 
philosophy through an immersion within the tradition of philosophy.  The way into the 
ground of philosophy is through attunement.13  Destruktion seeks to become attuned to 
the ground of thinking at its most originary point, which Heidegger found in the thinking 
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of the Pre-Socratic Greeks.14  When Heidegger thinks philosophy, he is trying to think 
with those philosophers who thought before they knew they were doing philosophy.  It is 
their thinking that actually gives rise to what is termed “philosophy.”  Heidegger believes 
that philosophizing has covered over their originary thinking though.  So, the necessity 
exists to get “behind” (temporally) all of the material and “thinking” that has been placed 
between now and the original thinkers who gave rise to philosophy.15  Through being 
open one can now become attuned to these thinkers which allows one to hear philosophy 
as it is said for its first time in its origin, as philosophia.16   
In order to be attuned to the originary modes of thinking, Heidegger argues that 
one should be familiar with the history of philosophy so that one is able to distinguish the 
originary Greek voice.  Heidegger advocates a “thinking-through” of philosophy with the 
Pre-Socratic Greeks in order to enter onto the path of philosophy with those whose 
thinking has cleared the path for an unconcealing of Being.17  To think-through is to 
listen to a thinker and be able to engage a problem in the same way and in a manner that 
holds to the “spirit” of the way of thinking opened by the thinker: thus, thinking through 
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is not just a repetition of someone’s previous thought.  Thus, Heidegger believes it is 
necessary to traverse the path with the Greeks by thinking-through the philosophical 
problems that have plagued humanity since their time.18  Thinking-through allows one to 
enter the path of another by being open to the possible ways someone else might have 
thought.  Heidegger believes that thinking-through enters into the force of earlier thinking 
as one is moved the way earlier thinkers were moved by the force within philosophy that 
opens thinking.19     
The thinking-through that occurs in philosophy is through the practice of 
dialogue.  Dialogue is the means by which philosophy proceeds.  This is seen in the 
etymology of the word “dialogue.”  The first part of the word comes from the Greek dia 
which means “through.”  The second part is from the Greek logos which means “word” 
or “reason.”  However, Heidegger does not want to leave logos as meaning strictly 
“word” or “reason.”  The meaning of logos for Heidegger must be extended further.  The 
reasoning that occurs in the logos is not just reasoning like the type that occurs in a 
scientific proposition or geometrical axiom.  The reason of the logos is gathering or a 
bringing together of two partners in the dialogue.  The gathering of the logos allows the 
partners to exist together through a living in difference, not through a synthesis 
reminiscent of the Hegelian dialectic.  Dia-logue is a discourse that necessitates two 
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entities, then, as one “thinks or reasons through” with the other while having contrasting 
ways of thinking.20  
The dia-logue begins with the Pre-Socratic Greeks because they began the 
questioning that opens the way for philosophy.  The dia-logue begins with an attempt to 
listen to the Greeks in what they think.21  Listening is the first move made in order to 
enter into a thinking-through of philosophy22 as this action opens one to hear what is 
giving itself in this history and to tread a path already worn by the Greeks.23  However, 
listening is not a passive acceptance of what the Greeks articulate; rather, listening entails 
hearing what is is opened for thinking through their thought.24  Listening allows one to 
enter in the originary ground of philosophy and thinking because in listening one 
becomes involved.  Listening is the first action of the dia-logue with these historical 
others as it allows one to accept and appropriate by thinking-through.  Thus, listening is 
always part and parcel of what it means to actually think.25  
If listening is part and parcel of thinking, this changes how thinking is understood 
by Heidegger.  The path laid by Heidegger uses listening to point to the fact that the 
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nature of thinking is to become open26 and not to find a correct methodology or correct 
proposition (things that close thinking).  Thinking seeks to be open by listening to the 
rhythm and voice within philosophy and how this opens various possibilities to the 
thinker.  The idea of philosophy in Western thinkers has avoided this wholeheartedly in 
its quest for a complete metaphysics.27  The thinking of philosophy as seen in its pursuit 
of onto-theological metaphysics fails because it does not listen and, subsequently, is not 
open: it is marked by the pursuit of closure.  Kevin Hart iterates that metaphysics seeks a 
cause for everything through a calculative reasoning that relies on epistemological 
principles of sufficient grounds while, in contrast, Heidegger pursues an ontological form 
of thinking that avoids closure.28  In following Heidegger’s notion of thinking-through 
one can offer a path to open the way of thinking in metaphysics.29   
Heidegger begins his thinking-through of the nature of metaphysics by turning to 
the way that the Pre-Socratic Greeks began.  And, in Heidegger’s mind, the Greeks began 
with astonishment.30  Heidegger sees the beginning of philosophy to be the wonder and 
awe that the original Greek thinkers had when thinking about the world.  For the earliest 
Greek thinkers nature was “the emerging, arising, enduring presence of Being.  It was an 
overpowering presence; it was not yet something which had been conquered in 
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thought.”31  Their attempts at describing were meant to convey this feeling through an 
opening of those who read, listened and thought with them to the same astonishment.  For 
Heidegger, if philosophy is going to truly rethink its ground, it must begin where these 
earliest Greek thinkers did—with astonishment. 
Astonishment becomes the impetus for philosophy and thinking on the 
Heideggerian pathway.  As such, astonishment pervades philosophy by working its way 
through the history of metaphysics.  The problem with philosophy is that it has neglected 
this astonishment through embrace of a way of thinking that embraces closure.  
Astonishment embraces a way of thinking that values openness as it pursues that which is 
other.  Heidegger names what falls outside the system of metaphysics “transcendence.”  
Astonishment leads to an understanding of transcendence in that it opens one to the 
inability of any way of thinking to offer a way of explaining everything.  Instead, 
astonishment always opens the thinker to more through the embrace of the awe and 
amazement that comes from that which one cannot explain.  Astonishment offers 
Heidegger a way to call into question every system by being attentive to that which 
breaks or surpasses such closed ways of thinking.32  
For Heidegger, transcendence calls into question human ways of thinking by 
acknowledging the limitations of humanity.  There can be no explanation of all things 
predicated by a person.  The attempt to do so is not only misguided, but is futile.  For 
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thinking to occur, then, there needs to be an acknowledgement of the thinker’s 
limitations.  This acknowledgement leads one to embrace astonishment as it allows one to 
dwell in the amazement that occurs from gazing upon those things that consistently seem 
to be on the outside, just out of reach.  Transcendence leads the thinker to the place of 
being amazed at that which calls into question hegemonic and totalizing forms of 
thinking.  Transcendence becomes the recognition that there is always something other 
that breaks the conceptions one has of the way things are or the way they have to be.33  
Thinking begins by residing in a disposition.  Heidegger shows this when he says 
that astonishment is not a way of positing a mystery or accounting for a feeling; rather, 
astonishment is a way of existing which leads to thinking in a certain way.  For 
Heidegger, the thinker should live in a state of being amazed/ astonished at that which 
appears.  The thinker is amazed because that which appears always seems to be-more-
than what can be described.  Thinking comes from this disposition of being-astonished.   
Being-astonished arises from the very existence of things through the fact that 
there is something rather than nothing.  This astonishment is what allows Being to be 
pursued and to unfold itself.34 In astonishment, Being can unfold itself because the 
philosopher no longer tries to categorize Being but only to be astonished and dwell in the 
unfolding of Being.  Philosophy ceases to be a search for facts; rather, it pursues that 
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which allows facts to come into Being.35  Thinking takes on the role of allowing 
existence to come to the fore by being-open to how Being unfolds and discloses itself 
through listening and being attentive to these disclosures.  This becomes the role and task 
of thinking. 
B. “Step Back”36—Opening the Path to Being 
The previous section laid out the path of thinking for Heidegger, specifically how 
he orients the thinker into a disposition of openness.  This section will analyze how this 
openness to the outside of philosophy leads him to the “step back.”  The “step back” is 
the move Heidegger makes to get out of the ways of thinking of onto-theological 
metaphysics.  As Kevin Hart articulates, “The Destruktion of philosophy as metaphysics 
involves recovering what has remained unheard in a philosophical text during the history 
of philosophy and putting it to use in the project of overcoming metaphysics.”37  What 
Heidegger terms the “step back” accomplishes this Destruktion through its disposition of 
openness and its desire to listen and allow the unfolding of Being. 38   
The disposition of being-astonished leads Heidegger to the second move in his 
program of the Destruktion of philosophy: the positing of the ontological difference 
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between Being and beings.  Heidegger argues philosophy misses the true object of its 
thought by pursuing the thinking of beings instead of Being.39  Janicaud says that the 
negative side of Destruktion is the “difficult process” that is “the rupture from the 
forgetfulness of Being, as the manifold probing that thought must perform in gaining 
access to each epoch and its configurations…”40  For thinking to be truly thought it needs 
to overcome its forgetting of Being by thinking Being in its difference from beings.41  
This is the task that Heidegger sets forth for thinking in the second move of Destruktion.   
Heidegger posits this ontological difference because he understands Being to be 
the place where beings are gathered together.  As such, Being is what gives the 
astonishment the Pre-Socratic Greeks use as the basis for their thinking; beings become 
only those things that show that there is something rather than nothing.  Thus, Being is 
what gives beings.  Further, Heidegger says that “Being gathers being together in so far 
as it is being.  Being is the gathering together—Logos.”42  The logos is the articulation, or 
the putting into language, of that gathering together that occurs in Being.  As Heidegger 
famously says, “Language is the house of Being.”  However, language is the “house of 
Being” because this is where the person “ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the 
truth of Being, guarding it.” 43  Humanity encounters beings through language, but this 
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language is also what points toward Being and away from beings.  The gathering that is 
language (as logos) is not meant to construct a whole predicated upon the entire 
population of beings; rather, the goal is to point to Being.  Language as logos is what lets 
the truth of Being appear in its difference from beings.44  An attentiveness to this 
appearing is what begins the movement of the “step back.” 
In order to be attentive to Being, Heidegger argues that one must navigate the 
ontological difference between Being and beings.  The ideal place to begin is with 
Heidegger’s famous lecture “The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics.”  Here, 
Heidegger opens the path for thinking through and after the “step back” from 
metaphysics.  Heidegger navigates the lecture by having a dialogue with Hegel.45  
Heidegger wishes to enter into a conversation with Hegelian thought46 in order to think-
through the problem of ontological difference.47  In order to think-through with Hegel, 
Heidegger shows that there are three concerns that Hegel’s matter of thinking opens in 
relation to the difference between Being and beings.  In posing these, Heidegger opens a 
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way of thinking that can pursue the ontological difference in its duality.  The first concern 
Heidegger poses to Hegel is in relation to the concern of thinking, which Hegel sees as 
finding the absolute concept while Heidegger believes that it is concerned with 
articulating the ontological difference as difference.48  Next, Heidegger shows that Hegel 
enters into a conversation with the history of philosophy to catch the force of each 
thinker’s thought, while Heidegger enters into conversation with the history of 
philosophy to think the unthought in the ontological difference between Being and 
beings.49  This leads Heidegger to the third concern, which he sees as articulating how the 
step back occurs.  He says that Hegel enters the conversation with the history of 
philosophy in order to come to an absolute foundation (Aufhebung), while Heidegger 
enters into the conversation of philosophy to think the ontological difference which leads 
to the “step back” in order to think that which has been skipped over by philosophy.50   
After articulating these three questions, Heidegger enters the conversation with 
the history of philosophy.  For him, the problem with the history of metaphysics is that it 
has left unthought Being by conflating Being with beings.  What has happened is that 
there has been a pursuit of a grounding ground for all things in metaphysics.  For him, 
this is onto-theology.51  Onto-theology is the melding together of ontology and theology.  
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Metaphysics has become onto-theological in that it has pursued a grounding ground for 
all things, seeking what ontology does with its search for the nature of existence while 
also seeking an ultimate reason for this existence, the domain of theology.52  Metaphysics 
in its onto-theological form posits a God, but this is not the God of religion; rather, this is 
God as causa sui.53  This God is similar to Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, a logical 
necessity to explain all things.  In this type of thinking, logic is not the gathering place 
(like the Greek logos), but a hegemonic structure that is used to hold all things together.54  
No longer are beings gathered together, astonished at their existence and then pointing to 
the beyond; rather, metaphysics has now offered a complete explanation in a system. 
The problem that occurs is the fact that it is only through the ontological 
difference that Being can be rigorously thought.55  One begins by thinking the unthought 
of metaphysics through the articulation of the difference between Being and beings.56  
Thinking the unthought begins with the realization that things are, so there must be a 
movement beyond pure beings.  In saying that something, anything, is, that beings are, a 
distinction is drawn between beings and Being.57  One can sense in this a certain 
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instability that exists inherently within the word is.  The is coincides with many beings in 
that beings are, but the is encompasses everything that is able to is while also talking of 
what grounds their ability to is.58  Language, then, has not taken account of the fact that 
beings is and has forsaken the way of thinking that opens one to the is-ing of beings.  The 
search for the ground of beings has caused onto-theology and metaphysics, specifically 
within Western forms of language, to cover over and conceal Being.59 
The concealment of Being by the search for the ground of beings has caused 
philosophy to consistently bypass the original astonishment of the earliest thinkers.60  
Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the quest of philosophy has abandoned the impetus 
laid out in the way that the Pre-Socratic Greek thinkers pursued thinking.61  Instead, 
philosophy has concerned itself with the principles and causes of beings and not with the 
search for Being.62  The result of this misguided search has been the continued 
concealment of Being by beings.  The loss of astonishment and the ability to think-
through has caused metaphysics to cease thinking in terms of the Greek logos by a failure 
to understand the gathering together that occurs in Being.  This logos has been covered 
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over (or concealed) by a search for the causes and principals of beings.63  The creation of 
a metaphysics that does not seek to gather together, but to gather one whole, results in the 
covering of Being.64  The task of thinking is to think Being outside of this creation of a 
whole of beings by moving into the more originary moment of Being through the “step 
back.’  
The “step back” allows one to think this originary moment of Being in its 
unconcealment.  This unconcealment of Being comes about due to the perdurance of 
Being.  What is held in this perdurance is that Being is what grounds while beings are 
what is grounded.  The need in the “step back” is to think Being and beings in their 
difference and duality by showing the difference that exists between the two and how this 
difference creates a tension.  This tension between Being and beings opens the possibility 
for the unconcealment of Being; however, the thinker steps into this tension through 
beings, which are only in the fullness of Being, allowing one to begin to open oneself to 
Being by listening to it through in existence of beings.65  In order to “step back” into 
Being through beings, one first clears away the thinking of beings that conceals Being.  
In the clearing away of beings, one becomes open to Being which is necessary to actually 
think Being in its difference from beings.66  The clearing of beings is the openness to 
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something more than beings, which is what gives the possibility of letting Being appear.67  
The truth of Being is found in the ability to let Being appear through the clearing of 
beings or in the unconcealment of Being.68    
The Greek word alethia, often translated “truth,” is where Heidegger finds both 
the unconcealment and truth of Being coming together.  Heidegger says that from the 
time of Plato aletheia has become associated with technical knowledge through a concern 
with beings.69  However, Heidegger understands aletheia as unconcealment and says that 
it is “the clearing that first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to and for each 
other.”70  Aletheia is the unconcealment of Being which gives it to thinking: this is truth 
in the Heideggerian mind.  Thus, true thinking is lost when one reverts to the type of 
thinking that is overly representational and indebted to a logic that only seeks to 
totalize.71  This is to do the opposite of the truth sought as aletheia.72   In seeking aletheia 
one moves toward a kind of thinking that seeks to uncover the techne and episteme 
behind a thing.73  Thinking works to understand how it is that one encounters an object 
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and how this leads to further understanding.  This means that in order for thinking to 
occur, there is an attempt to go beyond the type of thinking that leads to enframing, 
which disguises Being and leaves it truthless.  Heidegger pursues a type of thinking that 
is in-tune with how something gives itself and the way in which one can think that 
giving.  This is to be attuned to the something else,74 which opens the thinker to Being in 
such a way as to pursue aletheia.75  
Heidegger turns to the idea of God as causa sui as a pointer to the way the “step 
back” from beings to Being should occur.76  There is a logic at work here.  For 
Heidegger, God as causa sui is the God of the philosophers, similar to the Unmoved 
Mover of Aristotle.  This is a God that cannot be sacrificed to or worshiped.  This is a 
God that is not experienced in any originary way.  The God as causa sui is merely the 
idea of God according to a totalizing logic.  This is the God of onto-theology and, thus, a 
God he abandons to the realm of beings.  In order to counter this onto-theologic it is 
necessary for a god-less thinking to occur.  God-less thinking, for Heidegger, is akin to 
the God of religion, the God experienced by people in worship, the God people sing to 
and pray to, the God that astonishes, etc.  This idea of God is more originary for 
Heidegger.  The problem comes when people take this originary experience and place it 
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within a hegemonic, metaphysical system.  The “step back” in this case is a move from a 
place of metaphysical necessity and totalizing systems to the place of an originary 
experience that is not completely explainable but which gives rise to the arrival of 
things.77  The logic of the “step back” is one from the discourse of philosophizing and 
hegemonic discourse to a language built from the place of an originary experience.     
It is in thinking the difference that emerges between beings and Being that gives 
rise to the ability to take the step back.78  The “step back” consists of thinking the 
difference between Being and beings, so that one can allow Being to unfold and 
unconceal itself, no longer trapped by the discussion of beings.  But, this “step back” is a 
more originary move into thinking itself as it is not just a move away from thinking 
beings as a whole, but is a move outside of philosophy proper.  The step back “rescue[s] 
language from its metaphysical tendency to objectify, idealize, or represent meanings.  It 
would enable the thinker to ask not what words means, but about the event of mean-ing 
itself…”79  The “step back” is confounding in that it is never complete, closing a system; 
it gives rise to come into existence.  The “step back” is concerned with leaving thinking 
open so that it may pursue aletheia.80  But, this “step back” allows the thinker to view 
beings as beings, gathered together in Being.  The “step back” pursues an active 
responding to Being as it gives rise to itself in beings.  The thinking involved here is an 
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openness that responds and not just receives.  The reception of the rise of Being includes 
the response which is accomplished through this “step back.”81  
C.  Thinking as Attunement 
The “step back” leads Heidegger to a place outside of the onto-theological 
confines of much metaphysical discourse.  This leads him to the last piece of the 
Destruktion of Western philosophy.  The last piece is reconstruction which articulates 
how it is that one is aware of the unconcealing of Being.  For Heidegger, this occurs in 
the development of the idea of attunement.   Heidegger’s notion of attunement consists of 
listening to the voice of Being and in so doing to be “placed in a relationship with what 
is.”82  Attunement is being “tuned in” to a thought in order to understand the thought.  
Thus, attunement becomes not just “knowing” or “recognizing” Being when it becomes 
unconcealed, but to be tuned into the thought that arises from thinking Being.83  This 
section will analyze the idea of attunement in the Heideggerian corpus by following how 
he uses the German word Befindlichkeit in Being and Time and moves to the use of 
Bestimmung in later works.   
This elucidation of Heidegger’s notion of attunement84 begins with his most 
famous treatise, Being and Time.  However, there is an immediate problem when dealing 
with this text: Heidegger does not use the German word for “attunement”—Bestimmung.  
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Heidegger begins his thinking from the place of Befindlichkeit, usually translated as 
“disposition.”  However, in her translation of Sein und Zeit Joan Stambaugh makes the 
conscious decision to translate Befindlichkeit as “attunement.”85  She does this to avoid 
the psychological associations that come with the English word “disposition”86 which 
would cause one to read Heidegger as advocating a phenomenology that begins from 
psychological disposition (a la Husserl).87  Through her translation, Stambaugh shows 
that Heidegger is concerned with a more originary, “gut-level” disposition of being 
attuned to the other/an-other in an initial moment of existence.  S. J. McGrath reinforces 
this when he says, “Dasein always already finds itself in a particular emotional 
attunement, discovers itself responding to a world that it does not constitute and in a way 
that eludes its own theoretical grasp.”88  This becomes evident when Heidegger turns to 
initial moments of understanding like angst and fear.  The thinking behind this is to 
elucidate an originary moment that allows the thinker to tap into the foundations of 
existence and, thus, Being.   
In Being and Time Heidegger begins his thinking around the idea of attunement 
by linking it with understanding (Verstehen).   Understanding in this instance refers more 
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to that originary moment when one “understands” something at first glance.  This is the 
“gut-level” moment when one has a pre-understanding of something before one fully 
comprehends it.  The way that Heidegger talks about this is that it is an initial 
understanding that is there before one even knows it through one’s reflection.  This 
understanding is a basic ontological structure of Da-sein that is often manifested in 
dispositions like fear, angst, and anxiety.  The possibility for this kind of understanding 
comes from one’s attunement.89  One’s attunement is what makes understanding possible.  
Attunement allows the initial, pre-understanding to occur because it makes one aware of 
the fact that one inhabits certain “emotive dispositions” for reasons that are unclear.90  
This initial understanding deepens as one becomes more attuned to the world and the 
ontological structures that allow one to encounter the world.  Thus, the more that one 
understands, the more that one is attuned, and the more one is attuned, the more one can 
understand, and so on and so on.91  There is a reciprocity between attunement and 
understanding, where the increase of one leads to the increase of the other.  The 
understanding at work in attunement is akin to that of understanding a situation or a piece 
of art or a poem or musical number.    
One of the ways that Heidegger pursues thinking attunement is in the questioning 
of Da-sein as an ontological questioning rather than an ontic one.92  This leads Heidegger 
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into a description of what he sees as the three ontological characteristics of attunement.  
First, attunement discloses Da-sein in its thrownness and its facticity.  Da-sein is thrown 
into a situation or into a world.  Part of that thrownness is to be attuned (or disposed) to 
the situation that one finds oneself within.  Second, attunement discloses being-in-the-
world as it is being toward something.  Attunement is not directed toward nothing, but 
toward something and as such, discloses the world within which Da-sein finds itself.  
Third, in Heidegger’s elucidation, attunement allows inner, psychical experience where 
one is affected or moved.  Here, Heidegger’s thought moves from a more outward 
attunement to one that is more associated with one’s inner nature.  By being attuned, the 
person is affected and/or moved by those things that are encountered through one’s 
thrownness and subsequent being-in-the-world.  The disclosure of the world is affective 
and this is a moment of attunement to that world.93    
These three ontological characteristics of attunement become important for Da-
sein in its constitution of the world.  Specifically, attunement is a submission to the world 
so that the world can be encountered.  This submission to the world comes from the fact 
that the world is what gives significance to Da-sein.94  Attunement becomes submission 
to the world in such a way that one can encounter the things that one cares for and is 
moved by.95  Here, Heidegger uses care as an ontological category that describes the very 
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structure of existence as being-in-the-world.  This care comes from how Dasein finds one 
attuned (Stimmung) to the world in one’s facticity.96 Heidegger says, “Since being-in-the-
world is essentially care, being-together-with things at hand could be taken in our 
previous analyses as taking care of them, being with the Mitda-sein of others encountered 
within the world as concern.  Being-together-with is taking care of things, because as a 
mode of being-in it is determined by its fundamental structure, care.”97  The one who is 
attuned has a certain care for the world in which one exists as “care lies ‘before’ every 
factical ‘attitude’ and ‘position’ of Da-sein, that is it is always already in them as an 
existential a priori.”98  The reason that care is important is because it gives Da-sein 
significance as a being-in-the-world.  Carlson says that Heidegger “defines the 
worldhood of that world (without which Dasein simply is not, and vice versa) as a 
primordial totality of referential relations that constitute the ‘significance’ 
(Bedeutsamkeit) in terms in which Dasein’s existential possibility is constituted and 
appropriated understandingly.”99  The world is such that the person cares for certain 
things in this world by being ontologically attuned to them from one’s facticity.   
When one begins to meditate upon this nature of what one cares for, there are two 
subsequent modes of attunement that arise: fear and angst.  For Heidegger, fear is a mode 
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of attunement because it is mode of existence that discloses the world in such a way that 
shows the possibilities of its being threatening.  Fear is an ontological category because it 
becomes not just a way of relating to the world but of initially understanding the world.100  
For Heidegger, “what is feared has the character of being threatening.”101  One who is 
attuned as being-in-the-world understands how “fearfulness” is disclosed in the world 
because of the understanding that what is feared can draw near to one.102  This fear can 
even be extended to those one is being-with, the others who inhabit the same world.  One 
fears for these others, that they may be threatened as the self is threatened.103   Fear is 
manifested in three different ways, becoming alarmed, horror, and/ or terror.  These three 
are built on one’s fundamental existential attunement to the world through fear.104   
The other mode of attunement that Heidegger specifically mentions is angst.  
Angst is a mode of one’s fundamental, ontological attunement as a being-in-the-world.  
Authentic attunement occurs with the initial understanding of Da-sein’s being-toward-
death and that one can neither flee nor cover over death as death is inevitable.105  The 
result of this understanding is ultimately unsettling and distressing, leading to angst.  
Here, angst reveals to Da-sein the ontological possibility of its own nothingness.106  
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Heidegger’s analysis of angst shows that in temporality Da-sein is brought before its own 
thrownness and is shown the uncanniness of its being-in-the-world.  The attunement 
revealed in angst is an understanding of the world and one’s place within it, setting one’s 
own contingency and finitude in light of this world.107  From this angst arises the 
ontological structure of care while the fact that one cares about one’s own being gives 
rise to angst as well.108  Angst and care are related at an existential level.  This is because 
angst leads to care because Da-sein, as the being concerned with its own being, moves 
toward its potentiality-for-being.  This potentiality-for-being comes about because of how 
Da-sein projects itself into the future, seeing itself as it wants to be.  This is not a 
psychological project, but takes place at an ontological and existential level as Da-sein 
lives into what it sees as its own potentiality-for-being.  Da-sein is concerned (has care 
for) those places and positions in which it will exist in the future.109  This gives Da-sein a 
way of existing in the world and relating to it initially, and this initial relation is one 
which is fundamentally temporal.  While projecting into the future, Da-sein is still in the 
present as a being-in-the-world which gives significance to Da-sein.110   Da-sein’s 
existence as its very possibility of being-in-the-world and understanding the world is 
predicated upon its temporality as a being projecting into the future yet simultaneously 
inhabiting the present.  Da-sein understands this as it is attuned to the world through its 
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own angst in its temporal situation.  Thus, attunement becomes a constituent part of Da-
sein.111   
From this understanding of attunement Heidegger moves into discussions of ways 
that Da-sein is attuned inauthentically.  For him, to be attuned inauthentically arises when 
one stays within the horizon of the ontic and existentiell, not moving into one’s own 
ground in the ontological and existential.  The way that this inauthentic attunement 
manifests itself for him is in the structures of idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, and falling 
prey to one’s own thrownness.112  Fear and angst are existential and ontological because 
they describe Da-sein’s fundamental attunement to one’s world as one exists and inhabits 
such a world.  In the inauthentic moments of attunement just listed the problem that 
occurs is that one gets caught up in the series of structures that cover over one’s 
authentic, ontological account of oneself.  In doing so, one is attuned inauthentically by 
not living into one’s own death.  Rather, in this inauthentic attunement, one denies one’s 
death and oneself as being-toward-death by using these other structures, like idle talk, to 
cover over the temporal structures that actually give understanding to one of one’s own 
finitude and death.  In doing this, Da-sein leads an existence that inauthentic as it is only 
concerned about beings and not attuned to its authentic self in its concern as a being with 
its own being. 
In his thinking after Being and Time Heidegger moves to a more explicit use of 
the idea of attunement.  I first analyze Heidegger’s essay from 1930 entitled “On the 
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Essence of Truth.”113  In this essay, Heidegger turns away from the idea that thinking 
begins with an attunement that is disposition (Befindlichkeit) to a way of thinking that is 
attuned through Stimmende (a variation of Stimmung).114  The translator of the essay, 
John Sallis, renders the variations of Stimmung with the notions of “accordance” or 
“attunement.”  As Sallis articulates in a footnote, this rendering of Stimmung bridges the 
nature of attunement that Heidegger articulates in Being and Time into harmony with the 
more explicitly musical idea of attunement found in the later What is Philosophy?.  Sallis 
says that Stimmung allows Heidegger to bring together the ideas of attunement that occur 
when one tunes a musical instrument with the ideas of attunement as disposition or mood 
that he had put forward only a few years earlier in  Being and Time.115  Giorgio Agamben 
agrees with Sallis when he argues that what Stimmung must be stripped of is its 
psychological associations.  Agamben believes that Stimmung must carry with it its full 
“acoustic-musical dimension.”  Agamben sees a connection existing between Heidegger 
and Novalis, who used Stimmung to convey an “acoustics of the soul.”  Stimmung acts as 
a way of Dasein’s attunement to its thrownness to the world.116   In this essay, Stimmung 
carries the connotation of “according-with” or “in-tune-with.”  
In “On the Essence of Truth” Heidegger explicitly bring attunement to bear on his 
understanding of truth by saying the only way to get to truth is through an accordance or 
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an attunement.117  Heidegger brings together two ideas of accordance: first, the idea of 
consonance of something with our pre-understanding of it and, second, the consonance 
between a statement and the matter about which it is said.118  There is a twofold nature to 
the approach to truth.  First, there is an initial attunement to the idea of truth.  This initial 
attunement comes from the first part of accordance which says that in talking or thinking 
about “what is true” one already has an initial understanding of truth.  There is an 
intuition of truth that is prior to our reflection on truth.119  The initial way of 
understanding truth is that truth accords (Stimmende).  This understanding of truth says 
that one has an initial understanding of whether a statement could be true or not due to its 
accordance with the matter at hand.120       
This initial understanding of accordance for knowing truth is further articulated 
by Heidegger through the use of the idea of comportment.  Comportment is an openness 
that occurs through a relatedness and not through an opposition (like the subject/object 
split).  This relatedness is an abiding in the presence of that which makes itself present.  It 
is to stand in an openness to the fact that something presences itself and opens itself up, 
giving itself.  This openness to the presencing of things is what allows us to know the 
truth of beings by becoming aware of beings.121  In a related way, openness to the 
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presencing of beings gives the ability to make statements about beings in that the beings 
become capable of allowing themselves to be said.  Truth is found in this place of 
openness, in the attunement to the presencing of beings that occurs through comportment.  
It is this openness found in attunement that allows truth.122 
The discussion of accordance and comportment allows Heidegger to conclude that 
the essence of truth is attunement.123  This attunement comes from the openness of 
comportment which is involved in letting things be.  As the essence of truth, attunement 
is interested in the disclosure of what it is that lets things be and how this letting-be 
brings into accord.  By bringing into accord, the letting-be of attunement—through 
comportment—opens the thinker to one’s relatedness to the world which results not only 
in a way of relating to the world through one’s disposition, but also in being tuned into 
the world in which one lives.124  This becomes even more evident as Heidegger discusses 
un-truth, where un-truth is to be un-attuned or dis-attuned instead of to speak or think 
wrongly.  When one is improperly attuned, one is not able to find the truth.  The truth 
becomes hidden, concealed.125  
There is a problem with Heidegger’s account in “On the Essence of Truth.”  
Through his association of attunement and truth with accordance and comportment he is 
unable to escape the idea of attunement disclosing beings as a whole.  Heidegger’s 
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account of un-truth shows how he continues to describe how Being is covered over 
through the ways that comportment and attunement result in un-truth.  Heidegger 
explicitly brings this out with the problems of concealing and errancy.  In concealing, the 
question of Being is covered over by denying the question of beings as a whole.  
Concealing bestows on the absence of the question of Being a type of presence.  The 
result is a replenishing of one’s world with new standards and measures of happiness.  
Thus, concealing covers over the truth of one’s being-in-the-world by not being attuned 
to the world.126  This is a problem in Heidegger’s scheme.  In a similar manner, errancy 
leads to dis-attunement and un-truth in that it is the counteressence of the originary 
experience of truth in attunement.  This is because errancy is part of the inner constitution 
of the person in that one falls into error not just once, but through an entire means of 
constituting oneself.  This errancy is seen in the problem of metaphysics, as it tries to 
constitute the person without recourse to an ontological questioning that throws the 
person into question.127  Through the problem of un-truth one can glimpse the nature of 
attunement.  If one is attuned wrongly the result is concealing and errancy.  If one is 
attuned rightly leads to the ability to think through the nature of truth through one’s 
being-in-the-world.  Thus, attunement becomes the thinking that opens the way for 
accordance.   
Heidegger will further the understanding of thinking as attunement that he lays 
out in “The Essence of Truth” in his lecture-turned-book called What is Philosophy?  In 
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this text Heidegger makes an explicit move to articulate attunement through a turn to the 
“musical” metaphor of Bestimmung.  John D. Caputo argues that Heidegger turns to 
Stimmung because it gives precedence to the affective sphere of being human as it 
“means mood and has a strongly intentionalist quality.  Literally, Stimmung means 
‘tuning,’ the way factical life is tuned to the world, its attuning, and hence its being-
toward the world.”128  Heidegger will use attunement to bear directly on what it means to 
take the “step back” and think Being.  Thus, for What is Philosophy? the thinking needed 
to do philosophy is attunement as directed toward Being and, thus, the possibility for 
thinking Being. 
Heidegger begins by trying to understand how it is that one can be attuned to 
Being if it is always concealed and hidden.  He argues that in order to be attuned to Being 
the thinker must find those other thinkers that have been able to think Being.  Of course, 
Heidegger finds those who were able to think Being to be the Pre-Socratics.  It is in these 
thinkers’ astonishment at Being where Heidegger finds the first and best instances of 
attunement.  Heidegger believes we must enter into a conversation with these thinkers, 
not just recapitulating their ideas but learning to think-through with them.129  The way to 
enter into this conversation with these thinkers is to learn their language.130  When one 
learns the language of the Pre-Socratics one can learn what path they took on the way to 
                                                 
128
 Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger, 69.  
 
129
 Heidegger, What is Philosophy? 45 and 67. 
 
130
 For Heidegger, as he uses it in this context, language here does not just mean the language one 
uses to communicate, like French, English, German, Latin, etc.  Rather, language here refers to the entire 
way of thinking of a thinker or a group.  Thus, Heidegger believes one needs to enter into the thinking and 
the world of the Greeks in such a way that one learn from them how to think Being.  This learning allows 
one to engage in thinking with them so that one can travel the avenues of thought that they have opened.   
96 
 
thinking Being.131  It is the language of the Greeks, then, that allows attunement to 
Being.132   
Due to this, Heidegger posits two Greek words that work in tandem to help 
articulate the path to the attunement to Being.  First, he discusses logos, which he briefly 
describes as the gathering together of all things that exist.133  In previous texts, Heidegger 
has pointed to the Greek logos as what grounds the essence of language because it is the 
place where the gathering together of language occurs.  Thus, the apprehension of truth 
that comes through accordance and comportment is caught up in this gathering, which 
means that logos becomes the place where truth is found and, consequently, where 
attunement occurs.134  The second Greek word he discusses is sophon which he finds 
saying that “all being is in Being …being is Being.”135  Both of these words point to the 
same thing—that for the originary Greek thinkers language was the place where all things 
were gathered up together so that one could see the appearance of Being.136  The place 
where attunement to Being begins to occur is when a harmony exists between the 
originary language and one’s thinking, when one is able to “think through” with the 
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Greeks because one understands their language.137  Attunement becomes available when 
the thinker finds the harmony that exists between his or her thinking and the thinking of 
the Greeks.138   
The way one enters into the language of the Greeks is through listening, as this 
opens the way for translation.  Attunement gives one over to Being in listening because 
one listens beyond the chatter of beings as a whole, tapping into the more originary 
moment of Being. 139  One can hear the “saying” of Being through the noise created by 
beings as a whole.  The necessity is to be able to articulate this saying of Being. 140  For 
Heidegger, this is a problem of translation.  The problem of translation stems from the 
fact that it is difficult to say Being as one exists in the world of beings.  Thus, there needs 
to be a moment where one can translate what one hears of Being in the originary moment 
of listening.  For Heidegger, the only way to translate the word as it is said or written or 
played is to listen to it and be attuned to it.  One’s ear is attuned to the word through 
listening and this makes possible the moment of translation.141  Translation becomes a 
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process of opening up what has been said by the word for an/other so that the other may 
hear it with a similar impact for thinking.142   
In What is Philosophy? Heidegger utilizes the notion of attunement most 
explicitly.  He does this by relying on listening as what opens one to thinking-through 
with the Greeks.  John D. Caputo says that Heidegger wants to listen in an attentive and 
close way that allows him “to hear what is drowned out for the rest of us….the primal 
voice which is ‘speaking’…”143  This speaking speaks across historical periods and 
allows the thinking of Being with different thinkers in different places with different 
ideas.  Through this conversation the thinker learns to become disposed to where Being 
speaks and tuned into how this speaking occurs.144 
Heidegger believes that the “thinking through” that occurs in the conversation 
with these thinkers should lead one to find new ways within his or her situation to think 
the unfolding of Being.145  In the contemporary world, Heidegger finds astonishment at 
Being in the language of poetry.  This is because he finds poetry the language that comes 
closest to the thinking of the Greeks, even though there is an enormous abyss that exists 
between thinking and poetry.146  Poetry is a meditative and responsive thinking that “is 
called forth by that which is ‘thought-provoking.’”  The question for poetry is “What 
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calls forth thinking?”147  To be called forth as the poet is is to embrace a certain kind of 
thinking that responds with thankfulness—the thinker looks to give thanks for what has 
been given.148 The next step for embracing this responsive thinking is to engage in 
language that actually responds to the being-called-forth.  For Heidegger poetry is the 
language that accomplishes this.149  As Carl Raschke says, “Poetry is the speaking that 
allows what-is to gather itself in its fullness…Poetry is what permits Being to lift its veil 
and show its face as the truth of both language and thought.”150  The poet is the one to 
facilitate the coming forth of Being in language.151  For Heidegger poetry becomes a 
place where the type of thinking as attunement is at work.  He does not wish to view 
poetry and philosophy as the same but believes that both begin thinking through the 
astonishment that comes from the fact that there is something instead of nothing.     
Heidegger turns to language because he believes this is where both thinking and 
poetry have their experiences.  He says that they both dwell in the same neighborhood as 
both are concerned with similar experiences.152  For Heidegger, “Neighborhood means 
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dwelling in nearness.  Poetry and thinking are modes of saying.  The nearness that brings 
poetry and thinking into what we call Saying…‘To say’…means to show: to make 
appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call the World, lighting and 
concealing it.  This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is the essential being of 
Saying.”153  Heidegger argues that Saying is the essential nature of language.  Both 
poetry and thinking are languages of Saying because they seek to allow the appearance of 
the originary moment of one’s experience.  For this reason, Heidegger posits that both 
thinking and poetry act as neighbors.  The reason that one often does not see them as such 
is “…because we are caught in the prejudice nurtured through centuries that thinking is a 
matter of ratiocination, that is, of calculation in the widest sense, the mere talk of a 
neighborhood of thinking to poetry is suspect.”154   
Poetry and thinking both embrace a language that is outside the typical one of 
ratiocination and calculation.  This means that their experience with language, while 
attempting the Saying, inevitably leaves certain elements unsayable.  The Saying is trying 
to unconceal that which is unsayable, but never can fully.155  The reason that poetry is 
important for thinking about thinking is for this very reason: it is a language that attempts 
to think the Saying of language while also acknowledging that which is unsayable.  
Heidegger finds in Georg Trakl’s poetry the ambiguity which resides in the attempt to 
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Say that which is ultimately unsayable.  Heidegger says, “The ambiguous tone of Trakl’s 
poetry arises out of a gathering, that is, out of a unison which, meant for itself alone, 
always remains unsayable.  The ambiguity of this poetic saying is not lax imprecision, 
but rather the rigor of him who leaves what is as it is, who has entered into the ‘righteous 
vision’ and now submits to it.”156  Trakl’s poetry makes apparent the nature of the 
gathering of beings together in Being as something that one tries to Say but always 
remains unsayable.  The unsayable nature of the language, though, is due to Trakl’s rigor 
in thinking through what it means to let a phenomenon appear.  Poetic language is a 
prime language for opening the type of thinking that is able to accomplish this.   
In order to think through the nature of what kind of language is able to engage in 
thinking, Heidegger also turns to musical metaphors.  In On the Way to Language 
Heidegger uses two musical metaphors to think Saying.  The first is made apparent when 
Heidegger says that in Saying “it comes to pass that the World is made to appear.  The 
sound rings out in the resounding assembly call which, open to the Open, makes world 
appear in all things…The sound of language, its earthyness is held with the harmony that 
attunes the regions of the world’s structure, playing them in chorus.”157  Heidegger thinks 
the Saying as the sound that rings out throughout the World.  This sound also gathers the 
World together by allowing the different regions of the experience of the World to play 
together and, subsequently, be heard together as a chorus.  The musical metaphor of the 
harmony that occurs in the chorus of this ringing of the sound of the sound of the Saying 
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offers Heidegger a way of thinking the nature of language as that which brings together 
multiple tones and rhythms to let them be heard together.  This is the gathering together 
accomplished in the logos that Heidegger was concerned with throughout his career. 
The first musical metaphor leads to the second one that Heidegger uses for 
Saying.  He says, “Saying is the mode in which Appropriation speaks: mode not so much 
in the sense of modus or fashion, but as the melodic tone, the song which says something 
in its singing.  For appropriating Saying brings to light all present beings in terms of their 
properties—it lauds, that is, allows them into their own, their nature.”158  The gathering 
that occurs in the Saying is now described in terms of a “melodic tone, the song which 
says something in its singing.”  What the song “says” though is not really said; what 
Heidegger brings to the fore is that this melodic tone allows the appearing of beings.  The 
tone and song of Saying bring beings forth into their own nature as beings.  These beings 
are brought into the poetic language of rigorous thinking.  The originary experience of 
language is again thought through the form of the Saying.  This time it has been 
accomplished through the use of musical metaphors.  
Heidegger uses the above musical metaphors simply as metaphors to speak about 
language.  By using these musical metaphors, he can accentuate various elements of the 
poetic language of thinking, like rhythm, timbre, cadence, etc.  His concern is with the 
nature of a poetic language that allows beings to open thinking Being.  Heidegger turns 
away from his musical metaphor (Bestimmung) to develop the literary metaphor of the 
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poetic.159  He does so because he finds in the poetic that approach to the world that is 
most in line with thinking.  In doing so, however, he leaves behind certain elements of 
the nature of language that only the musical metaphor is able to bring out.   
Most explicitly he loses the thinking associated with Bestimmung found in his 
development of the notions of consonance, resonance, and listening among others.  While 
these are also prevalent in poetry, the contention of this project is that the type of thinking 
that occurs in the musical is more apt to allow for these to come to the fore.  The musical 
calls to be embraced in its sound through listening.  As one listens, one is tuned in to the 
music and can begin to hear the different ways the piece is consonant with others or the 
way that it resonates.  By turning to poetic language Heidegger tends to cover over the 
way that the phenomenon calls the thinker to listen.  This turn to the poetic also tends to 
cover over what is unsayable in the Saying by bringing to the fore what language actually 
says.  The musical can think the unsayable because it does not have to “say” anything in 
its Saying.  Rather, the musical can evoke by catching one’s attention through its 
consonance and resonance.  Ultimately, the musical opens the type of thinking that 
Heidegger wants to engage within without covering over elements that are key to this 
thinking.   
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The other element that Heidegger loses is that of the gathering.  While poetry is a 
place where gathering may take place (as he shows with the discussion of Trakl), music is 
a site where a gathering can occur that allows multiple beings to resonate at once.  In the 
metaphor of the harmony of the chorus that Heidegger uses the idea of the gathering is 
one where beings can speak at the same time.  In poetry, every line is only able to be the 
thought of one voice; only one voice can speak at a time, even if multiple voices are 
included in the poem.  The result in poetry is not the harmony of the chorus but a number 
of voices doing a solo.  In the musical the thinking of the gathering through the chorus 
can occur where beings are able to sing in one harmony, even if the voices are singing 
different lines.  The chorus can sing as one in their difference.  The gathering is able to 
take place as what brings together the differences in one harmony or song.  
D.  Conclusion 
This chapter fits within the overall goal of this project by beginning to clear the 
ground of totalizing and hegemonic discourse in order to open the pathway for the types 
of thinking that will be engaged throughout the project.  The turn to Heidegger was used 
because he is the thinker who most adequately thinks through the so-called “end of 
metaphysics.”  In doing so he opens avenues for thinking other than onto-theological, 
metaphysical discourse.  The task of this chapter was to offer an analysis of Heidegger’s 
Destruktion of Western philosophy.  This Destruktion clears the path for thinking 
theologically through improvisation. 
The argument in the chapter followed three broad steps.  The first was to follow 
Heidegger in his initiation of the Destruktion of philosophy through an internal critique.  
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In doing so, Heidegger opens the path that the project will take.  The first section of the 
chapter follows Heidegger as he thinks Being by thinking through with the Pre-Socratic 
Greek thinkers.  By doing so, he finds astonishment that there is something instead of 
nothing to be at the center of the way that they think.  The thinking through that occurs is 
to move on the same path of thinking as the Pre-Socratic Greeks in a way that is more 
than just repetitive.  Thinking through entails thinking in the same way as the Greeks.  
This thinking through seeks to be open to and listen to the way that they thought so that 
one can tap into the originary moment of experience that gave rise to philosophy.  The 
originary thinking of the Pre-Socratic Greeks teaches a disposition of openness and 
listening as what is necessary to begin the task of thinking. 
The second section of the argument consists of an elucidation of the “step back.”  
The “step back” is necessary because the history of Western philosophy, since the time 
after the Pre-Socratic Greeks—the times of Plato and Aristotle—has covered over the 
originary experience of Being.  Instead, philosophy has asked the question of beings, 
confusing this with the question of Being.  Heidegger believes that philosophy has 
conflated the question of Being with the question of beings.  In order to rectify this 
conflation, he advocates the step back.  The step back is a movement out of the onto-
theological thought that is focused strictly on beings.  He argues that one must step out of 
the onto-theological disposition Western philosophy finds itself within to a place where it 
is again possible to think Being.  For Heidegger, one way of doing this is through the 
focus on gathering which says that beings must be gathered somewhere and the place 
they are gathered is in the logos of Being.  The step back becomes possible because of the 
106 
 
disposition of openness created in the first part of the argument; the step back continues 
this disposition by not only being receptive but also embracing the responsiveness 
necessary to think Being. 
The third part of the argument deals with Heidegger’s notion of attunement as it is 
developed in Being and Time, “On the Essence of Truth,” and What is Philosophy?.  
Attunement is the outcome of the step back as it is the way that one responds to Being.  
Attunement means being tuned-in to the way that Being arises and responding to it.  
Heidegger’s development of the notion of attunement relies on the musical nature of the 
word (Bestimmung).  The series of metaphors around the notion of attunement deal with 
openness, consonance, resonance, and listening, among others.  Heidegger attempts to 
use these to find a type of language which brings all of these to bear upon what it means 
to think.  He turns to poetic language.  In the poetic he finds a language of attunement 
that allows for the gathering of beings into Being.  The poetic also is a language of 
Saying that does not cover over the unsayable.  As such, this is a language that allows 
thinking to take place. 
I also critiqued Heidegger for his choosing of the poetic over the musical in order 
to think thinking.  The reason for this critique was because of Heidegger’s focus in his 
notion of attunement to elements such as consonance, resonance, listening, and rhythm as 
elements necessary to think Being.  While the poetic does include these, it also covers 
over them by focusing on the Saying.  Also, the poetic does not allow the harmony of the 
chorus of Being to come to the fore in the gathering.  Heidegger, then, is an inadequate 
guide, even though he starts the type of thinking I engage in within this project.  This is 
107 
 
why I turn to the work of Jacques Derrida in the next chapter.  Derrida offers a 
completion to the project started by Heidegger in his explicit use of musical ideas to put 
forward his notion of deconstruction.  Derrida ultimately shows the adequacy of the 
musical notion of attunement to the type of thinking necessary for theology.  He does so 
through the development of a disposition that is in-tune with the rhythm, cadence, and 
timbre of the Other is what allows one to think.  This will open the path to thinking 
theologically as improvisation.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
DERRIDA AND ATTUNEMENT: USING DECONSTRUCTION 
TO FURTHER THE IMPROVISATIONAL NATURE OF THINKING 
The next phase of the argument picks up the thought of Jacques Derrida.  
Derrida’s thought, often termed deconstruction, is similar to that of Heidegger’s 
Destrucktion.  However, Derrida extends the notion of deconstruction (Destruktion) to all 
discourses. He believes that deconstruction is always occurring in discourse, so that what 
the thinker does is to notice or be aware of the deconstructive nature of different texts.  
Thus, deconstruction is not a method.  Rather, it is a disposition that one takes in regards 
to the text through a way of reading that comes from the inherent instability of texts.  
Deconstruction is both a condition of discourse and includes the disposition of the reader 
to notice its occurrence.  The argument in what follows is that Derrida’s explication of 
deconstruction, and how it functions in his thinking, opens a way of thinking for theology 
which takes seriously the place of attunement.  The concern in this chapter is to extend 
the discussion on Heidegger and attunement by explicating the thinking of attunement 
through an analysis of deconstruction.    
In order to accomplish the goals of this chapter, the argument will consist of three 
steps.  First, I make the claim that Derrida’s deconstruction is concerned with attunement.  
This is seen specifically in reference to two works: his famous essay “Différance” and his 
two-volume Psyche.  Part of this first section will be to notice theactive-passive nature of 
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thinking, along with how one becomes attuned to the rhythm of texts.  The second part of 
the chapter works out a notion of attunement through an exploration of Derrida’s work on 
hospitality.  The goal of this section is to develop the thinking on the nature of the 
disposition of the thinker in relation to the Other and how this occurs through an analysis 
of the welcome, call/ response, invitation/ visitation, and event.  This leads to the third 
section, where the notion of hospitality allows Derrida to develop a way of interpreting 
through his discussion of translation.  For Derrida, this becomes an ethical act because 
interpreting is a “risk” one takes for the other due to the attunement one has to the other.  
Here, the development of the risk and responsibility of translation will be shown as an 
outcome of the deconstructive thinking developed in the first two sections.   
A.  Deconstruction as Attunement 
Derrida’s deconstruction flows out of a concern of being in rhythm with, or in-
tune with, the other of the text.  Deconstruction is reliant upon the rhythm of texts.  This 
is seen especially in the article “Différance” and Psyche: The Invention of the Other.  In 
these texts one sees that the turn to deconstruction helps to think through the nature of 
discourse and to show that at the heart of Derrida’s enterprise is a concern to be attuned.  
The way that he does this is through the articulation of how one is aware of the rhythm of 
texts by being disposed in a certain way toward a text.   
Before the discussion of Derrida’s two texts, it would be helpful to offer a brief 
foray into the essentials of Derrida’s mode of operation.  At the center of his criticism is 
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the idea that metaphysics is logocentric in that it tries to endow being with presence.1  He 
says that deconstruction calls into question the foundations of metaphysical thinking by 
pointing out the inherent destabilization and complications of such thinking.2  For him, 
all totalities are inherently unstable and self-deconstructing.3  This is because the signs 
used to signify a full presence inherently come before the presence: the presence is 
always coming but never here.4  Thus, as Derrida says, “There is neither symbol nor sign 
but a becoming-sign of the symbol.”5  What becomes necessary is a supplement where 
“the sign is…the supplement of the thing itself.”6  This supplement always moves away 
from full presence or full absence.  It is deferred, exceeding the language of metaphysics.  
Deconstruction, through the noticing of the supplement, calls into question the binary 
oppositions7 that are often evoked in metaphysical thought and shows that the opposition 
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between them is not as great or as miniscule as is often thought.8  Then he makes explicit 
that there is a gulf between concepts that are often thought as almost synonymous 
because each contains a trace of the other.9  Thus, deconstruction occurs as one is 
attentive to the other within the text, noticing the beginning of the trace and how the trace 
becomes “occulted” by metaphysics.10  Thus, the coming of the other in the trace calls 
into question the logocentrism of a thinker or text.11   
One of the ways that Derrida questions the logocentrism of texts is through is 
notion of différance.  This notion is taken up most explicitly in the essay “Différance”12 
which explicates the mode of thinking Derrida is pursuing.  He turns to the notion of 
différance because it is something that resists the claim to a totalizing definition through 
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its play or movement.13  This is seen through Derrida’s etymology of différance.  He 
takes différance to be the combination of the double meaning of the French word différer.  
Différer has two meanings which often operate differently.  The first is “to temporize,” to 
make temporal and to give space to.  This also includes the idea of delay.  Here, he brings 
out the metaphysical definition of différer.  The second meaning concerns otherness, as in 
to make not identical.  This element of otherness becomes key to the definition.14  In 
using the neologism différance, Derrida wants to keep both meanings together 
simultaneously.  He joins the two by turning to the idea of the sign and the problematic 
nature thereof.  Différance is unable to be a sign because it is a constantly deferred 
presence, never attaining the presence necessary in the logocentric nature of the sign, 
which shows the sign to be reaching for a presence that never comes.15  Thus, language 
becomes a series of differences as  signs signify in their difference from one another.  
This allows Derrida to view meaning in difference as historical, constituted, and trapped 
within systems of differences.16   
Derrida furthers his analyses by showing how différance makes signification 
possible.  He argues that signification is not static but is dynamic, associated with 
movement (or rhythm).  The movement of signification comes from the fact that a sign 
only signifies when it is relating “to something other than itself.”  This allows the sign to 
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carry with it the meaning it held in the past, the meaning it holds in the present, and to 
cast its meaning into the future.  This sign is always in motion in its spacing of itself 
between the past and the future.  There is a constant need for the pursual of spacing and 
difference in this movement of signification.17  This leads Derrida to the idea that 
différance is the “active” moving discord of differences that was first brought to the fore 
by Nietzsche in his opposition to systems that seek to govern or totalize.18  This active 
discord is seen in the fact that différance points to the deconstruction of systems through 
its dual nature, where it simultaneously points to the economy of presence which a sign 
always tries to point back to, while also pointing to the “impossible presence” of an 
“expenditure without reserve” where presence is never attained.19  While this may seem 
illogical, it is the logic of différance which operates in the displacement of the 
metaphysical tradition.   
Derrida uses the logic of différance because it breaks the dualism of presence and 
absence.  He undertakes an exposition of the deconstructive nature of metaphysics/ onto-
theology because within this discourse there has been a consistent move to establish 
presence.  Derrida shows that absence is in the attempt to establish presence while 
presence plagues any move to absence.  The two cannot be disunited.  Différance 
operates in a way that breaks this opposition by pointing to the non-possibility of pure 
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presence because of the necessity of absence within presence.20  It is this breaking of the 
binary presence/ absence in a text that allows for interpretation.  Différance opens the 
way for the reader to see the presence in the absence and vice versa.  There is always 
alterity in the logic of différance.  Through this logic of différance Derrida establishes a 
disposition which allows one to move with a text’s movement, allowing one to read not 
only what shows itself, but what is hidden, absent.21 
This hidden, absent, almost nonexistent other of the text is what Derrida refers to 
as the trace.22  Derrida says of the trace that it is “not a presence but the simulacrum of a 
presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself, it properly has no site—
erasure belongs to its structure.”23  The presence of the trace only comes in its own 
economy of signification.  The trace is known by entering the movement of signification 
through attunement.  The trace appears as a counter-movement or an under-current, 
something that does not appear at the outset, but comes to be in the midst of moving 
within a discourse through the economy of signification.  The appearance of the trace 
may also be in its absence.  Thus, the trace shows the limit of the text and the fact that the 
text breaks this limit.  The trace is recognized through one’s attunement to the text where 
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there is a recognition of the rhythm and movement of a text.  This attunement gives the 
ability to notice whether there is a “stutter” or “error” or “difference” or “other” in the 
text.24       
This other of a text or discourse causes Derrida to ask how it is possible to see or 
know what is outside of a text. 25  For Derrida, it is only through the attempt to be 
disposed to the other by listening for and hearing the other in its calling that one is able to 
see the outside of the text.  As Derrida ends the essay “Différance” he is caught in the 
problematic play of différance in that the word does not really signify anything and it is 
unnameable.  Derrida is unable to escape his own play.  The way out of the play of 
différance is found in Derrida’s search for an outside.  In his search, which seems to 
ultimately trap him, he is able to point to an/other that can break the limits of such a text.  
He finds that taking a certain disposition or approach to the text allows him to get outside 
of the problematic play.26  The approach that Derrida takes is to be attuned to the other, 
in-tune with the movement of a text or tradition in such a way that one can see the outside 
limit and allow the limit to call into question one’s thinking, giving a different way to 
“move.”  
A bind occurs here, though.  The question that comes to the fore is: what allows 
the attunement to the other to occur?  What allows one to be attuned?  How does one 
become aware of what is to be attuned to?  Here, there is a need for a supplement to 
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Derrida’s différance.  This is found in the notion of “rhythm” at work in his two-volume 
Psyche.27  In this text, Derrida’s thinking attempts to explicate how it is that one is able to 
pay attention to the other of the text.28  He paves a way for navigating the question of 
how to be disposed to allow a deconstruction to take place.  The way he does this is 
through the idea of rhythm.  By being attentive to the rhythm of the text and how the text 
varies rhythms and gestures, there is attunement to the text.  
Derrida turns to rhythm as a way of thinking through the idea of deconstruction 
because it resists the implicit move of metaphysics and ontology to totalization.29  
Through the notion of rhythm, Derrida is able to open a path of thinking through texts 
that resists any attempts at closure.30  His understanding of the rhythm of a text gives 
Derrida a focus on the inability of a reader to construct a border around a text.  There is a 
continual openness at work here in that there is “an infinite extension of metaphoric 
supplements.”31  Derrida shows that one follows these supplements in the creation of a 
rhythm that allows one to read and follow a text in such a way as to constantly allow it to 
unfold.  By being aware of the rhythm, one gets a feel for the beat, pulse, and meter of 
                                                 
 
27
 Jacques Derrida, Psyche: Invention of the Other, Volumes I and II, ed. Peggy Kamuf and 
Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007-2008).  
 
28
 Now, a caveat must be made.  In what follows, my proposal is not an attempt to articulate what 
Derrida thought or would have argued.  Rather, the project here is to pick up on a theme, a gesture, in one 
of his texts and let this open a path for thinking.  Through his use of the idea of rhythm in Psyche, Derrida 
opens a way of explicating the idea of attunement which is important for the majority of this project.    
 
29
 Derrida, “What Remains by Force of Music,” trans. Peggy Kamuf, in Psyche: Inventions of the 
Other, Volume I, 89.  
 
30
 Caputo agrees that deconstruction is always concerned with leaving open and avoiding closure.  
To see how Caputo does this in reference to the sovereignty of God, see Caputo, The Weakness of God: A 
Theology of the Event, 28 and 32ff.  
 
31
 Derrida, “What Remains by Force of Music,” 84.  
117 
 
the text.  Thus, the importance of rhythm is its use in the construction of a way of 
thinking that does not allow one to dominate by performing a hegemonic thinking of 
closure. 
The reason that one cannot dominate a text or way of thinking is due to what 
Derrida calls the inherent “iterability” of texts.  Iterability refers to the ability of a text to 
be repeated and disseminated outside of its original context.  Iterability is almost 
synonymous with différance as the iterability of a text leads to its inherent 
destabilization.32  Derrida says that it is this structure which allows every mark “to 
withdraw from a context, to free itself from any determined bond to its origin, its 
meaning, or its referent, to emigrate in order to play elsewhere, in whole or in part, 
another role.”33  At work is the role that iterability plays in putting a rhythm to work in 
the text.  Iterability allows the different marks in a text to play by moving beyond their 
initial determination so that a text is in constant flux.  The “meaning” is unstable.  As 
such, there is a necessity to be aware of the play of the text by “listening” to the rhythm 
of the text as it comes through in its iterability.  The iterability of the text is what allows it 
to be rhythmic, changing pace and tone so that one is open to the fact that the meaning is 
at play.  The goal of the interpreter is to be disposed so that one is aware of how the 
marks in the text are at play. 
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Derrida’s essay “The Deaths of Roland Barthes”34 offers a look at how Derrida is 
not looking for the stability of a way of reading but is following the rhythm of Barthes’ 
work.  He begins his discussion by pursuing the musical nature of Barthes’ work, saying 
that an interpretation of Barthes must begin “…with an ear to music…”35 The reason for 
this is because Barthes’ work is plural.  Barthes uses plurality to embrace the incomplete 
nature of thinking.  For Derrida, this plurality of ways of thinking necessitates an 
approach that is musical in that it follows different movements and themes.  This opens 
Derrida to the option of pursuing a way of thinking that embraces the fragment, 
understanding an approach to Barthes’ as one that must be fragmentary because of 
Barthes’ plural voice.36  As such, Derrida advocates that one should pay attention to the 
“obscure figures” of Barthes by not only being aware, but of seeking out the “pace, step, 
style, timbre, tone, and gestures” of his corpus.37  By being attuned to Barthes and 
reading through this attunement, Derrida becomes open to the fact that Barthes is 
“playing” a certain music in his texts which opens into a plurality of voices, none of 
which have the ability to dominate or overcome the other.   
The referent of the text seems to always be escaping.  The only way for Derrida to 
“catch” this other in its reference is to listen for it, aware of its rhythm by being attuned 
to the text in such a way so that he hears the other as it interrupts.  The listening opens 
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him to the other through the disposition of being actively passive, performing the action 
of listening which causes him to passively wait for the other to break in.38  Derrida’s 
reading picks up on what he sees as the “ghost” of Barthes’ texts, which is their 
fragmentary form as a composition, specifically in the vein of a sonata or fugue.  For 
Derrida, this opens up the idea that Barthes is a “musical” writer.  Barthes has 
constructed a series of texts that ask to be read as an accompaniment which gives rise to 
the “voice of the other.”39  The fugue/ sonata composition40 of his work comes from the 
polyphony at work in his writing.  These forms open up the impetus to pay attention to 
the way that Barthes’ plays in the text, the cadence at work, the rhythm which gives the 
texts their form.41  The texts are in a form which “disorganizes all studied discourses, all 
theoretical systems and philosophies.”42  The possibility for this reading is an attunement 
to the way that Barthes’ constructs the works, as well as the way that texts play the music 
that Barthes has set before them.  Derrida offers a way of reading that seeks the play at 
work in the corpus which allows a voice of the other to come to the fore.   
Noticeably lacking in the above discussion of “The Deaths of Roland Barthes” 
has been an analysis of how Derrida understands rhythm and how this opens certain 
possibilities for the possibilities of thinking.  This lack is fulfilled by turning to a second 
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essay in Psyche—“Désistance.”43  In this essay Derrida develops a more explicit 
understanding of rhythm and textuality through an analysis of the French thinker Philip 
Lacoue-Labarthe.  In this essay, the importance of being attuned to the rhythm of a 
thinker in order to offer a way of reading and thinking becomes clearer.      
Derrida begins his reading of Lacoue-Labarthe with a similar exhortation as that 
which began his reading of Barthes: the reading should begin with a hearing of the 
rhythm at work in the writings of Lacoue-Labarthe.44  The task in this reading is to listen 
to the writer in his texts, to follow his rhythm, listening for the possibilities open to the 
reader.  Derrida is looking to discover how these texts unfold and fold back in their 
movement between disclosing meaning and hiding meaning.  This leads Derrida to look 
for the way that the voice of these texts plays rhythmically.  The rhythmic play of the 
voice of the text stems from the fact that Derrida reads Lacoue-Labarthe in a middle 
voice, neither active nor passive.  This middle voice—that of “désistance”—lives in the 
gap that exists between the way that the text speaks and the way that one should receive 
that speaking through listening.45  The rhythm of the text leads into the aporetic nature of 
interpretation due to the necessity to decide how and what to interpret.  One is attuned to 
this through the passive-active disposition one takes in regards to the text in its 
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requirement to actively listen so that one can encounter the meaning(s) at work in the 
thinking of the other.46   
Derrida points to the fact that in order to read the texts of Lacoue-Labarthe47 one 
should be tuned-in to the rhythm of these texts.  This attuning comes through reading and 
rereading of the texts to become aware of the major themes and also the incidentals at 
work in the text.  These are what gives the text its shape and color along with its general 
tone.  Derrida says one should “submit to their strategy, made up of audacity, cunning 
and prudence…”  The nature of attunement being pursued by Derrida is twofold: first, it 
is active in engaging texts and thinkers but, second, becomes simultaneously passive in 
the submission of oneself to these texts and thinkers as one takes in how they have 
unfolded themselves.  The one who is attuned pursues a reading that is attentive to the 
nuances of thinking by being aware of the pace and tone of a thinker and her texts.  It is 
this being tuned-in that opens the possibilities for thinking by allowing one to tap into the 
“manner and maneuver” of a thinker and her texts.48 
At this point in the essay, Derrida finds it imperative to enter into a direct 
discussion of the idea of rhythm through an elaboration of the Greek “rhuthmos.”  He 
enters this discussion specifically as he sees it at work in Lacoue-Labarthe.  For Derrida, 
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the main idea of rhythm in Lacoue-Labarthe is that there is “no rhythm without 
repetition, spacing, caesura…and thus repercussion, resonance, echo, reverberation.”49 
Rhythm is at work in each person, constituting the person.  Part of the nature of thinking 
is in the active-passive idea of désistance that Derrida has been articulating.50  The 
rhythm that constitutes thinking is that of the movement between the active and passive 
in oneself and in other thinkers and texts.  The rhythm of each thinker and of each text is 
what signs the texts and thinking of a person.  As such, it is this rhythm which makes 
possible the noticing of a deconstruction at work inside a way of thinking.  If 
deconstruction is to notice the structural aporias in a text then the rhythmic nature of the 
text, in the movement between the active and the passive, points to such problems.  
Deconstruction becomes possible in this rhythmic movement of thinking.51   
Attunement comes through the rhythmic necessity of the caesura.  Derrida says, 
“There is not rhythm without caesura.”52  However, he is quick to note that the caesura 
itself is not rhythmic, or anti-rhythmic for that matter.  If it was, this would make it some 
part of a dialectical logic.53  Rather, the caesura is that which “interrupts alternation.”  
The caesura is the gap, that mark of the withdrawal of the text or of the movement of a 
way of thinking into something else.  The caesura points to the breaking points of texts, 
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to the borders that are crossed, to the rhythmic movements that do not always make 
sense.  The caesura opens possibilities and makes possible the movement of a textual 
rhythm in new directions.  This is due to the fact that caesurae within these texts show the 
textual gaps which give an openness to the possible meaning at work.  The caesurae point 
to the rhythms that make up these gaps.  As the logic of the active-passive at work in 
désistance makes apparent, the gap brought forth through various caesurae also points to 
the inner breaking of each person who is thinking.  If one is constituted by rhythm and 
rhythm is marked by this gap, then this gap is part of the constitution of one’s thinking.  
The middle voice pursued by désistance is not rhythmic as a movement from active to 
passive but is rhythmic in its very existence.  This means that by necessity the reader/ 
thinker is caught up in the gap.  This person is actively engaged in passively receiving the 
other as the other gives and yet, can never fully receive because of the gap that exists 
between the two.  There is no way of reconciling this.   
This situation points to the double bind of rhythm.  Rhythm seems to be a 
movement between two things; but, this would place it within the logocentric, dialectical 
thinking which Derrida is actively working against.  Derrida navigates this bind through a 
turn to the undecidable, which gives rise to thinking rhythm through the caesura.  The 
caesura points to the gap where there may be no rhythm.  Since the caesura is a gap in the 
text, there would be no rhythm here to be attuned to.  However, in order to find the 
caesura in the text, one needs to be aware of the movement that opens the gap.  To do 
this, Derrida posits that a movement—a rhythmic device—is what opens the gap.  Thus, 
the absence of rhythm in the caesura—the arrhythmic—actually brings with it the 
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necessity of rhythm.  For Derrida, then, rhythm is even at work in the non-rhythmic, in its 
own absence.  The nature of désistance allows Derrida to avoid the logic of calculation.54  
The gap that exists between the reader and the text leaves open the undecidable.  
This gap between the two necessitates the need for a movement in rhythm as there must 
be some point of contact which opens the back-and-forth between the reader and text.  
This allows the overcoming of the gap, but not the destruction of the gap.  The caesura 
remains only because once it is covered over the thinker relies on a logic of calculation 
that necessitates forcing a text to be read within a system or way of thinking.  If the 
thinker stays vigilant with the caesura then there is the realization that one can never 
cross this gap and must rely on the logic of désistance at work.  This allows one to tap 
into the rhythm of the text.  This indecidability does not allow closure but a way of 
thinking that embraces the gap and the openness that is part of the gap.55 
The caesura points to the need for a certain disposition on the part of the reader.  
Derrida finds an example of such a disposition in the work of Lacoue-Labarthe.  Derrida 
notices that the rhythmic nature of Lacoue-Labarthe’s thinking upon and reading of 
others is necessitated by his “rigorous compassion” and not by the imposition of an 
outside logic or system.  Lacoue-Labarthe “institutes himself as a subject” as one who is 
“haunted by rhythm and music.”56  Derrida follows Lacoue-Labarthe in that he places 
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himself into the void, the gap, that exists between the text and himself.  He embraces this 
as the opportunity to engage the other at work in the text.  Derrida believes this brings 
one “…as close to and as far from…” the other text as possible but always works in the 
movement of a rhythm.57  What is really necessary is the attunement that occurs through 
that reader’s initial disposition of taking up the middle voice.  The middle voice is both 
active and passive, actively engaging something while also passively taking it in.  This 
allows the opportunity to stand in the gap of the caesura, actively standing here while 
passively waiting to engage the other in this gap.  This opens the possibilities for 
engaging the other through the other’s engagement of oneself.58   
The disposition of attunement that Derrida advocates opens the reader to read the 
text within its own rhythm and movement.  The problem that arises comes with the 
question of what would happen if a rhythm changed or if the text is “off beat.”  Here, 
Derrida posits the need for a “stutter,” similar to the way that a jazz musician may stop on 
a line and stutter it by repeating it and seeing what possibilities for the line exist.  The 
player gets “stuck” in a moment, on a line, a note, a chord, or something else, and then 
plays on top of this.  Derrida does something similar.  In his reading of Lacoue-Labarthe, 
he stops at one point and asks “How can I write this?”  His reading and subsequent 
elucidation of Lacoue-Labarthe seem to get stuck on a parenthesis in the work of Lacoue-
Labarthe.  He is not sure what to do with this parenthesis.  As a parenthesis, it is not 
necessary to the rest of the argument.  And yet…and yet, it is there.  It catches him off 
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guard and pushes his reading to “a point of incomprehension.”  He is stuck on the 
parenthesis; his attunement to the rhythmic play of the text has caught him, making him 
stop and write on that which does not seem to matter.  And yet, he writes and comments.  
He shows how this parenthesis is what opens his reading of Lacoue-Labarthe by taking 
up the ideas of rhythm and the disposition of the subject in interpreting.  Thus, the stutter 
becomes the impetus for Derrida’s reading by picking up that which seemed unnecessary 
and yet opens the possibility of thinking.59   
Through this elaboration of both difference and the role of rhythm in Psyche, one 
can posit that deconstruction is primarily concerned with being attuned to the other.  This 
attunement to the other through the rhythm of the text opens the possibilities of the text.  
For Derrida this means one must [il faut] do justice to the other.  This does not mean to 
calculate or control the other of the text60 but to understand where the other comes from 
and how this other calls into question the very concept being brought forth by the text.  
The other is “heard” in the text and this “hearing” leads to an understanding of how one 
may open up a place where the other comes to the fore.61  The necessity of “hearing” this 
other in a text is akin to what has been termed “attunement.”  It is a thinking of the other 
as other through the being open to the other in and through a text.62  Deconstruction is 
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reliant upon the coming of the other and says to this other, “come.”63  Deconstruction 
seeks to do justice to the other.64  The justice at the heart of deconstruction is concerned 
with allowing this other to come [viens] and to listen/ hear this other as it comes.   
B.  Hospitality as Attunement 
In this section I outline the notion of attunement more thoroughly through an 
analysis of hospitality as it is at work in Derrida.  Hospitality necessitates65 openness to 
the other and does so by embracing the active-passive mood of engaging to be engaged.  
It is this attunement to the other which allows one to notice the deconstructive 
movements within texts.66  In fact, Derrida goes so far as to say that deconstruction is 
hospitality. 67  This is because deconstruction is for the other by being hospitable to the 
other as the other comes in whatever the other comes, even the other beyond the other.68  
For Derrida, deconstruction is concerned with the allowing of the other to come which is 
also the primary concern of hospitality.69  The notion of hospitality is at the heart of 
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deconstruction as a mode of resistance against hegemonic structures and forms.  
Hospitality shows the possibility for thinking through the continued allowing of the other 
to come and being in tune with this other so that there is no possibility of closure in 
relation to a text or system.70   
For Derrida, the beginning of hospitality is the moment when one is engaged in 
being-open to the other.71   This begins with the idea of listening.  For Derrida, the other 
must come from somewhere, whether the past, future, or another place.  Listening fulfills 
the active-passive logic Derrida emphasizes in that it actively engages some phenomenon 
while being able to only interact with that which has been given to be heard.72  Derrida 
explicitly links this notion of listening with the Heideggerian notion of Stimmung by 
showing how listening is not strictly concerned with knowing the words that were said 
but also wants to be tuned-in to the way in which the words are said or written, to the 
tone and rhythm of the phenomenon or text.73   
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As the beginning of attunement, listening initiates the movement of hospitality so 
that one can come to what Derrida terms “the welcome.”  As he describes it, the welcome 
is a “tending toward the other, attentive intention, intentional attention, yes to the 
other.”74  Derrida says that the welcome is the first gesture towards the other.  Drawing 
from the work of Emmanuel Levinas (specifically Totality and Infinity),75 Derrida shows 
that “hospitality becomes the very name of what opens itself to the face, or, more 
precisely, of what ‘welcomes’ it.”76  Hospitality and the welcome are synonymous as 
both are predicated upon being open for the other to come.  In fact, the being-open is the 
necessary step of hospitality in welcoming the other and, thus, being attuned to the other.  
He furthers the understanding of the welcome by showing it to be an operational 
concept that speaks of the first gesture one takes toward the Other.  This is a movement 
of being open for the coming of the other in a non-thematizing encounter.77  Derrida 
describes this encounter as both a movement without movement78 and as a waiting 
without waiting.79  The action of the welcome is to be passive by allowing the other to 
come.  It is only in this passive activity of directing one’s attention toward an/other 
                                                 
74
 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22-3.    
 
75
 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).  Derrida has been engaged with the thought of Levinas 
since the early part of his career.  For an example, see Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An 
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 79-153.  
 
76
 Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, 21.  
 
77
 Ibid., 25.  
 
78
 Ibid., 22-3.  
 
79
 Derrida, “Hostipitality,” 360ff.  
 
130 
 
without necessarily trying to find the other that the welcome begins the movement of 
hospitality.  With the welcome operating in such a way, it becomes the condition of the 
possibility for one’s encounter with the other.  This is because if one is not open to the 
other, available to be encountered by the other, then the other has no way to encounter the 
person.80  This encounter of the other in the welcome becomes the beginning of 
attunement, where the thinker welcomes the fact that an/other may come and be 
experienced.   
In the mode of the active-passive, the welcome extends the invitation to be 
encountered, to have the other come (although this invitation is an invitation to be 
interrupted and encountered).81  The invitation is just that—a true inviting of the other to 
come.  In this act of invitation one offers a sincere invitation to come.  The welcome 
necessitates an extension of a warm, friendly invitation, opening oneself, home, life to 
this other.82  Hospitality welcomes the other without limit and stipulation.  Hospitality 
necessitates the unlimited opening of the self and subsequent embrace of the other.  
Derrida goes so far as to say that this can be an unexpected visitation, reaching beyond 
the logic of invitation.  Rather, to show that the welcome of hospitality is at work even 
when it seems to not be needed, the visitation of the other also necessitates the welcome: 
this is hospitality without limit.83   
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Part of hospitality, in its most pure/ impossible form, is the unexpected nature of 
the coming of the other.  In order to practice hospitality in its most pure form (an 
impossible hospitality),84 it becomes necessary to welcome the one that was never known 
to be coming.  This becomes the impossible hospitality because there is an offering of 
hospitality to the one who comes within an unforeseeable arrival, “whose visitation…is 
such an irruption that I’m not prepared to receive the person.”85  Hospitality would be 
quite easy if it were only looking to receive the one that was known to be coming, who 
had responded to the invitation with an RSVP, coming within a controlled invitation.  
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However, hospitality, as Derrida construes it, must be a welcoming of the other who one 
cannot know is coming, who one does not have time to prepare for, who cannot be 
controlled, but upsets the host’s life, interrupting it.  It is only when there is a cost that 
hospitality comes to be.  When the other comes and disrupts life then hospitality occurs.86  
Thus, hospitality becomes a “welcoming beyond my capacity to welcome,” offering 
beyond the capacity to offer, opening beyond the capacity of the self to be open.87   
The coming of the other is an event.  This event is marked by interruption, which 
Derrida calls that which “regularly puts an end to the authority of the Said, the 
thematical, the dialectical, the same, the economical, and so on...”88  The interruption of 
the coming of the other is that which breaks open the systems often used to and embrace 
the closure of the other.  Derrida’s thinking on the event is such that the event is an event 
because it does break open these hegemonic systems of closure by shattering the bounds 
often placed on meaning and interpretation.89  The event opens space because it comes in 
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the “incalculable unconditionality of hospitality.”90  Here, Derrida is saying that the event 
occurs because of the fact that hospitality occurs, because hospitality is unconditionally 
offered to the other (whoever it may be) and that in doing so, there is not attempt to 
calculate.  The other is allowed to come as other and interrupts, disturbs, and breaks 
systems open so that there is no possibility of closure.91     
The event of the coming of the other in the welcome necessitates a response on 
the part of the one who welcomes.  One must continue the welcome in a response to the 
interruption that is the coming of the other.  This is evident in Derrida’s (in)famous essay 
“How to Avoid Speaking: Denials.”  Here, Derrida articulates the problems he associates 
with negative theology, specifically as represented by Pseudo-Dionysius.  In so doing, he 
briefly opens one’s thinking to how the ultimate other—God—would break hegemonic 
systems.  He turns to the thought of God as the Other who calls before one can respond.  
God, as Other, calls first and the necessity is for a response.  The call of God precedes 
any speech about God, thus necessitating a speech that can respond in some sort of 
fashion.  Speech in the apophatic tradition of Christian mysticism always is preceded by 
God but also proceeds from God in that it is only in the response to the coming of God 
that one can and does speak.92  For Derrida, this example shows that the welcome is at 
work to be open to the call of God, the Other, which then allows God to interrupt one’s 
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thinking.  This interruption by the Other calls for a response in a new way of speaking of 
God which is what apophatic theology seeks.   
The response becomes an act of faith to the other in the hope that the other will 
come and also the hope that the other refuses to harm or destroy.  The decision to respond 
to the other is not able to be calculated.  At some point, one must simply act.  No one can 
calculate every possible variable.  To decide for the other by responding to the other must 
be a decision based upon a (well-informed) act of faith.93  There is no certainty in the 
action; but, this lack of certainty is what opens up the ability to act.  This action is 
predicated upon the fact that the other may not respond and that there may be nothing 
else from the other.  The response to the other cannot expect the other to reciprocate; this 
response must simply be a response.  The necessity is that while one wants the response 
of the other there needs to be an acceptance of whatever decision the other makes.94 
Derrida accepts the other however the other may come because he wants to 
counter the common move to allow the other to come but then to place stipulations upon 
the other as the other comes.95  He seeks to show that in hospitality thematization of the 
other should not occur if one wants to continue practicing hospitality.96  The other cannot 
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be reduced to some theme or common denominator.97  In reducing the other so that “I” 
am in control of the appearing of the other is to calculate the way that the other can come.  
In that event hospitality ceases.98  However, there is a certain tension within Derrida 
when it comes to the idea of thematization in hospitality.  Derrida wants to avoid 
dominating thematization, but pushes the idea of thematization by arguing that it can only 
occur with hospitality in that hospitality is the condition of the possibility for 
encountering the other and one cannot thematize the other without this encounter.  
Hospitality, thus, becomes the condition of the possibility for thematization.99  In light of 
this, we gain a better understanding of attunement in that it is an action of allowing the 
other to come and accepting this coming as best as one can.100 
For Derrida, hospitality works to break open any attempt at closure through the 
showing of the fact that closure of the other is not possible.  This is seen explicitly in 
multiple places in Derrida’s corpus, under different themes like gift and justice.101  In this 
line of Derrida’s thinking, hospitality does not become itself until it is enacted through 
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the responsibility—or duty—of a response with and for the other.102  Deconstruction is 
predicated upon the demand for justice, which is what makes deconstruction a movement 
of hospitality.103 Hospitality is the structural logic used to bring justice for the other.104  
However, hospitality’s logic necessitates a conclusion of taking responsibility for the 
other by responding with the other.  The necessity of hospitality is to not only the 
welcome into one’s own home, but to also clear the space for the other to break into one’s 
own world. One then stands with the other in this inbreaking, allowing the other to call 
into question one’s own world.   
In order to further articulate this, Derrida uses the example of religion as a place 
of the enacting of hospitality.  In religion he finds the importance of responsibility and 
duty for/ to the other to also come to the fore.  For religion, this response is twofold.  
First, as in the welcome of hospitality, there is a response to the coming of the other.  For 
religion, the necessity is not only to respond to the coming of the divine other, but then to 
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take responsibility for this response through the bearing of witness or testimony.105  To 
elucidate this more fully, Derrida turns to what he sees as the ultimate act of hospitality—
the story of Abram/ Abraham (Gen. 16).106  Derrida says that the visitation of God to 
Abram is “radically surprising and overtaking.”107  The identity of Abram is “fractured” 
because “he receives without being ready to welcome.”  God visits Abram in such a way 
as to completely disrupt Abram’s life (he is telling of the gift of Isaac) and to disrupt it in 
such a way that Abram can no longer be seen as Abram, but has been transformed into 
someone new, Abraham.  This is the ultimate act of hospitality on the part of Abram as 
he is open to God in such a way that while he was not expecting to encounter God—and 
not ready to do so—that when he does encounter God, he allows himself to be 
overwhelmed and even transformed by this God.  After this, Abraham becomes the one to 
bear witness to God.  For Derrida, this is the story of hospitality par excellence  
This responsibility of hospitality is a duty for one to act in the name of the 
other.108  By taking on responsibility for the other, it is not that one acts for the other, but 
that one acts with the other.109  For Derrida, acting with the other on behalf of the other, 
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tears at the very fabric of current structures by calling into question what has always been 
thought as possible.110  One is bringing the other into the world as a questioning of one’s 
own world.  This breaks the systems that have engulfed the other by destroying otherness 
and difference for the move to a sameness and similarity.  By taking responsibility 
seriously as a practice of hospitality, a different way of existing is brought forth.  This 
world where hospitality is possible is the very world that deconstruction asks one to live 
into, expecting something that never gets here.111      
Hospitality is a leap from knowledge into the decision, into the necessity of being 
with others through the welcoming of the other.112  This leads deeper into an 
understanding of attunement.  No longer is attunement about just a disposition, but is now 
concerned with the movement to a decision of being for the other.  This decision is not 
predicated upon something that is definitively known (like that the sky is blue), but that is 
on a best guess, a good judgment.  While the decision comes from a probable, it is still a 
decision that is not predicated upon concrete knowledge.  The possibility for one to act 
comes because one knows that one must act in accordance with the other, having faith 
that the action opens the space for the other to be other.  
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The ultimate result of hospitality and the attunement that comes through it is a 
gathering.113  The gathering is the culmination of hospitality because it is the bringing 
together of multiple people who are different.  The gathering is the unity that comes from 
the living in difference with multiple others.114  For Derrida, the ultimate example of such 
a gathering is a pure democracy.  In such a democracy, there would be simply the 
existence and equality of many differences where these differences are all gathered in a 
mutual interplay.115  Derrida talks of the fact that democracy tends only to be open to 
those who want to be my brother or compatriot and excludes those who are foreign, 
outside, beyond the borders.  He implies that a pure democracy must also embrace these 
others on the outside or as the foreigner.  For democracy to be pure, it must allow the 
voice of all to speak while practicing the act of listening.  The pure ethics of hospitality 
occurs in a pure democracy because this is the only structure that supports the other as the 
one who is absolutely unlike.116  Thus, democracy is a place where hospitality is the 
ethical norm, which leads to a place of gathering which we would term democracy.   
The discussion of hospitality opens a useful logic for my project.  This logic 
builds on the work by Derrida in regards to différance and rhythm.  Through these, we 
see the necessity to be in tune with the other in the text.  In the first part of the chapter, I 
argued for the necessity of attunement and now, through the discussion of hospitality, 
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attunement is necessary in order for deconstruction to take place as it opens one to the 
other.  Derrida’s notion of hospitality opens a way of thinking that is predicated upon the 
necessity of attunement to an/other in such a way that this other breaks hegemonic 
categories, one’s own thinking, and calls into question the system that leads to 
totalization.  The way Derrida does this is through the actions of welcome, openness and 
listening.       
C.  Risking Interpretation—The Example of Translation117 
Derrida’s thinking on attunement culminates in his analysis of the nature of 
translation.  For Derrida, the final move made in hospitality is to risk responsibility for 
the other.  Similarly, in the deconstruction of texts, the last move is to risk an 
interpretation of the text.  In both hospitality and interpretation attunement calls one to 
risk for the other so that the other may come to light.  Attunement is of no use in either 
situation if it does not articulate the place of the other in new place and in a new way of 
thinking.  Derrida calls this move to articulate in new places and new ways translation.  
The last section of this chapter, then, is an analysis of Derrida’s notion of translation and 
how this shows the risking of interpretation.  
For Derrida, the importance of translation comes from the fact that all writing and 
thinking begin from the encounter with the other, however that encounter may occur.118  
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Thinking begins from interrogating this encounter with the other in hospitality.  This 
other comes, whether in the text or in a structure, and dislocates the reader and the text.  
The necessity is to respond to the coming of the other.  This is what writing and thinking 
accomplish in their encounter with the event of the other’s coming.  Writing and thinking 
interrogate this coming.  This interrogation can result in the suppression of the other if 
one subjugates the other to a systematic or hegemonic discourse.  However, if thinking 
takes its impetus from the encounter with the other, then it responds to the other by both 
raising and attempting to think about the questions that the coming makes pertinent.  The 
response gives rise to the other by showing the way that the other has come in a text or 
structure.119   
Derrida argues that translation is the way to respond to the coming of the other.  
He turns to translation because he views translation to be the task of philosophy as a 
discipline concerned with interpretation of texts and arguments.120   Derrida sees 
translation and interpretation as synonymous due to the inherent iterability of texts.121  
The text is marked in such a way as to be able to be read and communicated, but never 
with the full knowledge of why it was written, who wrote it, and to whom it was 
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written.122  For Derrida, this leads to the fact that the text can be repeated anywhere, in 
any context at any time.  The text is no longer tied to any controlling presence.  From 
here Derrida concludes that it “can break with every given context, engendering an 
infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable.  This does not imply 
that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts 
without any center or absolute anchorage.”123  Derrida argues that the iterability of a text 
opens into the place where it has no internal presence, only the presence given to it in its 
moment of finding a new context(s) which is what then gives it meaning.124  The goal of 
translation is to give a new interpretation in a new context.  
However, Derrida says there is no way to get a “pure” translation or interpretation 
because of the absence of the author and the specified receiver.  The text is always meant 
to be repeatable even in the absence of anyone who may have originally contributed to its 
production.125  The text is marked by absence.  Due to the instability of texts at their core, 
a text does not function in the same way over the period of time; neither does it “mean” 
the same over a period of time. .126  The fact that a text can be repeated in different 
context means that it will be interpreted differently as it finds itself placed in different 
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situations.127  Thus, the interpreter never gets to offer a full, pure representation of the 
text.128  The result of this is that translation can never exhaust or even comprehend the 
other text fully.  Rather, the text, in its own language as other, is incomplete and offers no 
room to be saturated.129 
For Derrida, every text must be not translated because of the fact that it is never a 
saturated whole as it always operates in an absence of author, receiver, and original 
context.  This synonymous nature of translation and interpretation is seen specifically in 
Derrida’s attempt to deal with Plato’s pharmakon.  Derrida notes that Plato’s use of the 
word pharmakon is fraught with both the necessity and problematic nature of translation.  
First, in order to interpret a text, one must translate pharmakon.  However, due to the 
polysemy of the word,130 it is impossible to offer a complete translation.  Derrida shows 
that pharmakon within Plato can have two possible meanings.  The most likely (and most 
traditional) is that of “remedy” or a “beneficient drug.”  However, Derrida notes that 
pharmakon could also mean something that causes illness and that this is possible within 
the context of Plato.  Derrida points to the impasse at the heart of translation and 
interpretation as there are two possible meanings.131  To translate the term “remedy”, as is 
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often done, is to miss the problematic, dynamic nature of the word.  Thus, for Derrida, 
the pharmakon shows the inner tension of texts.132  As he describes it, Derrida’s goal 
oftentimes has been to show the internal tensions, contradictions and heterogeneities that 
found in such texts and structures.133  This due to his belief that the inner tension is what 
allows the possibilities of meaning to be pursued.134  Derrida shows, then, that there is not 
a moment, nor a text, that people do not interpret and make decisions as this is the 
necessity of thinking.     
For Derrida, there is a necessity for one to engage in translation and 
interpretation.  He brings this out most thoroughly with the example of foreign idioms 
and metaphors.  These are, in a sense, untranslatable because their meaning can never be 
exhausted.135  The need is still present within these to “say something”136 but the meaning 
always exceeds what could be said.  Due to this, Derrida argues that the untranslatable 
nature of idioms and metaphors is the very condition of the possibility of their translation.  
He finds that the economy of both of these allow one to offer a “loose translation” that 
does not attempt to represent word for word but to open the iterable meaning of the idiom 
anew.137  An example of this kind of idiom that Derrida points to is Paul Celan’s use of 
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“Shoah” in some poems.  For Derrida, the “Shoah” is not translatable outside of German 
because it was the German language that was the privileged witness to these events.  The 
poem bears testimony to these events, offering a witness to the atrocities.  It is the bearing 
witness that gives meaning to the idiom as it is used in German.  The testimony of the 
poem is what allows the poetic force to come through the word “Shoah” without 
calculating or reducing the meaning to some formula.  The force, through translation, is 
allowed to confront and impede the reader through the translation.138   Thus, it becomes 
imperative to offer an understanding of what the text says or does and how this opens up 
possibilities for different forms of meaning.   
This brings Derrida’s argument to the place of needing to explicate how it is that 
attunement plays a role.  As has been shown, Derrida uses the other within the text as the 
disrupting force that calls attention to the fact that translation is necessary.  Texts are 
haunted by the other,139 who must be brought to the surface due to the welcoming of the 
other that occurs in hospitality.  Attunement is the way that the person is aware that the 
other is operating in the text.  Attunement only comes to full fruition through the offering 
of an interpretation of the other in translation.  In order to see how this account of 
attunement is accomplished in Derrida, the argument will briefly follow the discussion in 
“Des Tours De Babel.” 
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Derrida begins “Des Tours De Babel” by articulating the way that the story 
recounts the “internal limit to formalization.”140  The story of Babel is constructed in such 
a way as to show the necessity of translation because there is always a multiplicity of 
tongues.  Babel is a story of confusion.  However, the confusion does not just arrive 
through the multiplicity of tongues, but because the name of God haunts language at the 
center of language.141  The name of God is the origin of tongues, of multiplicity because 
God scatters the speakers.  God, as proper name, divides among the speakers, becoming 
engrained in the different languages as YHWH, Allah, God, etc.  This leads people into 
the necessity of placing the divine within language, but such that the idioms and 
metaphors used for the divine are not the same, do not function the same, and eventually 
lead to confusion.  As proper name, God disrupts language.  The necessity, for Derrida, is 
to be able to “render” this proper name in a language through translation.142 
The idea of God becomes a problem for language because it is untranslatable.143  
For Derrida, it is at this limit of the untranslatable that one can enter more fully into the 
way that translation takes place.  By necessitating the rendering of God into another 
context or language, Derrida offers the way that he will go about thinking through the 
problem of translation.144  In doing so, Derrida broadly follows the contours of Walter 
                                                 
 
140
 Derrida, “Des Tours De Babel,” 104.  
 
141
 Ibid., 105.  
 
142
 Ibid., 108-9.  
 
143
 Ibid., 109.  
 
144
 Ibid., 112.  
147 
 
Benjamin, specifically his article “The Task of the Translator.”145  Derrida notes that 
Benjamin sets out four tasks for the translator.  First, the translator does not follow a form 
of reception of a text, even though it may contribute to a theory of how a text is received.  
Second, the goal of translation is not necessarily communication, just like the goal of the 
original is not communication, but is dependent upon the communicability of language.  
Third, a translator is not attempting to produce an image or a copy of an original text; 
rather, the translation is something other and different.  Translation becomes another 
form of text and different than the original.146  Fourth, the translator finds oneself in the 
predicament of not being committed to the author of the text or to a model that must be 
represented and reproduced.  The question becomes what one is committed to in 
translation.147  The commitment, in translation, is to the survival of the text.  The 
translator is in debt to the text in that it is the text which is being translated; but, the text 
is also in debt to the translator as it is dependent upon the translator to actually 
translate.148   
The problem becomes one of the economy of translation.  Derrida navigates this 
economy by analyzing the idea of God at Babel as the name given to be translated.  
However, this translation cannot be universalizable as God cannot be reduced to a 
language.  As a proper name, God is always untranslatable and resists the tendency to be 
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placed in a conceptual language.  For Derrida, the translator needs to find a way through 
the economy of translation by offering a finite project for a text whose meaning is never 
closed.  The solution that Derrida finds is that translator cannot seek to offer a copy or 
original “because the original lives on and transforms itself.  The translation will truly be 
a moment in the growth of the original…”149  The translation is not wholly other than the 
original but is a complement to the original as it offers a reinterpretation of the original 
into a new context.  The original text has already lived and grown and by being translated 
into another language, the thinking of the text is transformed into a new way of thinking 
through.150  The translation becomes a transformation of the ideas in the text.151  Thus, 
translation becomes an outgrowth of the original that lives on in the translation.   
In order to complement the original, the translation must be in-tune with the core 
of the text.152  The core of the text is that which “can bear translating and further 
retranslating.”  This is due the fact that the core always resists a full translation and so 
always attracts more translation as there is no possibility of its meaning ever being 
exhausted.153  One comes to understand the core by being attuned to the text, listening to 
the rhythm of the text, hearing its tenor.154  Attunement becomes the impetus for both the 
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role of the translator and the translation.  The translator, by being attuned to the original 
text, is able to know the core.  The text allows itself to be heard which gives it new life in 
being asked to be interpreted and in calling the translator to rethink the text.  The goal of 
the translation is to develop a language that gives the original over to a new context by 
articulating the way that the core functions in this new context.  Derrida articulates that 
the translation leads to the Babelian event of a multiplicity of languages and 
interpretations.  The same way that God, the wholly other, disrupts the universalizing 
tendency to create and justify only one language,155 so does the original disrupt any 
totalizing language by calling for a constant reinterpretation.  This constant 
reinterpretation leads to a multiplicity of languages—or ways of thinking—that develop 
from the text which is what leads to the continual growth of the original outside of 
itself.156     
The turn to translation, then, functions as a way of offering an interpretation of the 
coming of the other.  Translation works to communicate the problem of difference and 
otherness to those who may not understand or come into contact with this otherness—
thus, it is not just meant for foreign languages or unknown idioms and metaphors.  Thus, 
translation becomes the impetus for speaking with the other through the attempt to 
communicate this other in a different place and context.  The translator, then, does not so 
much reproduce the work as allow it to grow in a new world, to be heard in a new key or 
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from a different instrument.  It is to allow the text, as other, to invade and reshape a world 
while also being invaded and reshaped by this world.  This occurs through the retaining 
of the “core” of the text.  The core is never lost, but is reworked and interpreted in new 
ways.  This is the task of both translation and interpretation.157  The goal, then, is to 
create a harmony between the multiple languages, so that the core is not lost but allows 
for the thinking of the text to continue, only in new ways.158   
D. Concluding Remarks 
The goal of this chapter has been to expand upon the argument started in the first 
chapter.  Specifically, the above discussion of Derrida has further clarified the notion of 
attunement through the use of explicitly musical modes of thought by him.  Within the 
context of the argument of the entire project, this chapter has further articulated the idea 
of attunement at work in what comes subsequently.  The elucidation of Derrida’s thought 
builds upon Heidegger’s Destruktion of Western metaphysics while also pointing to the 
ways of thinking engaged in the subsequent chapters on improvisation, David Tracy, and 
St. Augustine.  The chapter does so by focusing on how Derrida’s focus on the other and 
how this other comes has implications for the way that thinking should proceed.  The 
chapter proposes that deconstruction is a way of attunement and that, as such, opens 
possibilities for the way that thinking should be conducted.  The chapter made this 
proposal in three sections. 
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The first section focused on the role that rhythm plays in Derrida’s thought.  This 
section focused on the essay “Différance” and Psyche: Inventions of the Other.  The 
exposition of “Différance” focused on how Derrida uses the concept of différance to 
become attuned to the other in the text.  Différance also allows Derrida to become aware 
of the rhythm at work in texts.  This bringing together of the other and rhythm is brought 
out more explicitly in Psyche: Inventions of the Other.  In the essays that make up this 
text Derrida puts forward an understanding of reading other text that is reliant upon the 
notion of rhythm.  For Derrida, to be aware of the rhythm of a text is what allows one to 
notice the other in a text.  This happens because the other upsets the rhythm or plays 
differently in the text.  This is due to the différance at work in the text which allows the 
other to come to the fore.  When one is tuned-in to the text and aware of its rhythm, one 
then notices the other.  For Derrida, the coming of the other is what gives the ability to 
undo the totalizing and metaphysical structures much thought finds itself within.  Also, it 
is through attunement to the other that one is able to be involved in deconstruction. 
The second section of the chapter involved an exposition of the nature of 
attunement through an analysis of Derrida’s notion of hospitality.  The concern of 
hospitality in Derrida’s writings is to be open to the coming of the other.  Hospitality is 
the disposition one takes so that the other may come.  The coming of the other is a 
disrupting and interruptive force and, yet, Derrida’s imperative in hospitality is that one 
must welcome the other.  Hospitality leads to attunement.  When hospitality welcomes 
the other, it does so through being open and creating a disposition where the other can 
come.  The beginning of attunement is the creation of such a disposition.  Attunement 
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also includes the welcoming of the other in a way that encounters the other as other 
instead of trying to make the other the same.  As such, attunement deals with the other’s 
otherness and difference.  Attunement does justice to the other.  This justice is done by 
taking responsibility for the coming of the other and in the duty to be for the other.  This 
responsibility and duty is what allows one to ultimately think with the other.  By doing 
justice to the other, attunement sets one on the track of being able to interpret and create 
room for the possibilities of meaning available to a text or phenomenon.   
The third section of the chapter finishes the exposition of attunement.  The first 
section laid the foundation by showing how one becomes aware of the other through the 
rhythm of the text.  The second section analyzed how one is attuned to the other through 
the elucidation of Derrida’s thinking on hospitality.  The third section finishes the chapter 
by describing how one takes responsibility for the other through translation.  Translation 
is the end of attunement because it actually allows the other to be heard.  The other is 
heard in translation when one interprets a text and places it in a new context and, thus, 
transforms the way it may be read or heard.  For Derrida, this is translation.  He argues 
that one can never have a “perfect” or “full” translation because the text, although finite, 
has an inexhaustible meaning.  Translation tries to convey this inexhaustible meaning 
within the confines of a finite apparatus.  This means the translation always needs more 
and, due to this, there is an other at work within the text.  When one is attuned to the text, 
one can translate this other into new contexts and situations where the meaning of the 
other can be extended.  Thus, attunement results in an infinite amount of interpretation 
and translation since neither can ever be complete.   
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Through the use of rhythm, hospitality, and translation in Derrida’s corpus this 
chapter has laid the foundation for the way that the rest of the project will think 
attunement.  This chapter has also continued the push into a way of thinking that actively 
resists closure.  The chapter sets the direction for the rest of the project by pointing the 
way of thinking that one engages in when one is attuned.  Deconstruction becomes the 
preferred mode of operation from here.  The next chapters will continue to build on the 
framework of attunement built here while also engaging in a deconstructive approach to 
theological thinking.  The result will be a place where one can think theology as 
improvisation. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
SKETCHING ATTUNEMENT AS A WAY OF THINKING  
IN IMPROVISATIONAL MUSIC 
The two preceding chapters have focused on the philosophical issues surrounding 
the notion of attunement.  They gave the critical apparatus for thinking attunement.  It is 
now possible to offer an analysis of attunement as a way of thinking within 
improvisational music.  Two goals emerge from this analysis.  The first is to give a 
thorough understanding of the notion of attunement as it is at work within 
improvisational forms of Western music.  The accomplishment of this first goal continues 
to build on the thought of Heidegger and Derrida while also giving an account of 
attunement in improvisation.  The second goal is to begin developing a non-conceptual 
language that can be used in theology.  This second goal is not primary but is important 
within the greater argument of the project.  In all, this chapter offers an understanding of 
attunement that begins to build upon the non-conceptual modes of thought found in 
improvisational music.    
In order to accomplish these two goals, the chapter contains three sections.  The 
first sketches the primary place of listening for the activity of music making.  The second 
section is an elucidation of the multiple places a musician is attuned to in order to create 
music.  This section contains subsections on the attunement of a musician to a piece of 
music and the musical tradition that piece resides within, the attunement of the 
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musician to other musicians, as well as the attunement of the musician to an audience.  
All three of these places of attunement are necessary in order for improvisation to be 
good improvisation.  The last section shows how improvisation breaks forms through a 
process of unstructuring where the impetus is on innovation by pushing the boundaries 
and limits of a piece and tradition.  What is discovered is that in improvisation 
attunement functions as a way of thinking that opens a musician(s) to the possibility of 
taking apart and reorienting a piece so that it may be heard anew.   
Within the broader scope of the project as a whole, this chapter offers a form of 
theological thinking that deals with the fragmentary nature of the contemporary world.  
Improvisation is a form where fragmentariness and unstructuring is part of its very 
nature.  The elucidation of attunement allows the ability to see the form of unstructuring 
at work in improvisation.  Specifically, in articulating the logic of attunement at work in 
improvisation, one can see the unstructuring activity at work and how this opens the 
possibilities for new ways of thinking within the music and how this can then be 
extended to the site of theology.  Through this understanding of improvisation as 
attunement, what we find is that improvisation serves as a new form for answering the 
question “what is theology?”.  The answer to the question now becomes that theology is 
improvisation as it pays attention to the unstructuring of theological forms at work when 
thinking God. 
A brief excursus is necessary here.  The above outline of the chapter points to the 
unstructuring and fragmenting of pieces that takes place in improvisation.  This chapter 
will explain this by pointing to how improvisational musicians transform a piece of music 
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into something other so that it can be heard otherwise.  The way that the discussion 
proceeds has affinities with much of the contemporary dialogue around “metaphor.”1  
Improvisation is a way of thinking that avoids closure in order to keep open possibilities 
for their continued transformation.  Metaphor has a similar impetus within it. 
Within the discussions surrounding metaphor, the first move made is to offer an 
account of what it actually is.  Ricoeur, who may be the most influential thinker on 
metaphor since Aristotle, says that metaphor is a form of discourse.2  By arguing that 
metaphor is a form of discourse, Ricoeur makes context central to the discussion.  He 
says that the meaning of a metaphor comes from its place within a text or in its broader 
social context.3  Ricoeur even goes so far as to say, “The dictionary contains no 
metaphors; they exist only in discourse.”4  Here, he is showing the nature of metaphor as 
something that cannot be defined by a literal meaning.5  By definition the metaphor 
avoids any set, literal meaning.  Instead, metaphor changes the meaning of a word or a 
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group of words.6  The way that metaphor leads to this change is through the dual nature 
of its copula “is.”  Metaphor carries with it both the “is” and the “is not.”7  These are held 
together in a tension within the metaphor, creating a “clash” between two things that do 
not belong together.  This “clash” creates meaning. 
What makes the discussion of metaphor parallel improvisation is the similarity 
that exists between the kind of interpretation it takes to deal with both.  The question of 
how one interprets both the metaphor and improvisational music has been quite 
problematic.  On the side of metaphor, Ricoeur argues the first move that one should 
make to understand is to understand the (con)text within which it is being used.8  The 
nature of the metaphor is to disrupt and add the possibility of meaning differently.  The 
way it does this is through its context as metaphor makes words mean otherwise than 
they would normally.  By doing this, metaphor begins to extend the meaning of words 
into places that may not have been imagined.  As Ricoeur says, “In the case of metaphor, 
none of the already codified acceptations is unsuitable; it is necessary, therefore, to retain 
all the acceptations allowed plus one, that which will rescue the meaning of the entire 
statement.”9  Thus, Ricoeur is showing that the meaning of metaphor cannot be fixed; 
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rather, the metaphor extends meaning beyond the bounds of what is possible to reorient 
the entire text.   
The way that one goes about interpreting a metaphor is to understand how it is 
that one can “translate” it to other people while still conveying the excessive meaning 
contained therein.  The question of translation asks how one can communicate the 
meaning of the metaphor to an/other.  The translation of the metaphor wants to bring that 
which has remained “inapparent, hidden, or latent” into the open.  Translation is the 
process whereby one can fulfill the metaphor’s need to enunciate and bring to light a new 
way of thinking.10  The problem of translation comes from the fact that the metaphor is 
never “stable” but that its meaning is “guessed” in every situation.  This translation of the 
metaphor is an attempt to give a similar constellation of the world that the metaphor 
gives.11  The reason translation attempts this constellation is because metaphor 
reorganizes the perceptions of people.  The metaphor offers an alternative “realm” by 
opening various possibilities in front of the text.12  In translation the initial constellation 
of the world that one has is confronted by the alternative offered by the metaphor.  The 
metaphor opens up new possibilities for existing by reorienting one’s own constellation 
of the world and calling one to change.  
Jacques Derrida points to the major problem that exists for any discussion of 
metaphor: that “philosophizing” about metaphor ultimately traps it within a metaphysical 
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system.13  This is a problem since the metaphor actively avoids closure.  The metaphor 
becomes metaphysically closed when one tries to “comprehend” or “grasp” the nature of 
the metaphor and, thus, to retain a sense of mastery over what a metaphor may say.14  
Part of this stems from the linguistic nature of the metaphor.  While the metaphor has a 
surplus of meaning, it is still limited by the bounds of the language being used.  The more 
that one conceptualizes the nature of the concept of the metaphor, the more that one will 
continue to place it within linguistic bounds.  In this vein, the words used in a metaphor 
cannot do anything other than what the words allow.  Similar to this is that the context 
controls what will happen in the interpretation of the metaphor.  Through this Derrida 
notices the difficulties of thinking metaphor outside of the metaphysical system inherited 
in Western language.  The difficulty arises because the more that one uses a metaphor for 
a conceptualization to grasp an object, the more that it becomes one more metaphysical 
construct.  This metaphysical construct eventually can be used to establish a totalizing 
and hegemonic nature to the discourse.  The metaphor then loses its nature as excessive 
and becomes one more way of thinking that is totalizing.  
As will be shown in what follows, improvisation helps a thinker to resist 
metaphysical thought.15  Improvisation will be used to point to the fragmentary nature of 
thinking and the unstructuring of forms used to dominate discourse.  In improvisation, the 
goal is to never repeat.  To make one’s improvisation “the way” to interpret a piece 
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would be to destroy the very nature of improvisation as this would make the 
improvisation a composition.  Thus, improvisation avoids the problem of metaphor in 
that it cannot be tied to a linguistic structure and an improvisation cannot be used as a 
conceptual tool to undergird a metaphysical construct.  Rather, the improvisation avoids 
these through its continued use of the transformation of a piece of music.  In this, not 
only the piece itself, but even the context of the piece is changed.  The improvisation 
never closes but always undoes itself to be heard otherwise.  In this way, improvisation 
offers a way of thinking that the philosophical texts on metaphor do not.    
A.  The Centrality of Listening for Attunement in Music 
An account of the nature of music should begin with the role of listening, 
especially if one is dealing with the nature of attunement.  Listening is the center of the 
musical process.  The importance of listening is brought forth explicitly by Peter Szendy 
in his Listen: A History of Our Ears.  The first point made by Szendy is “You have to 
listen!” is the imperative of all music.16  The mode of thinking in music is predicated 
upon listening.  This type of thinking is the beginning of what has been termed 
“attunement.”17  Don Ihde says that listening’s importance is because it is the most 
original experience, preceding even sight and speech.18  For the musician, the first sense 
that is developed is that of hearing, where one wants to be able to listen effectively, to 
hear the pattern of notes, to hear the rhythm and timbre, etc.  In order to do so, the 
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musician must be actively engaged in listening to others usually through recordings and 
in person.  The imperative to listen begins the movement of attunement.19 
Listening produces attunement it opens one up to the other and finds meaning 
elsewhere through both the resonance of sounds (music) and that to which the sound 
refers.20  Jean-Luc Nancy continues in this vein, saying both that listening opens one up 
to the resonance of a phenomenon21 and this openness allows one to be attuned to the 
meaning of a phenomenon.22  Nancy says that the resonance of a phenomenon comes 
from that phenomenon’s rhythm and timbre.  To be attuned through listening is to tune 
into a phenomenon’s rhythm and timbre, being able to follow the phenomenon as it 
moves and does things.23  Nancy furthers his articulation of listening by arguing that the 
subject is one who is constituted by one’s own listening.  Listening tunes one into the 
resonance of a musical work or auditory phenomenon.  The subject, in order to encounter 
this phenomenon, is constituted through listening both for and to the object.24   
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F. Joseph Smith echoes Nancy in The Experiencing of the Musical Sound: 
Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music.25  Smith argues that the basic attitude for any 
phenomenology is one of listening.  He believes that listening creates a sense of 
openness, which allows a phenomenon to be and then to be encountered.26  This means 
that the phenomenologist “does not pre-categorize anyone’s work but lets it be what it 
is.”27  He says that any attempt to understand a phenomenon begins with listening 
because listening is a way of being open to the other, however that other may appear.  
Don Ihde also makes this point, saying that listening is inclined to follow a phenomenon 
through the flux and flow that may be experienced.28  A phenomenon is never static to 
one’s experience but requires an ability to “be moved with.”  Thus, listening is a way of 
being attuned to a phenomenon in order to flux and flow with it.  
The way that listening opens one up to the phenomenon is through its nature as 
event.  Listening is not just hearing something, the way that one hears everyday, 
mundane noises.  Rather, listening is tuning into something that catches one’s ear, being 
in tune with something in such a way as to “flux and flow” with it.  In this attunement 
through listening there is an event; but, this event is shrouded in a sense of 
indeterminancy which comes from not knowing where the music will go or how a sound 
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will continue.  This stems from the fact that one is not in control.29  This is especially true 
in improvisational music where the event is the listening (whether as audience member or 
fellow player) to something that “I” cannot control, but that is going where it is going to 
go.  This results in an “enlivening” of a piece of music as listening finds the reference of 
a piece in its “pregnant significance” as the carrier of the possibility of meaning.30  
Listening opens possibilities for the music that enliven it in unique ways, opening places 
that can be “interesting and personal.”31   
At this point one may notice the dual nature of listening in that it is both active 
and passive.  To this point, the exposition on listening has been mostly concerned with 
the passive nature of listening.  The passive nature of listening comes from the fact that, 
to an extent, music forces one to pay attention by claiming one’s gaze or ear.32  Music 
was created to be heard and thus claims the attention of the listener(s).33  The goal of 
music is to catch one’s attention by summoning the one who will listen and to offer new 
possibilities to the one who is caught.  
Listening also includes an active element.  Peter Szendy points to the active 
nature of listening when he says that there are two components, or two ways, of listening.  
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First, one listens to music but, second, one becomes aware of one’s listening by listening 
to others’ listening of a work.  Szendy understands listening in a very active mode 
because it is involved in the process of music making.  Listening does not just take sound 
in but also necessitates being an active part of configuring the music.  For Szendy, this is 
most evident in the new technologies that can be used to configure one’s music or 
through the same technologies as they are used to make music.34  The use of these 
technologies is an intentional act to actively engage the music.35  Listening is active in its 
response to the music by “choosing” to what one engages.36  Listening responds to what 
is heard.  Bruce Ellis Benson makes this responsive nature of listening apparent when he 
says “and it is in the act of truly listening that we have a genuine experience in which we 
make content with what we hear.”37 Thus, listening is not just a passive hearing but is 
also an active process whereby one is open and is involved in giving content to what is 
being listened to.   
The way that listening leads one into the place of being able to make content in 
the way Benson points to is through the openness that listening brings with it. In his 
meditations upon the nature of music, Vladimir Jankélévitch echoes Benson.  
Jankélévitch believes that music creates a certain state of mind in the one who listens, a 
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state that is “ambivalent and always indefinable.”  This state of mind comes from the 
limitless nature of music as its inexpressiveness becomes apparent within the 
“innumerable possibilities of interpretation” for any given piece.38 Listening transgresses 
all the limits of “intellectual speculation” placed upon a piece of music.39  Instead, 
listening opens the listener up to the play of music.  The listener notices the polyphonic 
nature of the musical phenomenon and that the way one enters into making this 
phenomenon meaningful is through a conversation.40  This conversation involves the 
give-and-take that occurs as one listens to a piece of music: the piece gives something to 
be heard that the listener takes while the listener gives attention and takes the music.  An 
example of how such a conversation occurs is in one of the pedagogical devices used in 
jazz.  Here a player learns to play by first listening and imitating what is being listened to.  
The jazz player then seeks to branch out in one’s listening by engaging the music as well 
as the audience and interacting with these people.41  The music is polyphonic as it has 
numerous possible interpretations depending upon the place that it is played and who 
hears it.  Listening becomes the basis for playing by opening one up to the music and 
                                                 
 
38
 Vladimir Jankélévitch, Music and the Ineffable, trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 74.  Nancy echoes this sentiment and connects it to the interpretation of 
texts, saying that listening opens one to the multiple senses of a text.  See Nancy, Listening, 35. 
 
39
 Ibid., 119.  The metaphor of “conversation” or “dialogue” is used frequently when discussing 
the relationship between music and the listener.  This will be touched upon more in the next section on the 
attunement of the musician to the musical tradition, other musicians, and the listener(s).  
 
40
 Ihde, Listening and Voice, 178.  
 
41
 Dana Reason, “‘Navigable Structures and Transforming Mirrors’: Improvisation and 
Interactivity,” in The Other Side of Nowhere: Jazz, Improvisation, and Communities in Dialogue, ed. 
Daniel Fischlin and Ajay Heble (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2004), 74.  This will be 
articulated more thoroughly in the next section, “The Place of Attunement in Improvisation.”     
166 
 
being able to then be attuned to how it can be played.42  Ultimately, listening is central to 
improvisation as it is what opens the musician up to be able to be attuned to the musical 
tradition one plays within as well as the other musicians one plays with and the audience 
one plays to.   
B.  The Place of Attunement in Improvisation 
The nature of music is built upon the construction of the conversation or dialogue 
that takes place between piece/ tradition, musicians, and audience.  Bruce Ellis Benson 
seeks a way of understanding the musical dialogue that does not fall into the traps of 
Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons.”  For Benson, the beginning of this dialogue comes from 
the force that is exerted from the listener, composer, and performer.  This force holds 
together the dialogue.43  This project has sought to term this force attunement.  In this 
section, I analyze how attunement occurs in the making of music.  My analysis centers on 
the idea that music comes from a “triple attunement.”  This triple attunement—of the 
musician to a tradition (including the composer and piece), the musician to other 
musicians, and the musician to the audience—results in the construction of the way that 
music is interpreted and the way that it is then portrayed.  In reality, this triple attunement 
is what allows meaning to come to the fore in a way that is polyphonic.  This multiplicity 
of meaning results in a transformation of the form of music. 
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1. Attunement and the Tradition 
For the improvisational musician, the first kind of attunement that takes place is to 
a tradition.  In order for the musician to be able to improvise, there must be an immersion 
into the music where one learns the “language” and “dialogue” that occurs within the 
tradition.44  One is conversant when the attunement to the tradition is well enough that 
one can actually dialogue with others both musically and verbally about the music.   
The reason that jazz improvisation begins with one’s attunement to the tradition is 
because this is where one is initially introduced to the various strands that form this 
music.  This tradition includes a lot of material, including composers/ musicians, standard 
pieces, and a series of musical ideas around various scales and modes.  The musician 
needs to immerse oneself more fully in the types of thinking that occur within the 
tradition and not be content with one’s factical place.  Paul Berliner points to this by 
bringing out two specific ways attunement to a tradition occurs.  First, he says that for 
many jazz musicians, their early home life was an environment that was almost musical 
by nature.  Berliner describes how many improvisational musicians learn the art of 
improvisation through an attunement to the fundamental nature of jazz music at social 
events in their early years, especially the more explicitly African American forms of the 
music.45  These musicians’ home lives were filled with parents, grandparents, aunts, 
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uncles, and cousins getting together and listening to or even playing music.  This began 
to expose the musicians to the musical tradition. 
Berliner also notes another place where musicians were often exposed to music: 
church.  He notices how church becomes a primary place for learning a tradition that 
seeks to stir people’s souls and feelings.  In these church services, they learned the 
tradition of taking a piece of music and building and raising the tension through 
improvisation to come to a climax and release.46 This musical structure was taken in by 
musicians from an early age, listening to the church service, to the preacher, and hearing 
how the different emotive elements worked together to stir people.  Paul Berliner 
summarizes a conversation with Max Roach where Roach explained that “in church, 
young musicians were judged on the basis of ‘their abilities to stir the congregation’s 
feelings’ rather than on ‘their technical proficiency’.  The emotional intensity of 
performances at black ‘hallelujah possession churches,’ where hymns build to ‘fantastic 
climaxes’ over forty-five minutes until ‘sinners shout and preach,’ epitomizes this 
value.”47  
For many musicians, these places help develop an “intuitive intelligence” which 
leads to a “quest for knowledge and inner exploration” that is necessary for one to 
improvise effectively.48  By developing one’s musical tradition within these social 
structures, the result is a musician who is aware of and tuned into the social environments 
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one occupies in playing.49  George E. Lewis enforces this when he says, “In my own 
view, the development of the improviser in improvised music is regarded as 
encompassing not only the formation of individual musical personality but the 
harmonization of one’s musical personality with social environments, both actual and 
possible.”50  The first mode of attunement to the tradition takes place through the 
different social places that a musician first hears music.   
The second place where Berliner outlines how the jazz musician becomes attuned 
to the tradition is within the jazz community itself.  The jazz community acts as an 
educational system committed to “producing, preserving and transmitting musical 
knowledge.”51  The community trains improvisers in the musical knowledge that has 
come before them so that these musicians can then perpetuate the tradition.  The teaching 
of the tradition comes through the transmission of not only certain scales, melodies, 
harmonies and rhythms, but also of practices that allow the musician to cultivate and 
practice the art of improvisation.  An example of this is George Russell, who was both a 
teacher and a musician.  Russell developed what he called the “Concept” which was an 
attempt on his part to systematize ideas about harmony through the relationship between 
chords and scales.  He hoped the result would be greater musical freedom through 
practice of how modes and scales shape and form chords.  This gives the musician the 
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knowledge and familiarity with the music necessary to be as free as possible.  The 
example that Russell offers is a case of one who, within the jazz community, develops a 
way of playing and then passes it on through the community.52 
Jeff Pressing, a cognitive scientist, has researched extensively the role that this 
immersion in the tradition and its habit of practice has on improvisation.  He says that the 
amount of time spent training and practicing the different methods of jazz learned in the 
educational process is what opens the possibility of improvisation.53  The education that 
occurs through the immersion in the tradition and through practice is what leads to the 
development of the different cognitive needs for improvisation.54  These different 
cognitive elements ultimately lead to a complete immersion in the music, where one may 
not actually be conscious—or, said phenomenologically, intending—to “say something” 
but one does because this is how the music goes.  For Pressing, this immersion results in 
a musician who has developed the cognitive ability to be so deep in the music that one 
stops playing the music and the music begins to play them.55  One who is so immersed in 
the music develops an ability to perceive the most subtle and contextually relevant 
information within a musical piece in order to “play” on it.56  The result is that one’s 
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cognitive development is so thorough that one has the ability to hear variations before 
playing them and this opens the possibility for improvisation to take place.57   
This educational process teaches that improvising is built upon some ground or 
foundation.  As Derek Bailey says, “An ability to improvise can’t be forced and it 
depends, firstly, on an understanding, developed from complete familiarity, of the 
musical context in which one improvises, or wishes to improvise.”58  He shows that 
improvisation is built upon a familiarity with the musical world in which one wants to 
play.  Carol S. Gould and Kenneth Keaton say, “All improvisation in musical 
performance relies upon the foundations of the particular musical tradition in which the 
work exists.”59  Philip Alperson echoes this sentiment, saying, “The truth, of course, is 
that even the freest improviser, far from creating ex nihilo improvises against some sort 
of musical context.  In fact, learning to improvise is often, in large part, learning to 
master that tradition.”60  Improvisation comes from playing upon a piece or tradition.  
This ability comes from the development of one’s personal “bank” of riffs, licks, and 
grooves.61   
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Through one’s immersion in the tradition, the musician learns to “think through” 
the music with the voices in the tradition.62  One’s development, both socially and 
cognitively, leads to the development of a musical understanding that opens possibilities 
for playing with the form of various pieces of music, along with general themes within 
the tradition.  This “thinking through” with the tradition is what allows the musician to 
then be able to improvise on the tradition, to hear the tradition anew and to create anew, 
not leaving the tradition but rethinking the tradition in a new space.63  The musician now 
pushes the very limits and, ultimately, the form of the music as it was presently 
constructed. 
Part of this tradition is that of the composer and piece of music.  Both of these do 
not come ex nihilo but from the educational system of one’s own tradition. 64  The one 
who improvises never starts from nowhere but comes to improvisation from some 
place.65  This place is that held by the composer and the musical piece, which are both 
part of the musical tradition.  The piece acts as a starting place for the musician.66  For 
Charles Mingus, the belief in the necessity of the composer and the piece was so strong 
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that he denied that “free improvisation” was even possible.  He thought the musician 
must begin somewhere with something and this gives the impetus to open into the form 
of improvisation.67  However, first, there must be an attunement to the tradition, 
including its composers and pieces.   
The composition functions as the basis for an improvisation but is not an 
improvisation in itself.  According to Lee Brown, the composition differs from an 
improvisation in three fundamental ways.  First, a composition has a different situation 
than an improvisation.  The situation of a composition is such that, if the composer feels 
compelled, she can go back and erase parts, retool them, etc.  The improviser, on the 
other hand, inhabits a situation where there is no room to correct mistakes or to rewrite 
the music.  The second difference between the two comes from how choices are made in 
each.  In a composition, there is no forced choice as a composer can take the time 
necessary to figure out what she wants in the piece.  The improviser, on the other hand, 
must choose in the moment one is playing.  Lastly, there is the role of the script or 
notation of a piece in the music.  The composer has many possible notes, inflections, 
tones, etc. at her fingertips, but is always guided by the script that is at hand in the piece 
being composed.  This piece demands certain avenues.  The improviser does not play 
with a set script but with a series of possibilities that are opened and closed within the 
playing of the music.68    
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With these differences between improvisation and composition laid out, it is 
important to see how composition is similar to improvisation.  For Bruce Ellis Benson, 
the composer is an improviser; or, at least, the composer improvises when one takes 
material from another composer and begins to shape it and move it so that it would fit in 
with one’s own work.69  John A. Sloboda echoes Benson’s sentiment by arguing that the 
composer in most cases is working from the place of an improviser by trying new things 
while working with existing material.70  The improviser works like the composer in that 
this kind of musician does not invent new licks or phrases, but strings together a set of 
learned material in new, yet appropriate, ways.71  By doing this, the improviser slides into 
the role of the composer by playing on a piece, transforming it and letting it be heard 
anew.  This is not a composition which is meant to be disseminated as much as a moment 
in time that offers different possibilities.72  The improviser and composer work with a 
similar mindset.73   
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From the above discussion, it could be said that the composition acts as a guide 
for improvisation.  Jerrold Levinson says a composition acts as a “means of production” 
for the pattern of sounds that a composer has put together.74  Roland Barthes even says 
that “to compose, at least by propensity, is to give to do…”75  The composition is a 
pseudo instruction manual for how a piece is to be played.  However, even as a means of 
production, it is not limited to only one way of being played.  In fact, a central component 
to any composition is that it offers the inclusion of certain musical “variables.”  These 
variables are elements within a composition that are not fixed or constant.76  Rather, a 
composition leaves a certain amount of “play.”  This play leads to the acknowledgement 
that the composer loses control of the composition.  Due to the variables at work in the 
composition, even those that the composer may not have had any concept would be a 
variable,77 the intentions of the composer do not play a role in how a piece should be 
played.78  Rather, the composer acts as someone who opens musical possibilities through 
the production of a piece of music.  Then it is the responsibility of the musicians working 
                                                                                                                                                 
and then rearranging these fragments in his own compositions so that they can be heard differently.  See 
Szendy, Listen, 87-88. 
 
74
 Jerrold Levinson, Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 73.  
 
75
 Roland Barthes, “Musica Practica,” in Roland Barthes, Image-Music-Text, ed. and trans. 
Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 153.  
 
76
 Richard Cochrane, “Playing By the Rules: A Pragmatic Characterization of Musical 
Performances,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 137.  
 
77
 Here, think of all the instruments used in a modern composition not used by composers even 
200 years ago.  This is especially true in relation to the electronic nature of music now, which was not even 
a thought for composers before the turn of the 20th century.  
 
78
 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 95.  
 
176 
 
on the piece to play the piece in interesting ways that are still faithful to the composition 
and its tradition. 
The fact that a composition is never definitively set leads to a discussion of what a 
composition actually is.  Benson prefers to refer to a composition as a musical work 
rather than a piece of music.  He does so because a piece is something that cannot be 
taken out of its contextual whole.  For him, a piece shows the incompleteness of the 
musical composition while a musical work communicates the idea of a whole.  Thus, a 
piece of music conveys both the incomplete nature of what is to be played as well as the 
inability of being able to take any part of the composition away from all other parts.  He 
says, “…whereas a work suggests something complete in itself at the moment of its 
completion, a piece would seem to be inherently incomplete, for the musical context in 
which it exists is in flux.”79  For Benson, a piece of music has a living existence.80  This 
indeterminate nature of the piece leads Eddie Prévost to the conclusion that an 
improvising musician contributes more to the piece than the composer, even if this can 
only be measured quantitatively.81  Thus, both Benson and Prévost place improvisation at 
the heart of a piece of music. 
A piece of music offers a guide to an improviser in his or her interpretation of the 
piece by projecting a certain mood.  The improviser becomes attuned to this mood of the 
piece and this gives a way for an appropriate performance to occur within the bounds of 
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the improvisation.82  A piece of music “configures in themselves their reception, their 
possible appropriation, even their listening.”83  It gives something to be played upon that 
is open to interpretation.  Improvisation is the musical interpretation of the piece.  Thus, 
improvisation occupies a space between composition and performance.84  This space is 
created through the giving of the mood or configuration of the music by the piece and the 
subsequent playing of this in a performance.  The performance does not control the piece 
but opens possibilities.  The piece gives way to “co-creation” through the interaction that 
occurs in improvisation between a composition and a performance.85  The goal of the 
musician in the improvisation is to use one’s attunement to the tradition and the musical 
agility developed through this understanding of the tradition to translate the ideas of the 
piece by drawing upon the tradition in unique and interesting ways.86 
Through the attunement to the tradition at work in a composition the musician 
understands that the piece presents a “world” wherein she can dwell.87  The space that the 
piece of music opens is a world that is “not self-contained.  Rather, it is a world within a 
world, a musical space that is created within and out of a larger musical practice.”88  For 
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one to learn about this space and to dwell in it the musician needs to learn to read 
between the lines of the piece and hear the spirit of the piece of music.89  As Ingrid 
Monson says, “In other words, it is not enough for a musician to play through a tune with 
only its melody and harmonic structure in mind…; the player must be so thoroughly 
familiar with the basic framework of the tune that he or she can attend to what everyone 
else in the band is doing.”90 Monson shows how one dwells in the world of a piece of 
music in her discussion of Jaki Byard’s playing of the standard “Bass-ment Blues” on his 
famous recording of the piece with his band on April 15, 1965.  She points to how Byard 
brings over 25 years of experience to his playing of this piece.  This experience, though, 
was not only as a performer, but also as a listener and composer.  However, his listening 
and composing is to the entire tradition, not just to this piece.  So, when his group plays 
“Bass-ment Blues,” Byard brings all of this to his playing, “quoting” other pieces in the 
tradition through his opening of the possibilities inherent in the piece. 91  Monson’s 
analysis of Byard demonstrates how improvisation “encourages multiple readings of 
improvised potentialities, locating and decoding such structures in order to understand 
and appreciate the kinds of exchanges that take place as new community formations 
occur.”92  Thus, improvisation is the event of one’s playing upon the piece of music.93       
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2. Attunement and Other Musicians 
If the attunement to a tradition opens up how a piece can be performed, it 
becomes important to examine how that performance occurs.  While the previous section 
implied certain ideas about performance, this section makes these ideas more explicit 
through an explication of the notion of performance.  The attunement to one’s musical 
partners is necessary for improvisation to take place.94  This does not mean that people 
just sit down and play with no interaction, but that interaction with different players is 
always left uncertain, no matter what may have been decided (if anything) in advance.  
Attunement to other musicians results in a musical dialogue, where the different people 
involved can propose ideas, affirm or deny ideas, and push the boundaries of each other’s 
playing.   
Many of the musicians performing in settings where improvisation is the norm see 
themselves as operating in a community.  Eddie Prévost says that music, and especially 
the improvisational music he plays, is intrinsically collective.  This collective nature of 
the music leads Prévost to assert that music operates under a “socialist ethic” where 
musicians derive strength from each other and also give strength to each other.95  In the 
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Western world, this collective nature of the music is seen most explicitly in jazz.96  In 
jazz, musicians look to support each other at all times in the music.97  Jazz is a tradition 
which perpetuates a legacy where all musicians work together for the good of the music, 
whether soloist or rhythm player.98  Thus, jazz becomes a process of playing together by 
building a group where a dialogue arises from the various “rhythms of interaction” that 
occur during a performance.99  The musicians all work together as a collective which 
gives rise to the musical performance that occurs in improvisation. 
The social interaction between the musicians occurs through what Alfred Schutz 
calls a “mutual tuning-in.”100  In order to articulate how this “mutual tuning-in” occurs 
between the musicians, he extends the discussion of the “I” and “Thou” by saying that 
these two can be tuned into each other in such a way that the “I” and “Thou” combine to 
form a “We.”101  This “We” of the musicians is what gives rise to the performance, 
especially those classic performances of the music.  The “We” of the musicians only 
form in their mutual tuning-in to each other.  Without this mutual tuning-in, the “We” 
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would not come to fruition.  Schutz argues that the relationship of the mutual tuning-in 
that occurs among musicians is based upon the “sharing of the other’s flux of experiences 
in inner time, thus living through a vivid present in common…”102 The musicians tune in 
to each other through the process of improvising together.  Over time they develop a 
rapport and can try new ideas.  This playing together gives the collective experience 
necessary for forming a “We.” 
The dialogue that takes place among the performers is one built upon the 
attunement to each other and the attunement that each have to the tradition.  Through 
knowing and interacting with the tradition and being tuned in to each other, each 
musician can dialogue musically with the others in a way that no one controls what will 
happen.103  There is an inherent freedom to the music that is played among the 
musicians.104  The free dialogue that occurs between the musicians is one where all 
people involved are able to have a voice and be conversant with none taking a more or 
less important role.105  The free dialogue of jazz flows from a musical aesthetic that is 
“open enough” to allow a multiplicity of viewpoints and perspectives to converge in the 
activity of the musicians making music.106  The openness is created by the musicians 
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being attuned to each other to create a collective body where a musical conversation can 
take place.  Attunement creates the musical relationships giving rise to the distinctive 
features of jazz. 
One such distinctive feature in forming musical relationships is the structure of 
“call and response.”  This structure is an important part of improvisational music as it 
allows a soloist to call to the others and the others to respond within the music.  Within 
this musical context, “the response of musicians is clearly crucial to whether a particular 
musical ideas is picked up on, developed, or ignored.”107  As the soloist calls and the 
other musicians respond, there is a building of a relationship that occurs between the 
musicians.  The “caller” realizes what arouses the interest of the “responders” while the 
“responders” learn what kind of calls are used by the “caller.”  This builds trust among 
the musicians and this trust is what gives them the ability to explore the possibilities at 
work in the aesthetic of improvisation.108  In order for improvisation to take place, there 
must be a mutual trust as exemplified in the structure of call and response.109 
The relationships of the musicians also lead to the creation of “space” within 
improvisational music.  In his article, “Sense of the Possible: Miles Davis and the 
Semiotics of Improvised Performance,” Chris Smith elucidates how Miles Davis was a 
musician, and group leader, whose main concern was to create a certain “space” to create 
an environment where fellow musicians could develop their attunement to each other and 
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to the music.  Davis also did this in order to decenter the group, taking himself out of the 
center of the group and, thus, creating the space for the other musicians to be able to play 
as they saw fit so that the musical dialogue was kept open and ongoing.110  Through his 
own decentering and the creation of musical “space,” Davis developed a way of playing 
with others that was highly conversational.  His way of playing was built upon the 
intuition that developed among the musicians in the “space” of the music.111  The players 
who played with Davis “uniformly allude not to issues of technical or compositional 
approach, but, more profoundly, to a way of hearing and responding, and encouraging 
others to do the same; to the cultivation of a unique capacity for attention” as Davis’ main 
contribution to the musical world.  Ultimately Davis developed a “sense of the possible” 
within the music.112  
The creation of the “sense of the possible” is a phenomenon that is prevalent 
throughout jazz and improvisation.  The “sense of the possible” is what happens when a 
group of musicians are concerned with being tuned in to a tradition and to each other and 
allow space and openness to play out in the music so that various possibilities and 
interpretations can be explored.  Bruce Ellis Benson points to this when he says, “Simply 
                                                 
 
110
 Chris Smith, “Sense of the Possible: Miles Davis and the Semiotics of Improvised 
Performance,” in In the Course of Performance: Studies in the World of Musical Improvisation, eds. Bruno 
Nettl and Melinda Russell (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 262. 
 
111
 Ibid., 163-64.  
 
112
 Ibid., 285.  The “sense of the possible” also develops within the context of musical mistakes, 
where a musician plays a wrong note or scale.  The “covering” of these mistakes ends up changing the 
performance and the piece as it is heard.  See Eddie Prévost, “The Discourse of a Dysfunctional Drummer: 
Collaborative Dissonances, Improvisation, and Cultural Theory,” in The Other Side of Nowhere: Jazz, 
Improvisation, and Communities in Dialogue, eds. Daniel Fischlin and Ajay Heble (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2004), 355-59. 
184 
 
the interaction among the players means that whatever any one player has decided in 
advance (or even what they have all decided) is always left uncertain.  To the extent that 
dialogue is a genuine dialogue, it is impossible to know exactly what is going to happen 
before it takes place.”113  The spontaneity of the playing of the music gives rise to the 
possibilities in the music.  As Monson clearly shows, musicians are trying to find a 
“groove” where they can find a sense of connectedness between themselves.  The groove, 
though, is not limited to the relationship among the musicians but is also necessary in the 
relationship between the piece/ tradition and the musicians.114  The balance that exists is 
one that navigates the necessity of change inherent in an improvisation along with 
keeping continuity to a piece and tradition.115  The result is a drive among musicians to 
keep playing together so as not to fall out of the groove.116   
For Ingrid Monson, there are two broad ideas at work in the concept of the 
groove: first, is the interdependence of the music through a variety of social structures; 
and, second, an aesthetic ideal that is larger than any one individual.  The prominent 
metaphors used to describe the groove tend to be quite social and idealistic as they talk of 
a feeling of mutuality in a pattern or compatibility.117  The goal of a good improvisation 
is to strike a groove with the other members of the group.  When this groove is “found” 
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the members are tuned in to each other through the sharing of the internal beat of the 
music.118  When the musicians share this internal beat of the groove, they come together 
to play the music as one.  This creates the space necessary for improvisation to happen.119  
In the groove, the musicians are open to each other, listening to each other so that each is 
tuned in to the other in a way that keeps the music open.120   
The attunement to musicians results in a set of structures which actually work to 
unstructure the form of the music.  In an improvisation, the musicians unstructure the 
music in interesting ways by decentering it and then going about trying to “play” with the 
material.  This comes from the very openendedness of improvisational music, especially 
jazz.121  For the musicians, the unstructuring of the musical form allows the musical 
dialogue to continue.  This is more important than just playing the music “the right 
way.”122  Improvising musicians are interested in constantly taking apart musical pieces 
and then working to put them back together again in new and interesting ways by trying 
new possibilities or new song structures or playing with the melody and harmony lines, 
among other things.  The unstructuring of the music is the creative thinking at work in 
improvisation, which is what leads to the interesting ways that music can be played and 
heard otherwise.123   
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3. Attunement and an Audience of Listeners 
The last place where attunement takes place within the process of making music 
is that of the musicians to an audience.  This attunement becomes necessary if the music 
is going to be heard.  In improvisation, the attunement to the audience becomes more 
necessary due to the fact that the group is playing the piece differently.  Also, the 
audience will react/ respond to the musicians, either approving or disapproving of the 
music.  Thus, it becomes imperative for the musicians to be attuned to the audience so 
that the improvisation upon the piece actually is able to reinterpret and allow the piece to 
be heard differently. 
Bruce Ellis Benson shows that the beginning of any attunement to an audience is 
the creation of space for both the audience and listener to dwell within while listening.124  
As the musicians try and create space among each other, so the musicians and audience 
also try and create a similar space for the possibilities of the music to be heard through 
the interaction of musicians and audience.  The musicians look to make a piece say 
something and extend to the audience a part in the musical dialogue.  The listener and 
musician are dwelling in the same space and time and are together in the process of music 
making.  This is what gives Christopher Small the ability to place the audience in a 
central place to the process of making music, as central as the musicians and composer.125 
The musician seeks to be tuned in to the audience in a way that allows the audience a 
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place of importance within the improvisation.  In this being tuned in to each other, they 
are “living together through the same flux, are growing old together while the musical 
process lasts.”126   
In order for the listener in the audience to be part of the performance, it is also 
pertinent for her to be tuned in to the performance and the music being performed.  When 
the listener is attuned to the music, she is able to hear a multitude of things that may not 
have been.  Some things that may be heard include variations on certain themes, 
transformations of certain pieces, and humor between the musicians and audience, among 
other things.  The listener that can hear these things is attuned to the music through the 
development of what Ingrid Monson calls “aural familiarity.”  For Monson, aural 
familiarity allows the listener to be tuned in to the music and performance through a 
development of a familiarity with the music.127  Monson says that the development of this 
aural familiarity allows the listener to get out of the music what one puts into it: since it 
takes time and work to develop such familiarity, the attuned listener gets much more out 
of the music than the one who has not put into the music a similar amount of time.128  
When listening to a group of improvising musicians, a listener needs to develop a 
familiarity with other genres as the group may dabble in various other places.129  Aural 
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familiarity develops for the listener the flexibility and agility to go with the musicians in 
improvisation. 
Within improvisation, tuning in to the audience is what gives the ability of the 
performers to improvise.  The goal of improvisation is to open up new ways of thinking 
about a piece in a new context.130  In order to understand how it can be heard anew, the 
musician must be attuned with the audience for which he plays.  This attunement to the 
audience comes through a mutual awareness that both musicians and audience “must be 
aware of the procedures and the life preferences that ultimately inform the art they 
embrace.”131 This also means that the audience and musicians should be aware of the 
various social signifiers at play in music as this allows a certain understanding of where 
the music comes from and where it is going.132  Through this, the musicians can 
commentate upon various social situations and the audience can hear the commentary.133 
In the process of making music the musician enters into a genuine relationship 
with the audience.  This relationship allows the audience to interact with the music and 
the musicians in a dialogue.  The interaction of the musicians and audience is what gives 
rise to some of the possibilities for the music within the performance.  The performers are 
trying to get the audience to understand the music differently, to hear it otherwise.  The 
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musician acts as a conduit of the music to the audience.134  The audience acts as a 
receptor, either accepting or rejecting the differences heard through a response in time to 
what the musicians are playing.  The audience may accept the playing through clapping, 
bobbing heads, shouting, or other positive forms of response.  A rejection from the 
audience might entail negative responses but, more than likely, would come through a 
non-response.  The musicians are consistently reacting to the audience’s reaction.  Thus, 
what occurs is a dialogue between the musicians and the audience.  This dialogue 
becomes deeper and more thorough the more that the audience is involved through its 
aural familiarity and the more that the musicians are able to transform the music.135   
A key in the performance of improvisational music is the give-and-take that 
occurs between the audience and the musicians.  The musician is trying to be attuned to 
the audience in order to know whether or not the audience “feels it.”  An example of this 
is the music of The Grateful Dead, the psychedelic jam band emerging from San 
Francisco in the 1960s.  Jerry Garcia talks of how The Grateful Dead rely on audience 
feedback and reaction in order to hear where the music can go.136  In fact, for Garcia and 
the rest of the group, the audience has intimate involvement in the music making process.  
However, Garcia acknowledges that the audience also involves themselves in the music 
where they almost take a share in the responsibility for the music making process.  The 
audience of The Grateful Dead sees themselves as intimately involved in the process of 
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the bands’ making good, authentic music.137  Thus, attunement to the audience is 
necessary for improvisation to occur.138  Through the use of attunement in the 
relationship of musician and audience, the musician develops the agility to take the music 
in new directions and places.  The Grateful Dead offers an example of how necessary this 
interaction is. 
C.  Improvisation as Transformation: Breaking the Musical Form 
The multiple attunement of the musician is what allows him or her to then rethink 
the music in a new way and, thus, improvise.  The improvisation breaks the previous 
forms, allowing the musician to open the music and avoiding attempts at closure.  As has 
been implied throughout, improvisation opens the path to “develop new forms (often 
breaking definitions);” or, improvisation seeks to open meaning through the 
transformation of the piece or tradition.  Musicians do this through the stretching and 
overcoming of different conceptions of what the music may look like.  The result is a re-
forming of the music in a way that gives a hearing to the mutual collaboration between 
composer, performer(s), and audience.139    
Improvisation is concerned with a transformation of the music.  The driving force 
for this transformation is the call to creativity within communities that stress 
improvisation, such as the jazz community.  The creativity at work in these traditions was 
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such that it worked to vary the music being learned and heard by students.  In a 
discussion with Max Roach that Paul Berliner recalls in Thinking in Jazz, he says that, 
“Because the jazz artist ‘was given credit for being innovative as a soloist,’ Max Roach 
and his peers, ‘grew up wanting to do something a little different from everybody else.  It 
was the crowning achievement if you could invent an idea…”140  The transformation of 
the music comes from the creativity of the artist to play upon the music and open the 
ideas to new forms which reorient the music.141  For Eddie Prévost, this means that 
“Contemporary improvised music is undoubtedly a break with established means of 
making music.”142 While Prévost is more willing to stress the break between the tradition/ 
piece and the musician through the turn to creativity than I am, he still shows that 
improvised music does something other with the music so that it may be heard anew. 
In contrast to Prévost’s sentiment, Jeff Pressing says that improvisation always 
begins from somewhere.  The improvising musician takes this “somewhere” and begins 
to “play” upon it by reorienting the scheme already present in a given work.143  One finds 
this in the talk of many musicians who say that they want to be faithful to the music; 
however, in this faithfulness to the music, there is also a recognition of the importance of 
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breaking with tradition or, at least, transforming the tradition through innovation.144 This 
echoes the words of Walter Bishop, Jr., in an interview given to Paul Berliner for 
Thinking in Jazz.  Bishop talks about the movement a musician takes toward 
improvisation.  He says that first a musician practices imitation, which results in an 
almost exclusive repeating of the piece or tradition.  Second, there is an assimilation, 
where one repeats different patterns one has learned from listening to standards or 
through the practice of scales and modes, but the musician adds little twists and turns not 
already present.  Assimilation does not result in a rethinking, but only in playing 
differently.  The goal is in the third moment, that of innovation, which is where Bishop 
believes true improvisation takes place.  Here, “one has created [one’s own] sound and 
[one] has a good sense of the history of the music” and now has the ability to “think of 
where the music hasn’t gone and where it can go…”145  Improvisation is concerned with 
innovation which immerses one in a style and tradition and then rethinks where this can 
go and how it can be heard differently.  The result is an unstructured form, which is a 
form with a (non)center that arrests the musician at some point and time, giving the 
musician the possibility to improvise.  For the purposes of the current project, this is 
termed “transformation.” 
Transformation is concerned with the opening of forms, resisting any attempt to 
close the form used to play the piece of music.  Daniel Belgrad argues that the openness 
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to the multiplicity of forms comes from the attempt of the marginalized—of which many 
improvised musicians were a part in the American context—to break the forms pressed 
upon them by different institutions and structures of authority.146  Improvisation becomes 
a key component in the arsenal of the artist to resist the totalizing moves made against 
him or her.  Eddie Prévost points to this when he talks of the development of 
improvisation in the generation following the slave culture of the Southern United States.  
This next generation was now immersed in the oppression of reconstruction and Jim 
Crow.  In opposition to this, the musicians begin to embrace styles and forms of music 
that seek change by throwing off hegemonic structures through improvisation.147  For 
these musicians, the transformation that takes place results in new music and in a new 
way of viewing oneself.148  The openness to possibilities necessary for transformation 
comes from the multiple attunements and from one’s own life and the attempt to reflect 
this in the music.149 
The concern of improvisation with transformation becomes manifest in three 
ways, according to Alan Durant in his essay “Improvisation in the Political Economy of 
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Music.”150  First, Durant points to the view that improvisation is liberation.  The 
liberationist view of improvisation is seen in improvisation’s encouragement of others in 
their expression.  This perspective also shows the prophetic nature of the music in that it 
offers an alternative vision to the forms of oppression entrenching people, especially 
those playing and listening to the music.151 Second, Durant says improvisation is 
discovery.  He believes that discovery occurs in “the transgression and transformation of 
existing codes…there is no new musical realm to discover that isn’t at the same time a 
restructuring or reconstitution of the old.”152  For Durant, improvisation works as 
discovery because it seeks to transform the old by leaving open the forms used to play the 
music by discovering new ways of thinking through the piece.153  Third, Durant says that 
improvisation is dialogue.  The dialogue of improvisation is concerned with exploration 
(which leads to discovery).  Here, improvising becomes the vehicle for the exploration of 
the relationships between the musicians and, by extension, all people.154  Improvisation 
offers a place for the exploration of the nature of relationships through the interaction that 
occurs around various musical ideas.155  Durant shows that the concern of 
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improvisational music is with transformation, whether it is through the attempt at 
liberation, the process of discovery, or exploring human relationships in dialogue. 
The threefold attunement of the musician discussed earlier becomes central to the 
nature of transformation in improvisation.  In the understanding of Bruce Ellis Benson, 
this comes about for two reasons.  First, the composer, in writing a piece of music, 
necessarily allows for the piece to be recontextualized.156  The piece is never again under 
the strict control of the composer but must now be interpreted by someone to be 
performed.  When the music is performed, it is necessarily placed in a new context.  This 
leads to the destabilization of the music, especially in jazz, doing away with a set center, 
but allowing the music to be “played.”  As Vladimir Jankélévitch shows, the meaning of 
music is hidden or concealed within the music.  The goal is to bring this meaning out 
through an evocation.157  However, to connect Jankélévitch with Benson, this evocation 
can only come through being attuned to the piece of music and understanding the 
meaning that wants to be brought out through the evocation.   
The necessary recontextualization of the music leads to the second reason 
transformation is central to improvisation.  The issue here is one of using one’s 
attunement to the piece and tradition in such a way as to perform the piece in a 
transformative way.  For Benson, the way that one is able to create the space for 
transformation is through dwelling with the piece.  Dwelling “transforms the space” by 
“fabricating what is conveniently at hand” in order to open the piece to becoming 
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something new.158  Thus, no longer can a performer simply repeat the notes on the sheet 
of paper, but must interpret them and, in so doing, she necessarily rethinks the way the 
music is heard.159  The music is transformed through iteration. As musicians 
recontextualize it, the piece is transformed over and over again through its continued 
play.160    
For the musician, part of the process of opening the piece up to being transformed 
involves a certain risk.  This risk comes from the imperative on the part of the musician 
to say something through the piece.  There is always the risk that the piece does not say 
something.  As Brown says, “An improviser (a) presents music intended to be worth 
hearing, by (b) creating it as she plays.  Given conditions (a) and (b), risk is latent in 
improvisational music.”161  For Brown, this risk is what makes jazz and improvised 
music so important, as it seeks a multiplicity of interpretations which gives rise to the 
unexpected.  The unexpected adds an element to improvised music often absent in other 
music—that of unsettling and disrupting not only the listener, but the piece and tradition 
itself.162  The result is an unstructuring of the piece, where one may pick up one line or 
one chord and reorient the entire piece around this single fragment, transforming the very 
way that the piece can be thought and heard.   
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The result is a form that slips away and is never totally “gotten” because it 
transforms into other forms.  The form is, in a sense, formless. This is not to say that 
there is not a form in improvisation.  Rather, the form is different, it “slips” so that one 
never catches it.  The form in improvisation unravels, unstructuring itself in the process 
of improvisation so that new ideas possibilities can be explored through a plurality of 
forms.  Ted Gioia reiterates this in his discussion of the Blueprint Model of music versus 
the Improvisational Model.  The Blueprint Model draws its name from architecture where 
“the artist plans in advance every detail of the work of art before beginning any part of its 
execution.”163  Here, form is the scheme that artwork must fit within in order for it to 
work.  The Improvisational Model, on the other hand, is not privy to a scheme that has 
been worked out ahead of time, but builds upon what has just come before.  The result is 
a model built upon the retrospective creation of form as it is developed from what has 
come immediately prior and works with where the musician wants to go.164   
The recontextualizing of the piece of music by the performer results in 
interpreting the piece for a new audience which leads to a transformation.  The 
improviser “is always engaged in making the music say something to and be useful for 
us, in the same way that future improvisers will be engaged in making music that says 
something to and is useful for those who come after.”165  In order to allow the music to 
speak to people in a new place, the improviser needs to be attuned to the piece and the 
                                                 
163
 Gioia, Imperfect Art…, 60.  
 
164
 Ibid., 60-61.  
 
165
 Benson, The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, 150.  
198 
 
tradition from which the piece comes.166  The attunement of the musician gives the ability 
to transform the piece through its recontextualization.  In being attuned to both the 
tradition and audience, the improviser is able to think the whole tradition of which the 
piece is a part so that it can be heard in a new context, so that the whole tradition can be 
rethought in a new place.167  This attunement opens the possibility for different forms to 
be used when playing the music.  The result is an improvisation that seeks to continually 
undo the form of the music.   
This transformation results in a shifting center at the heart of the piece of music.  
In this conception, the piece becomes an open product to be rethought and transformed.  
In order to articulate this transformation, Benson turns to Jacques Derrida and his 
thinking on translation.  For Benson, Derrida’s notion of translation provides an 
interesting parallel to the kind of thinking that is occurring in musical improvisation.  
This is because Benson (following Derrida following Benjamin) understands a piece of 
music to survive as “a living entity” through its constant growth and building of its own 
tradition.168  The translation of a piece of music comes from being attuned to the piece 
through a concern for the spirit of a musical work rather than the letter of the 
composition.169  By concerning oneself with the spirit over the letter, the improvising 
musician is trying to keep the tradition of piece open in new contexts.  This concern is 
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seen in what Lee Brown calls the greatest threat to improvisational music: plagiarism.  
Brown shows that plagiarism and not forgery is the greatest threat to music because 
plagiarism just copies the music without needing to be attuned to the spirit of the 
music.170  In order to plagiarize, one merely needs to copy the way another plays a piece.  
However, a forgery consists of emulating another’s way of playing a piece which 
necessitates being attuned in some way to the other.  A translation, then, taps into the 
growth of the original through its continued recontextualization.171  The translation of the 
music acts as the mediation of a transformation.172  The piece lives in the performance 
and its translation and the subsequent, ongoing translation of the piece.173  
The translation of the piece ultimately occurs because of the fragmentary nature 
of the piece of music.  The piece is fragmentary because it also needs a supplement—or, 
it must be interpreted—in order to be performed, but the performance can never capture 
the piece in its entirety.174  Translation is the supplement.  In trying to articulate this need 
of translation in the performance of improvised music, Ingrid Monson turns to Henry 
Louis Gates, Jr.’s concept of “signifying” to show how jazz is concerned with the 
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“transformative reuse of material.”175  For Monson, Gates argues that signifying is not so 
much concerned with what is said (or played) but how it is said (or played).  Gates uses 
the concept to evaluate how African-American forms of literature have been both co-
opted and can also transform those very institutions that have been co-opted.  For him, 
this comes through a transformation of the forms of the dominant language through 
“reversal, incongruity, and recontextualization.”  Signifying shows how to reverse forms 
of language through recontextualizing them and by showing their incongruity what how 
things are said.  This concept becomes helpful for Monson as it shows how jazz 
transforms other forms of music so that they may be heard differently.  Oftentimes, this 
comes through taking up a fragment that escapes the piece but opens up the possibilities 
of the piece in the course of performance.176 
Transformation, then, becomes a key component within any description of the 
nature of improvisation.  The goal is always to allow the music to be heard otherwise, 
opening the spirit of the music to the listener and incorporating the listener into the 
experience of the music.  Translation always keeps the piece open by denying any closure 
to the piece.  The end result is a music that plays with form so that it may be heard 
differently.  This music keeps its possibilities open through improvisation and seeks to 
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“say something.”  In all of this, though, improvisation looks to a form that allows for an 
unstructuring and decentering to occur through the pursuit of a certain formlessness.177   
D. Conclusion 
This chapter has had one central task: to articulate the kind of thinking that occurs 
in improvisational modes of music.  This has been built upon the work of the previous 
chapters on the nature of thinking in Heidegger and Derrida.  Through these three 
chapters, the goal has been to articulate a theory of thinking as attunement.  In this 
chapter, there has been a focus on how this occurs within the musical world. 
In order to articulate how attunement occurs and the implications for 
improvisation, this chapter has had three sections.  The first section was on the nature of 
listening within music.  The argument was made that all music is predicated upon the act 
of listening.  For the musician, the development of one’s ability to listen opens the way 
forward for being an improvising musician.  This is because listening acts as the 
connection between the piece and tradition, the musicians, and even the audience.  
Listening is central to all that occurs in music.  And, as such, it is the first moment in 
attunement, where one attunes oneself by first listening to the other, however that other 
may come.   
Second, the chapter articulated the threefold nature of attunement: that of the 
musician to a piece of music and the tradition the piece finds itself within; of the 
musician to other musicians; and, lastly, the musician to an audience.  I showed that all 
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are necessary for attunement to take place.  This is because music always begins from 
somewhere, so the musician must be attuned to the tradition and piece of music; the 
musician then seeks to play this in dialogue with others, whether others in the tradition or 
those who the musician plays with in current time; and, third, the musician plays this for 
someone, an audience.  When these three come together, attunement works as it should 
by playing something within a tradition with others for others.   
Third, the chapter laid out how playing music in improvisational forms of music 
seeks to transform.  The transformation of the music was seen to be built upon the 
attunement of the musician to the tradition, other musicians, and the audience.  The 
attunement of the musician to these three results in the in the transformation of the forms 
of the music.  This transformation takes place by exploring the spirit of the music instead 
of trying to repeat the letter.  The transformation of the music results in an unstructured 
form that resists any hegemonic form.  The result is a translation of a piece of music or 
musical tradition to a new time and place, recontextualizing the music so that it may be 
heard otherwise.   
This articulation of the type of thinking that occurs in improvisation has three 
implications for later chapters.  First, this articulation shows how a way of thinking 
predicated upon attunement occurs.  As the next chapters explore the nature of 
attunement within theology, it will be beneficial to have seen how attunement occurs in 
music, as well as being able to use the metaphors made available through the study of 
improvisation.  This will allow a way of thinking in theology to be articulated that is 
concerned with being attuned. 
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The second implication is that I have articulated the kinds of sources to which one 
becomes attuned.  This chapter has shown how one is attuned to a tradition, to those in 
one’s field, and to an audience.  For theology, these sources also carry great weight as the 
theologian is attuned to the tradition that one works within and to the conversations 
occurring in the theological guild and the broader world.  The result is a theology that 
values openness to closure, formlessness to hegemony, and multiplicity over totalization.  
Theology in this vein is transformed and seeks to transform others.   
The third implication is that the outcome of being attuned is that one is able to 
“say something.”  This saying something occurs through the transformation of traditional 
forms used to say something into forms that are more adequate to articulating what the 
musician wants to say in the moment.  While a theologian will not be improvising in the 
moment like an improvising musician, the theologian does have a set of forms available 
for thinking theologically that have become, at times, quite static and moved toward an 
embrace of closure.  If theology is going to actually think God then it seems that there is 
a need for a transformation of these available forms with an eye to the fact that only a 
plurality of forms could adequately think God.  Attunement in theology seeks to 
transform the static forms traditionally used, especially in more modern and systematic 
theologies, to explore the infinite possibilities available for thinking God.   
In order to accomplish these tasks, in the next chapter I deal with the work of 
David Tracy.  Through an analysis of Tracy’s work, I articulate how he wants to pursue a 
theological conversation that includes a tradition of classics available to theology, the 
current modes of thinking in theology, and how theology can articulate itself outside of 
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its traditional bounds.  Tracy shows a theological method for thinking theologically that 
places attunement at the heart of the theological enterprise, even if he does not explicitly 
state this.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 ATTUNEMENT AND THEOLOGY: RESONATIONS WITH DAVID TRACY 
The three previous chapters have cleared the ground for rethinking the nature of 
theology in our contemporary culture.  The current chapter takes the modes of thinking in 
improvisation and proposes a theological project in tune with the type of thinking that 
occurs in improvisation.  In order to do this, the following chapter enters into a 
conversation with the contemporary Roman Catholic theologian David Tracy.  This 
conversation will focus on the ideas that Tracy has dealt with most explicitly in his 
career, from the rise of pluralism to the nature of theology, and how the theologian goes 
about naming and thinking God in a postmodern world.  The concerns shared by Tracy 
and myself make him an ideal dialogue partner.  Through this conversation, this chapter 
can open up the avenues of thought pertinent to viewing theology as improvisation.   
I turn to Tracy because we share similar concerns.  There are two preliminary 
concerns that are shared by Tracy and myself that need to be elucidated before entering 
an elucidation of his thought.  The first is the idea that theology should be theocentric.  
Tracy’s approach to theology reflects his belief in the universality of the divine reality 
and, subsequently, the universality of the capacity for the experiences of sin and grace.  
The way that Tracy opens up the ability to have a thoroughgoing theocentric 
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theology is through his conception of the analogical imagination.1  Andrew Greeley says 
his “emphasizes the presence of God in the world and its creatures and relationships and 
social structures.  The analogical imagination stresses the metaphorical dimension of 
creation as a sacrament of God.” 2  The emphasis on the analogical imagination means 
theology cannot remain “self-enclosed” within its own set of language games and belief 
systems but must work collaboratively with others to understand and know God through 
critical and self-critical means.3   
The second preliminary concern that David Tracy shares with this project is the 
public nature of theological discourse.  The central question for Tracy, within this 
concern, is what kind of publicness is demanded by the doctrine of God, specifically in 
fundamental, systematic, and practical theologies.4  Tracy explores the way that one can 
think God publicly in a way that allows the theologian the ability actually to say 
something about God since because of the analogical imagination, God can be 
experienced in the sacrament that is creation.  For Tracy, this means the embrace of a 
revisionist, or critically correlational, theology.5   This type of theology has a dual 
commitment to the experience of and faith in the God of Jesus Christ and to critical 
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approaches to thinking which spring from common human experience and language.6  
From this dual commitment, a twofold task arises for the theologian: the first task is to 
enter into a critical conversation with the Christian tradition in a way that the theologian 
can question the situation in light of the Christian event; and the second task is to develop 
some criteria of internal coherence so that one can interpret the Christian event in light of 
the whole symbol system of the religion and one’s contextual situation.7  The theologian 
who embraces these dual commitments becomes one who is constantly interpreting and 
re-interpreting the theological tradition8 in a way that allows it to encounter the 
contemporary world and its ways of thinking.      
This chapter proposes that viewing theology as improvisation offers a way to 
navigate theses two concerns.  In doing this, the chapter sketches a way for the theologian 
can bridge the gap between the Christian tradition and common human experience and 
language.  In order to accomplish this, the chapter will take four major steps.  First, I 
articulate Tracy’s concern with the problem of totalities in theology and the need for a 
new way of doing theology in light of pluralism.  Second, I turn to Tracy’s explicit work 
on the naming of God through his turn to the fragment.  Third, I offer a discussion on 
how Tracy goes about constructing a theological “system” through the concept of the 
gathering of the fragments.  Lastly, there is a proposal for a type of theological ethics that 
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is a natural accompaniment to Tracy’s work: what is termed here an “ethics of 
resistance.”  Through these four moves, the articulation of Tracy’s thought begins to open 
the kind of thinking that is needed to think theology as improvisation.  
A. Theology as Conversation: The Problem of Totality and the Task of Theology 
Tracy begins his thinking by mapping the terrain within which theology operates.  
By doing this, he can outline the kind of problems that exist for theology in its current 
situation and then proceed to address these through the formation of a theological 
thinking.  For him, the world that theology finds itself in is that defined by a concern for 
addressing a pluralistic context.9  This pluralistic context causes issues because “behind 
the pluralism of theological conclusions lies a pluralism of public roles and publics as a 
reference group for theological discourse.”10  Tracy notices that theology has different 
audiences, whether one is writing to an academic community, to church people, or to 
those concerned with ethical issues; the theologian has a plurality of audiences.11  
Similarly, there are a plurality of disciplines and groups within which theology finds 
itself in conversation.  Thus, pluralism becomes theology’s predicament both from the 
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inside and the outside.  For Tracy, theology should analyze the pluralistic context and 
begin to advance a way of thinking that acknowledges this. 
Tracy begins by asking why this context arose in the first place.  His conclusion is 
that pluralism is a byproduct of what can broadly be called “modernity.”  In its most 
basic form, the modern is a discourse that moves toward totalization.  Modernity pursues 
a technical reason, seeking hegemony in response to different concepts.12  The 
theological impetus prevalent in modernity is that of foundationalism.  This approach to 
theology is dominant, even at the points where theology is hermeneutical, as the 
hermeneutics developed are to ground the foundation.13  The foundationalism prevalent 
in modern approaches to theology results in three separations that Tracy finds 
problematic: feeling and thought, form and content, and theory and practice.14  The 
separation of form and content occurs in modernity when thinkers focus on the form and 
argue that what appears is simply a “subjective construction” instead of the real being 
revealed through form; thus, the form becomes devoid of content as it gives nothing.15  
Tracy goes on to argue that if one undoes the separation of form and content, one can also 
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undo the other separations.16  Thus, the focus for Tracy is on the relationship of form and 
content.    
Theology encounters another problem in modernity which arises from these 
separations and foundationalism: the problem of totality.  The problem with thinking in 
totalities is that this kind of thinking also extends to God/ divine.  When totalizing 
discourse is extended to God, the way that theology thinks and names God becomes a 
series of –isms, whether atheism, theism, deism, agnosticism, etc.  In this form of 
discourse, God is subservient to the form because it totalizes the way that one can think 
God.17  This way of thinking theologically becomes a problem if one is going to think 
God as, for example, infinite or incomprehensible.18  This undergirding thought for 
theology in modernity is what Tracy works to undermine.  He seeks a form for thinking 
God that is non-totalizing as it embraces a multiplicity of voices from multiple contexts.  
In a post-modern world theology is to be done in a non-totalizing way.19           
In order to counter the totalizing tendencies of modern thought, Tracy calls into 
question the unthought of modernity.  There are two notable places that Tracy focuses his 
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critique of modernity: the first is “the unreality of modernity’s belief in self-presence in 
modernity’s self-understanding as the present [and] the unreality of the modern 
understanding of the autonomous, self-grounding self.”20  Tracy believes the belief in 
self-presence and the autonomous self are onto-theological constructions.  Tracy 
undercuts the move to totalization in modernity and onto-theology by arguing that two 
cornerstones of modernity are actually false realities.  In doing this, he is able to remove 
the apparatus that allows for totalizing discourse by removing two of the central 
components that give rise to the foundationalism which gives rise to totalizing 
discourse—self-presence and the autonomous self.  The move Tracy will make, then, is 
to analyze the way that form is a mediator, which will lead to forms that are non-
constraining and, thus, non-totalizing.   
However, a current and consistent critique of Tracy comes to the fore.  The 
critique acknowledges that he may be ushering in a post-modern way of doing theology 
with his critique and rejection of Enlightenment views of rationality.  However, the 
critique continues by saying Tracy’s theology is “thoroughly modern in his concern to 
correlate the gospel with human experience though now this experience is understood in 
a deeply pluralistic fashion.”21  Thus, Richard Lints associates Tracy’s method of 
correlation with Paul Tillich’s, which argued that the questions asked by a culture or 
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context could be given answers by theology.22  Tracy’s method of correlation is much 
more complex, dealing with issues of ambiguity and pluralism by taking into account 
hermeneutics and deconstruction.  In this vein, Tracy’s thought is thoroughly post-
modern as it is non-foundationalist, opening correlational methodologies for theology to 
the internal and structural critiques that come from many post-modern thinkers.23   
For Tracy, this conception of theology is ideal for postmodernity, which is the 
situation within which theology currently finds itself.24  He finds a way of thinking about 
what this form may resemble for a postmodern theology by turning to the 
nonconstraining nature of conversation and dialogue.25  He turns to conversation because 
epistemology has to be rethought by moving from the analogy of building a house to a 
way of thinking that is more akin to telling a story or conversing with others.  The result 
is not a loss of the publicness of one’s theology; rather, Tracy sees this epistemological 
move to conversation as a way of increasing public rationality as there is a greater 
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plurality of voices engaged.26  The theological form of conversation offers a non-
constraining form for theology that seeks to have multiple dialogue partners.   
Conversation and dialogue offer a “strategy for possibility” for theology in the 
postmodern world.  This strategy is useful because of the pluralistic nature that is 
prevalent in the postmodern context.27  Postmodernity, for Tracy, is what comes after, 
and reacts to, modernity.  The reaction that Tracy has against modernity is its embrace of 
a discourse that moves toward totalization.  Modernity pursues a technical reason which 
seeks hegemony in response to different concepts.28  An example (dealt with more fully 
later) is the naming of God.  Modernity seeks to offer the correct “-ism” for God, which 
is “the correct set of abstract propositions which name and think God.”29  While modern 
thinking seeks to systematize all things within a self-grounding reason, postmodernity 
tries to let God be God again through “disrupting historical consciousness, unmasking the 
pretensions of modern rationality, demanding that attention be paid to all those others 
forgotten and marginalized by the modern project.  Theos has returned to unsettle the 
dominance of the modern logos.”30 In part because of  this penchant for dialogue and 
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conversation, a theology that occurs in postmodernity seeks alternatives for thinking God 
in otherness, difference, transgression and excess.31  
However, as an heir of modernity, postmodernity is not altogether innocent.32  For 
Tracy, the way to move forward with a critique of totalization in postmodernity is 
through the “linguistic turn”33 which he sees as reintroducing “society and history into all 
notions of reality and truth.”34  The linguistic turn makes it necessary and appropriate to 
ask who is asking the question of God.35  Tracy critiques modern thought’s impetus to 
totalization when he turns to the particularity of language, pointing to language’s self-
deconstructing, non-grounding play of signifiers which does not allow for a 
transcendental signified.36  Here, the theologian sees the inescapability of language with 
the historical limitations and ambiguity of all discourse, including central Christian 
texts.37  For the theologian, language functions not just as a mediator of truth but is the 
ultimate mediator.  Following Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Tracy makes the claim that all 
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of reality is disclosed through language.38  Thus, theology functions in a hermeneutical 
way that “waits and listens for” the disclosure of the whole of reality in the multiplicity of 
linguistic forms available to a thinker.39 
As Tracy analyzes the current situation and attempts to find forms and ways of 
thinking that allow for an appropriate thinking of God in the postmodern, he discovers 
that even the Christian tradition itself is pluralistic.40  He finds this especially in the 
Gospels where each is a different narrative in response to the one event of Jesus Christ.  
The different Gospels also allow a series of interpretations of this event of Jesus Christ to 
develop in subsequent traditions, developing theology into a thoroughly pluralistic 
phenomenon over the centuries.  Christian theology is in its essence a necessarily 
pluralistic discipline.41  Thus, conversation and dialogue are necessary to theology as they 
allow for the ability to understand the multiplicity of ways that people think and name 
God, whether strictly orthodox or outside of the established tradition.   
The account that Tracy offers here differs from postliberal accounts of the way 
that theology should be conducted.  Postliberals—like Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and 
William Placher—understand theology as a unified discipline with one essence that is 
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described in the language of the tradition and the church.  For Lindbeck, this descriptive 
task is so that one can experience the world in the way that the religion describes; thus, 
the goal is not knowledge as much as being religious in the right ways according to the 
tradition.42  The task of the theologian is to be strictly descriptive, offering an account of 
what the tradition and church believe in their linguistic framework.43  However, as Tracy 
makes clear, this type of theology actually works in a prescriptive way as there is no one 
tradition or one church, but a plurality of ways of thinking in the multiplicity of traditions 
and churches in Christianity.  The pluralistic nature of Christian theology opens the fact 
that interpretation itself will be pluralistic.44  For Tracy, this pluralism means theology 
has two primary tasks: first, theology must critically interpret the tradition, not simply 
through repetition, but through a mediation of the event which offers an interpretation of 
the situation; and, second, theology must interpret the situation and event within the 
whole symbol system of Christianity, developing criteria of internal coherence, even if 
this is incomplete.45  This makes theology an inherently hermeneutical discipline.  
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For Tracy, as a hermeneutical enterprise within a pluralistic situation, theology 
does not seek conflict or argument, but genuine conversation46 between its own tradition 
and the contemporary situation.47  As a text provokes questioning on the part of the 
interpreter, there should be an entering into “the logic of question and response of the 
subject-matter of the text.”48  Drawing on Kenneth Burke, he argues that the attempt to 
purify the various conflicting interpretations of the world at work comes through 
conversation.49  However, this purification is ongoing, open-ended, not seeking closure.  
Conversation is a discourse that is concerned with not only accepting, but actually 
encountering otherness and difference.  Theology in the postmodern milieu seeks 
openness to dialogue with the other as the other comes in difference, transgression and 
excess.  The goal is to converse in a back-and-forth movement.  The conversation 
partners for theology become those who are asking the questions of the situation while 
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being in dialogue with the classics, whether sociologists, philosophers, biologists, 
painters, poets, etc.50   
However, this idea of theology as conversation is not without its criticisms.  There 
are two that are quite valid and offer a way for better understanding the way that Tracy 
will develop this way of thinking theologically.  The first comes from Nicholas Lash, 
who criticizes Tracy by arguing that Tracy’s notion of theology as conversation is too 
idealistic.  Lash says that Tracy’s conception of conversation is extremely rare and 
difficult to attain.51  Lash also criticizes Tracy by noticing that conversations tend to 
“drown out” different voices, like the poor and oppressed, while privileging more 
dominant voices.52  Thus, Lash’s critique focuses on the problematic nature and 
conception of conversation that Tracy develops.  The second critique comes from Kristin 
Heyer who also critiques Tracy’s model of conversation.  She says he “remains vague 
regarding who constitute the members of the global conversation he proposes and 
whether or not it is a this-worldly possibility.”53 The critiques of both Heyer and Lash are 
valid and indicate where Tracy is vulnerable. 
Tracy answers the criticisms by arguing that theology is indeed conversation and 
broadens the people who can be part of such a conversation.  This means that the 
contemporary situation can put questions of the poor and oppressed to theology as they 
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arise.  The interaction that takes place in the conversation between the multiple voices, 
including theologians, the oppressed, philosophy, critical theory, etc., ultimately discloses 
the ways of dealing with the problems that come to the fore in our culture.54  Thus, 
conversation is the answer for Tracy, but only when it includes a number of dialogue 
partners.55  As such, conversation is a way of dealing with the interaction between text/ 
tradition and interpreter.56  In fact, Werner Jeanrond argues that Tracy’s hermeneutics is 
one where the text and reader stand in a dialectical relationship to each other, where there 
is the possibility of the interpreter being changed through the interaction.57  Tracy’s 
model of the game explicates the point Jeanrond is attempting to make.  In this example, 
the emphasis is on how one is immersed in the game, in the rules of the game, in the 
playing of the game, etc.  When a player enters a game this person is now a participant.  
By entering the game there is a transformation of the person.  This transformation moves 
the person from one who merely observes to one who is involved and is released to “do” 
the game.  Only the participant is actually involved in the game.58  This has implications 
for the nature of interpretation, as one must be able to play the game by entering into the 
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multiplicity of “possibilities suggested by others” as they enter into the search for truth; 
however, this is in a conversation with others.59  One learns to enter into the conversation 
of theology through a training of the imagination to enter into a dialogue across times, 
texts, translations, being able to engage the other as other, and still follow the multiplicity 
of ways opened for thinking God.60  
The way that the theologian enters into the multiplicity of possibilities opened 
through the conversation is by asking questions.  For Tracy conversation is “questioning 
itself.  It is a willingness to follow the question wherever it may go.  It is dia-logue.”61  
Conversation follows a question in search of the possibilities of truth, necessarily 
allowing otherness and difference to come to the fore, always with the recognition that 
the different and the other could become the possible.62  It is also important to note in a 
conversation that there is an “inevitable presence of our own pre-understanding and pre-
judgments.”63   It is important to understand one’s own presuppositions as one enters the 
conversation.  This allows a more genuine and fruitful conversation to develop.64  
To describe conversation, Tracy turns to the Platonic dialogues.  He says that the 
Platonic dialogue makes clear that “real conversation occurs only when the individual 
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conversation partners move past self-consciousness and self-aggrandizement into joint 
reflection upon the subject matter of the conversation.”65  A conversation in this vein 
employs a back-and-forth movement that consists of “an ability to listen, to reflect, to 
correct, to speak to the point—the ability, in sum, to allow the question to take over.”66  
Tracy says the “subject matter, the questions and responses, are allowed to take over.”67  
This has three implications: first, the dialogue is more interested in the question than the 
answer; second, to inquire truly provokes more inquiry; and, third, the inquiry that takes 
place is directed to the horizons of the inquirers.68  The dialogue is meant to work 
through the problem in a way that confronts those involved with their own existential 
self-understandings,69 throwing themselves into question by revealing their own 
“possibilities, complexities, and limits.”70 
The turn to Plato allows Tracy to note the concern with what kind of person can 
actually enter into the dialogue.71  Thus, Tracy’s turn to Plato is because he finds himself 
sharing the same hope that Plato had in his first Western academy: “a slow shift of 
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attachments, a painstaking education of desire—an education like that which Plato 
foresaw as our best, and perhaps our only hope for both living and thinking well.  Even 
metaphysics and the next abstract theology serve not only an intellectual but spiritual 
purpose: another great barrier against our natural egoism, another form to sharpen our 
attention.”72  Tracy is arguing for the correct attunement of the one entering into a 
dialogue through the overcoming of one’s natural egoism by directing attention outside of 
oneself.  Such an attunement leads to the development of an attentiveness to those ways 
of thinking that are outside one’s own.73  This is shown explicitly when Tracy follows up 
the goal of the Platonic dialogues with an exhortation to follow Bernard Lonergan’s 
transcendental precepts: “Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be 
loving, and, if necessary, change.”74  The formation that takes place orients one in a way 
to bring certain elements to the conversation that may not be present through knowing 
oneself. 
However, many interpreters of Tracy, especially the ones focused on his earlier 
works, have agreed that his thought focuses on finding some kind of common, rational 
ground and/or criteria for theology.  William Placher says that Tracy seems to 
“presuppose a universal human something-or-other which various religions, in their 
various ways, express” and that this is the same among all people.75  Placher and others 
accuse Tracy of being a foundationalist.  However, these thinkers miss the point that 
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Tracy simply makes the assumption that there is a religious dimension to human life, but 
he is not saying that this dimension is the same for all people.76  However, David 
Kamitsuka also critiques Tracy in this vein, saying that Tracy is looking to ground his 
explication of conversation and dialogue in the notion of community.77  Kamitsuka 
develops this critique thoroughly through an evaluation of Tracy’s hermeneutic for 
reading Scripture; here he says that Tracy wants to build upon a common human 
experience that provides a common criterion to all people for their thinking.78  He also 
says that Tracy’s scriptural hermeneutic requires an ecumenical consensus that is not 
present in the Christian tradition, let alone in the current context.79  John Vissers offers a 
good summary of this critique when he says that Tracy believes “the systematic 
theologian cannot engage in public conversation without first yielding to another analysis 
of reality.”80  These critiques are all dependent upon the reading of Tracy as a 
foundationalist who wants to ground his theological thinking in a foreign conception of 
reality.  By grounding his theology in a different, non-theological discourse, these critics 
argue that Tracy tries to articulate a foundation upon which all theology can be built.   
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Tracy offers a response to these different criticisms by returning to the notion of 
theology as conversation.  The Platonic dialogues, he says, exemplify the open-endedness 
that must be the main component of any attempt at conversation with others.  This open-
endedness shows three different Platonic presuppositions at work in conversation: first, 
there is a priority of the question over the answer in true inquiry; second, true inquiry 
provokes further inquiry in that any answer raises more questions; and, third, the type of 
inquiry involved in conversation is directed to horizons of inquirers, which means the 
conversants set the agenda for the conversation.81  These three presuppositions at work 
lead Tracy to offer two more components of any conversation: first, that the conversation 
is not an argument in that there is no winner, but only an attempt to inquire as to what the 
truth or meaning of a situation is;82 and, second, dialogue leads to the questioning of the 
assumptions of the various participants through the perpetuation of open-ended inquiry 
that leads one to reexamine the horizons of thought in which one is involved.83  Werner 
Jeanrond points to the openness not only of the participants but also of the self that is 
involved in inquiry.  Jeanrond notices that the involvement of the self in inquiry also 
necessitates, for Tracy, a willingness to engage different ideas and people and, if 
necessary, to change based upon the nature of the inquiry.  The one involved in a 
conversation must always be open to revision if a true conversation is going to take 
place.84  This dialogue, then, allows a self-realization that the subject is “in-process” 
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which leads to the proper framing of reason in its own “possibilities, complexities, and 
limits,” which are revealed through the dialogue with others who show the participants 
and the self the blind spots in one’s thinking.85 
Tracy argues that participation in the conversation only comes through the right 
formation of the thinker.86  This means that one learns to live in a pluralistic world and 
engage in a multitude of discourses with a number of different people and groups.  The 
reason that this formation is important for the theologian is because religion lives through 
the entering of a critical community of inquiry which would lead the religious thinker 
into a conversation with those engaging in such inquiry.87  The formation of the 
theologian involves education, where one learns to be involved in such a conversation 
through learning and internalizing the contemporary context and the Christian tradition.88  
The theologian becomes the one who actually does the discipline of theology, which for 
Tracy is “where action and thought, academy and church, faith and reason, the 
community of inquiry and the community of commitment and faith are most explicitly 
and systematically brought together.”89   
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The task of the systematic theologian is to “interpret the classic of her or his 
particular religious tradition.”90  Tracy believes in this because of the hermeneutical 
nature of theology.  The theologian is one who is “nothing more nor less than an 
interpreter of the religious classics of a culture.”91  The classic is a text within a tradition 
or culture that discloses the reality, the whole, of that tradition as something that is 
simply given and must be accepted and recognized.92  The classic is defined by 
containing two basic components: first, it has a radical stability as it has become a 
permanent part of a tradition and/ or culture while, second, also containing a radical 
instability since it has an “excess of meaning through ever-changing receptions.”93  These 
two components lead to its interpretation.  The interpretation of the classic occurs through 
its thoroughly particular position as something entrenched in a culture.  Due to this 
entrenchment the classic can never be fully understood.  However, it still reaches out 
from its own historical context and demands to be interpreted.94  Tracy argues that for 
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historically informed interpreters there needs to be a return “to the task of understanding 
by conversing with the claim to attention of classic texts and events.”95  The theologian is 
the one who enters into conversation with the classics of the tradition so that they may be 
interpreted for the present. 
Part of his discussion on the classic is Tracy’s focus on intensification.  He frames 
the discussion by discussing how one may produce a classic.  For Tracy, the classic is 
produced by “undertaking the journey of intensification into particularity.”  This journey 
is “…to the point where an originating sense for the fundamental questions and feelings 
that impels us all, and a rare response in thought and feeling to those questions, is 
experienced…”96  The one who produces the classic has a unique, particular experience 
that compels her to create something that speaks to that experience.  The creation of the 
classic is an attempt to understand the moment one experienced that made one question 
one’s fundamental feelings.  The producer of the classic feels like one must create in 
order to speak to “certain essential truths which…touch human existence by their 
immediacy and irreplaceability.”97  In the creation of the classic, therefore, is a moment 
of distanciation due to intensification.  This distanciation results from the “intense and 
paradigmatic experience” one has.  This distanciation, though, is essential for one to be 
able to speak to the nature of the experience in the classic.98  The distanciation from the 
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experience means that one needs a way of bridging the gap between the experience and 
the creation of the classic. Tracy argues this happens through the use of imagination 
which is “the correlative intensification power which produces in language that which the 
work expresses.”  Tracy goes on to say, “The classic text is produced only when 
imagination at work, in a work, impels, drives, frees the creator to express the 
meaning…of the work in the work.”99  The end of the journey of intensification is the 
creation of the classic whereby one communicates a particular experience through a work 
that transcends oneself.  Intensification also produces a work that avoids closure as any 
attempt at explaining the experience would destroy the very nature of said experience.100  
For Tracy, the journey of intensification results in a way of thinking that plays with genre 
in order to find what is appropriate to speak to the meaning and experience of the self 
transcended in the work of the classic.101         
Theology becomes a conversation with the classics of a tradition, specifically the 
theological tradition.  This conversation with the classics joins the theologian to the entire 
community that has gone about interpreting these texts and events.102  By entering the 
conversation on the interpretation of the classics, the theologian enters a “world of 
meaning and truth offering no certainty but promising some realized experience of the 
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whole by the power of the whole.”103  This world is that which the classic discloses so 
that the theologian can think and rethink what it means to think and name God.  This 
disclosure, though, is never controlled and completely comprehensible as it is the 
disclosure of the experience of the radical mystery of God which results in an 
“uncontrollable incomprehensibility.”104  The conversation the theologian enters with the 
classic is concerned with saying something about that which one cannot really say 
anything—the radical mystery and incomprehensibility of God.  Yet, the belief exists that 
these classics do disclose some reality of the nature of the divine.  The theologian, in 
conversation with the classic, is caught in the “back-and-forth movement” of trying to say 
something about God while also acknowledging that all truth about God is 
incomprehensible.105   
B. Naming God: The Turn to Form through the Fragment 
The next step of my argument consists outlining why it is that thinking theology 
as improvisation is a possibility.  The way forward is to begin to understand what it is 
that theology is conversing about.  For Tracy, theology is a conversation about what it 
means to think and name God.106  To this point, in the first three chapters, I have stressed 
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a way of thinking that is concerned with attunement to the other and how the thinker can 
be attentive to this other and to “groove” with this other, finding a rhythm with the other.  
In this chapter, I have also discussed how theology is a conversation concerned with what 
it means to think and name God.  Thus, the argument throughout the rest of the chapter 
details how theology can open possibilities for thinking and naming God.  The form that I 
consistently turn to is that of “fragment.”   
Tracy turns to the fragment because he finds in this form a way of confronting the 
totalizing discourse prevalent in modernity and critiqued in postmodernity.  Postmodern 
ways of thinking confront the totalizing discourse of modernity through the turn to the 
other, to the excessive, and to the transgressive.  Theology searches for forms that show a 
way through the attempt to totalize God-talk, allowing the idea of God to touch upon the 
reality of the God espoused in theology and breaking any whole that may be forced upon 
the thinking of God.107  The result is an attempt to find a form that communicates the 
content that theology wants to share in reference to God.108  Thus, the naming of God in 
the postmodern context turns to those forms that reveal the excessive and transgressive 
nature of the revelation of God, trying to match the content of this excessiveness with an 
appropriate form for God, all the while aware that this form is incomplete.109  The forms 
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that are used for God, then, uncover the underside of theology by exploring the 
“shattering otherness” of God.110  This shattering otherness of God becomes an 
interrupting force to any discourse on God.111  The interruption comes when the elements 
of excess, transgression, and otherness are present in discourse on God.  The search 
Tracy and I share is for the form(s) that allows thinking God with an awareness of God as 
interruptive force.112   
At this point it is important to examine why form is important for Tracy’s 
theology.  He turns to the idea of forms because he believes “[t]here can be no ideas free 
of the web of language.  There are no pure messages.  Whatever message comes, 
whatever subject matter is understood, comes by means of its forms, whether the text is 
as short as a proverb or as long as an epic.”113  Within Western thought, the idea of form 
becomes even more necessary as it has been central since the time of Plato for how an 
object or a phenomenon appears.  Plato sets the trajectory of Western thought by 
articulating the cosmic harmony within which a form can communicate a certain kind of 
content.  The role form, drawn from the Greeks, is to give a preliminary coherenece to 
the cosmos.114    
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From the Greeks, Tracy adopts the importance of form and sees that form is 
central in monotheism.  In monotheism, God is the creator of form.  This leads Tracy to 
say that “form prevails through the Creator-God’s formal, immanent causality.  For 
Christian thought, the doctrine of the Word grounded this reality of form in the central 
Christian doctrines of Christology and Trinity.”115  In monotheism, form and content 
become linked together because God—the content—creates the form.  Monotheistic 
theologies focus on finding appropriate forms for the content of the belief in God.  The 
first question theology asks is “who is God as God has named Godself in and through all 
the form of God’s biblical names…”116  This can also be extended to the way that 
traditions understand God as God has been revealed in the traditions.  The focus is not on 
the limits of human understanding but on the divine and how comprehensible, or 
incomprehensible, this divinity is.  Here, the form used to think God becomes linked with 
the content one is trying to understand this God through.117   
Christian theology, however, differs from the strict monotheism of other religions 
through its belief in the Trinity and the corollary belief in the incarnation of the Second 
Person of the Trinity.  Due to these beliefs, the centrality of form is necessary to any 
Christian theology faithful to the “incarnational principle” of Word as Logos, where God 
takes on human form.  This necessity of form comes through the belief that the Word as 
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Logos is manifested in and through form.118  Due to this incarnational principle, Tracy 
argues that theology should take christomorphic form as this makes theology able to 
reflect the idea that Jesus Christ is the form-of-forms, the divine-human form.119  In 
keeping with this christomorphic focus, the forms that Tracy finds helpful are those that 
point to how Jesus Christ came into the world, as a transgressive and excessive 
phenomenon, exploding the traditional forms used to think God.  The type of form 
preferred by Tracy is those that emphasize the excess of God as well as God’s 
interruptive and disruptive nature through the inbreaking as demonstrated in the 
incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity.120  
Tracy believes that he finds a form for an appropriate thinking of God in the 
fragment.  He turns to the fragment because this is a form that seeks to “shatter any 
reigning totality system”121 through a recovery of “once-forgotten, marginalized, and 
repressed realities.”122  The fragment does not allow the whole to continue by showing 
the inadequacy of every whole to offer a proper explanation.  The fragment does so by 
bringing to the fore the other and the different, those entities within the system that do not 
allow any closure.123  The fragment arises in the postmodern context where there is a 
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focus on the “once forgotten, marginalized, and repressed realities” that were ignored in 
modernity; religion offers place for the recovery of these ignored, repressed forms 
through the embracing of those realities that do not fall into any systematic categories or 
totalizations, most notably the idea of God.124  Thus, the fragment’s concern is to resist 
the resists totalizing nature of discourse.125 
The turn to the fragment accomplishes three necessary tasks on the way to being 
able properly to think and name God.  First, the fragment allows one to see the 
fragmented nature of both modernity and postmodernity, understanding that no discourse 
or way of thinking can offer a total explanation for the way things are.126  Second, the 
turn to the fragment encourages the letting go of any totalizing system.  Tracy wants to 
“[f]ocus instead on the explosive, marginal, saturated, and, at times, auratic fragments of 
our heritage…Blast the marginalized fragments of the past alive with the memory of 
suffering and hope; remove from their seemingly coherent place in the grand narratives 
we have imposed upon them.”127  The fragments disrupt ways of thinking people have 
now taken for granted.  Lastly, the fragment opens a way of thinking God that focuses on 
the incomprehensibility of God and relates this to the non-closure of all things in the 
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universe.128  These three tasks of the fragment show the inability of any discourse to think 
God adequately.  They do so by showing where discourse about God breaks open to 
allow the irruption of the divine. 129      
At this point, Tracy wants to differentiate his approach to fragments from 
previous ones that he finds inadequate.  The first approach to fragments that Tracy 
mentions comes from what he terms “radical conservatives.”  These thinkers view the 
fragments as the only remnant of what was a once-unified Western culture.130  The 
radical conservatives look to the fragment with both regret and nostalgia for a world that 
once was but is no more.  For Tracy, T.S. Eliot, especially his poems The Four Quartets, 
typifies this position.131  The second approach comes from postmoderns.  Postmoderns 
look to the fragments as those pieces that free one from a system or totality.132  The view 
of the fragment by the postmoderns partly explains the “return of religion” as religion is 
the “feared other” of the Enlightenment.133  These thinkers look for fragments in their 
most excessive and transgressive forms as these call into question the Enlightenment 
while avoiding the forming of any totality.134  Tracy finds these two views of fragments 
inadequate as they do not fully appreciate the nature of the fragment.  The conservatives 
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do not really want the existence of fragments but accept them as a reminder of the 
forgotten whole.  Postmoderns have a more positive view of the fragment, but only as 
that which breaks the totality and, thus, do not appreciate the full range of possibilities 
available to this form.   
Tracy endorses a third approach, one that is explicitly theological and 
philosophical.  He views the “fragments even more positively than the postmoderns as 
bearers of hope, for some form of redemption in our own time, if we could but attend to 
them.”135  With this approach, the fragment does something more than just break 
totalities: it offers hope and opens up certain possibilities.  The fragment does this 
through its preferences for the marginal aspects and people of history, those events that 
“recall forgotten, even repressed memories,” giving hope, and possibly redemption, to 
those who were ostracized, forgotten, and/ or repressed.136  For Tracy, the result of 
preferring this approach to the fragment is a vibrant religion that grounds itself within its 
most transgressive and excessive elements, the same elements that lead to irruption and 
fragment.137  
Tracy next turns to finding those discourses within theology that are fragmentary 
and give themselves to thinking God in this fragmentary way.  The two discourses that 
Tracy turns to are the mystical and prophetic.  He takes up these forms of discourse 
because they are pieces of the Christian tradition that play to the transgressive and 
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excessive nature of God.  He shows that these two discourses operate within modernity 
on the underside of theology.  Tracy also chooses these forms as they reflect the two 
classic forms for understanding God’s reality, as love and intelligence.  However, within 
the postmodern context, these forms return.  They return in a way that fragments the 
hegemonic thinking on God that occurred in much of modernity.  This fragmenting of 
these forms leads, in the postmodern, to a place where all forms for thinking God are 
subject to such an unstructuring.138   
Tracy’s project begins with a discussion of the mystical form.  While analyzing 
the mystical form, he notices that within mystical language there is a destabilizing force 
at work.  This force comes from the desire of the mystic to “say something” while 
recognizing one’s own inability to say anything concretely about God.  The mystical 
“says something” through a constant play of signifiers relating to God, creating an 
unpredictability to the language and postponing of any attempt at closure.139  Following 
the thought of Jacques Lacan, Tracy notices that there are two general moves at work in 
much mystical discourse.  The first is to reduce the world, especially that which is 
portrayed in Scripture, to its most basic elements: God, world, and soul.  This reduction 
occurs so that the mystic may order and view the structural relationships between these.  
Second, the mystic uses a language that reflects a radical turn in the mystical experience, 
following Dionysius, Eckhart, and Eriugena.  This turn is to see the basic elements of 
God, world and soul dissolving into each other so that they are self-dissolving and self-
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negating.140  The mystic turns to language and a way of thinking God that reflects this 
simultaneous radical otherness and radical intimacy that exists between God, world, and 
soul.   
Tracy begins thinking and naming God with mystical discourse as it points to the 
beginning point for understanding God as God.141  This beginning point is the 
incomprehensibility of God seen not only in the infinite nature of God but also in the 
seeming paradoxes that thinking God requires of the theologian.  The reason that the 
mystical form reveals God as incomprehensible is because it fragments all pretense of 
intellectual or linguistic totality.142  Tracy views the mystical fragmented form as 
containing two parts.  The first focuses on the human relationship with the cosmos 
through facing limit-situations.  The mystical allows an experience of human finitude 
and, subsequently, the infinite nature of God.  The second part is a turn to ethics in that 
one does not totalize either God or neighbor.143  The mystical fragment is interested in 
both how one thinks God and how one lives in light of such thinking.  The mystical, as a 
fragmented form, opens the possibilities for a number of ways of thinking God as 
incomprehensible but also a multitude of ways of engaging God through the life one 
leads in love.   
Tracy takes up the form of the mystical through two streams of Christian 
mysticism: love mysticism and apophaticism.  While these two forms of mysticism are 
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interrelated, there is still a difference between the two.  In love mysticism, Tracy notices 
a focus on the transgressive and, oftentimes, erotic nature of language used for God.144  
This form of mystical language shows the excessive nature of God’s self-giving as God 
transgresses all bounds of the chasm that exists between the infinite and finite.  The love 
of God becomes apparent which in turn inspires the mystic to love God.145  This gift of 
God’s love overcomes the distance between Creator and created.  The result of God’s 
love in the person is an increase in one’s love of God and in thinking God as 
incomprehensible.  Following his “incarnational principle” Tracy shows how thinking 
God through incomprehensibility comes when God overcomes the distinctions between 
the divine and human in the incarnation of Christ.  The incarnation is beyond adequate 
articulation and the result is a language that resorts to embracing the incomprehensible 
nature of the event.  However, this incomprehensibility gives rise to the response to God 
on the part of the human to receive God’s gift and respond in love. 
The incomprehensibility of God is shown more explicitly in the mystical language 
of apophaticism.  Apophatic mysticism stresses the radical incomprehensibility of God 
through a focus on the inability of the finite to speak of God.  However, the 
incomprehensibility of God is not cause for concern for the apophatic thinker as it is a 
positive reality pertaining to God.  Apophatic language, Tracy says, picks up on “the 
positive reality of the notion of radical incomprehensibility of God and/or the Void.” 146  
Tracy means that “incomprehensibility,” when used in reference to God, means 
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something about God: mainly, that God is not comprehensible.  This is to make a claim 
about the nature of God.  Thus, when the theologian says that humanity cannot 
comprehend God, this is a positive factor as it does not place upon God the limits of finite 
description.  Instead, the theologian is encouraged to explore and think the nature of God 
in a way that is endless, offering a way of thinking that corresponds to the infinite nature 
of God.   
To further explain the nature of the mystical forms, Tracy turns to the thought of 
Pseudo-Dionysius, a theologian who uses both of the fragmented forms of mysticism.147  
Tracy’s use of Pseudo-Dionysius comes from his desire to communicate that naming God 
requires a different kind of language that opens the excessive and transgressive elements 
of God.  Tracy says, “We move with Dionysius…to an excessive language, that is, 
excessive in relation to all predicative namings of God, positive or negative.”148 Tracy 
finds in Pseudo-Dionysius a way of thinking that moves beyond any language of pure 
predication or pure negation in relation to God.  Pseudo-Dionysius opens a way of 
thinking God that pursues a language of love that seeks love of God in worship, calling to 
God in praise and prayer.  There exists, here, an experience of God.149  This experience 
comes from the incomprehensible nature of God opening up a way of responding to God 
in love: the experience of God overcomes the distance between God and creature, 
opening a language that reflects this through the idea of incomprehensibility pursued in 
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love.  It is this experience of God as incomprehensible that will open into the experience 
of the hiddenness of God in the prophetic. 
The second form of theology language that Tracy explicates as fragmentary is the 
prophetic.  The prophet speaks because the Other demands it, not out of the prophet’s 
own desire.150  The prophet is one who “hears a word that is not his or her own.  It is 
Other.  It disrupts consciousness, actions, deliberations.  It demands expression through 
the prophet.”151  The prophet is the one who speaks for the Other that is not present but 
hidden.  For Tracy, the prophet speaks because of his or her experience of God.  This 
experience comes from the interruption of God into history; or the radical in-breaking of 
God into the created world.  Tracy’s philosophy of history undergirds this.  Tracy’s 
conception of history is that “[h]istory is not only contingent; history is interruptive.  
Western history is, through and through, an interruptive narrative with no single theme 
and no controlling point.”152  The prophet points to this interruptive nature of God in 
history by moving language about God in two directions: toward the apocalyptic and 
ethical.153  These two directions allow the prophet to root thinking of God in the 
revelation of God in history.  The prophet articulates the radical plurality and ambiguity 
that touches all ways of thinking and naming God as “there is no innocent interpretation, 
no innocent interpreter, no innocent text.”154   
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In his articulation of the prophetic fragment, Tracy begins with the issue of 
ethics.155  Through the prophetic, Tracy follows the work of Levinas—and Derrida—in 
beginning ethics with the issue of how one encounters the Other.  Tracy believes that the 
“principal issue today is the issue of otherness, not more of the same….”156  The Other 
releases the one encountered by the Other from all desire to offer a totality of the 
Other.157  Instead, the Other opens one to an ethical responsibility to actually engage the 
Other in the Other’s otherness. Through this engagement the prophet calls people back to 
their own agency and to action in their political and historical context.158  The prophet 
points to those moments of otherness as the place of the disclosure of God in the world.  
These places of otherness revolve around the marginalized, oppressed, and others marked 
as non-persons.  God is revealed in these moments of weakness, which follows the 
christomorphic form that Tracy has already articulated as the guiding principle for his 
theology.  Thus, the weakness and hiddenness of God actually work as the revelation of 
God.159   
The ethics that Tracy articulates comes from the in-breaking of God into history.  
Tracy articulates this in-breaking of the divine through the apocalyptic, which he sees as 
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part of the prophetic.160  Through his use of apocalyptic discourse Tracy shows the 
interruptive and disruptive nature of God while also articulating the hiddenness of God as 
the place of the revelation of God.  The apocalyptic moment is brought to the fore most 
explicitly in Luther’s conception of God’s hiddenness.  Luther is apocalyptic because his 
view of history is quite apocalyptic, as he sees history as a series of conflicts and 
ruptures.161  This leads him to the development of the hiddenness of God, which is found 
in two ways.  First, and most famously, Luther finds the ultimate revelation of God as 
being contained in the cross, as the life-giving God is revealed in the death of Jesus on 
this cross.162  Here Luther follows Paul in his strong belief that God is revealed in 
weakness, seen most explicitly in the weakness of God on the cross.163   
However, the Hidden-God is not strictly revealed in the weakness of the cross as 
the second moment of the apocalyptic shows.  This second moment of God’s hiddenness 
comes from behind, even beyond, the Christ revealed on the cross.  This moment stems 
from the experience of God in terror, as awe-ful, completely overwhelming the recipient 
of the experience.164  The revelation of God comes from the experience of dread and 
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terror of one’s situation.165  This experience of dread and terror gives Tracy the impetus 
to say that this seemingly negative experience ultimately opens humanity to be able to 
relate to God in the non-continuous, disruptive nature of history.166  This is the place 
where humanity is able to experience God.    
Through his analysis of Luther’s theology Tracy comes to the conclusion that the 
Hidden-God, as revealed in the prophetic fragment, is an absolutely disrupting, 
interrupting force in the history of the world.  This way of thinking God allows Tracy to 
articulate God “as an awesome, often terrifying, hope-beyond-hope.”167  The logos used 
to control and think the idea of God in the totalizing discourse of much modern theology 
often misses this hiddenness of God as it fails to articulate the disruptive and 
transgressive nature of God.168   Here, Tracy is not talking about God’s revelation coming 
in God’s incomprehensibility but the revelation of God in the hiddenness of God: these 
are different.  Tracy says, “This God reveals God-self in hiddenness: in cross and 
negativity, above all in the suffering of all those others whom the grand narrative of 
modernity has set aside as non-peoples, non-memories, non-history.”169  While the 
reasons for these acts are incomprehensible, the way of thinking God that arises here is in 
reference to the God hidden in the cross and the seeming negativity of Jesus’ death.   
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The fragmented form of the prophetic brings together the ethical and apocalyptic 
moments.  This fragmented form reveals the turn to the other in contemporary theology 
which is interruptive of any system through the interruption of God as event, gift, and/or 
revelation, among other moments.170  The turn to the other in the ethical is radically 
disruptive through its use of the apocalyptic forms of thinking to articulate the in-
breaking of God in history.171  Thus, if the cross is that moment of the revelation of God 
in history then this revelation continues to occur in those places where suffering and 
struggle occur in the contemporary world, in those non-spaces, the places occupied by the 
non-persons who are the oppressed, marginalized, and disenfranchised.  Tracy argues that 
the presence of these peoples reveals the reality of the other(s) and those that are 
different.  The revelation of these realities “destroy[s] any teleological version of modern 
history even as they allow a return of the eschatological God who disrupts all continuity 
and confidence.”172  For Tracy, the prophetic fragment relies on the importance of the 
cross.  Tracy says “the cross should now be read as the revelation of God in hiddenness, 
in suffering and struggle, in the endurance and the joys of those individuals and groups 
too often effectively designated non-persons by the dominant culture: the oppressed and 
marginalized in all history, in every society, in every church.”173  The prophetic utilizes 
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the cross as that point that is both an ethical command to embrace the other and the 
apocalyptic moment that interrupts history to disclose the hiddenness of God. 
Tracy makes this way of thinking the event of the cross more explicit through an 
analysis of Jesus’ death in the Gospel of Mark.  In Mark, Tracy finds an account of the 
cross that is prophetic in that it brings together the ethical and apocalyptic.  Tracy begins 
with the end, showing that Jesus makes the same cry to God the oppressed and 
dispossessed do: “My God! My God!  Why have You forsaken me?”  Mark’s Gospel 
discloses God in Jesus as revealed in the hiddenness of struggle and conflict.  Taking his 
cue from liberation theologies, Tracy argues that the Gospel of Mark must be read in light 
of all those who have, are, or will suffer, both living and dead.174  Thus, the prophetic 
takes an ethical turn by seeing the Hidden-God as disclosed in the suffering of those 
deemed non-entities.  God’s revelation in the hiddenness and weakness of the negative 
experience of the cross opens the possibility of seeing God in the weak, those who are 
oppressed, marginalized and forgotten.175  In doing this, the Gospel of Mark offers a 
beginning point for the development of forms of resistance to the destruction of humanity 
by finding the Hidden-God in those often de-humanized the most explicitly.   
The prophetic form opens the possibility of new forms of ethics.  These ethics 
develop out of God’s interruptive self-disclosure in history through “the survival, 
struggle, and conflict of oppressed and forgotten people, living and dead: in otherness, 
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difference, marginality.”176 Tracy furthers his understanding of ethics through his 
contention that new forms have emerged in the postmodern context.  The new forms 
emphasize differing people groups, the differences between different cultures and classes, 
as well as the multi-cultural nature of many approaches to theological thinking.  These all 
allow the content of a group’s beliefs to come through the form used to communicate 
their beliefs.177  This is because “the face of the genuine other should release us from all 
desire for totality and open us to a true sense of infinity for naming and thinking God.”178  
Tracy finds it necessary to embrace the genuine other in a way that is non-totalizing but 
open to otherness of the other; and, this leads to an extension of this embrace of otherness 
not only in the other person, but also in the other as Wholly Other, as God.  In doing this, 
he discovers the impetus to a discourse that is non-totalizing is the same as (or, at least, 
very similar) to the one which looks to do justice to the thinking of God as infinite and 
other. 
The mystical and prophetic fragments do something to the theologian.  There is an 
event in each that interrupts the person’s life and asks to be dealt with: the mystical in the 
gift of love and the prophetic in the in-breaking of God in history in an interruptive and 
transgressive moment.  Due to the nature of these fragments as events which transform 
the way one is thinking, Tracy points out that these fragments cause the theologian to 
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stop, to stutter the naming of God.179  The experience of God leads to the stuttering of 
God’s name; the theologian, in trying to name God, employs Pseudo-Dionysius’ insight 
to negate and deconstruct all positive language for God while also seeing the inability of 
negative language alone to “say something” about the reality of God.  In order to 
overcome this seeming impasse, Pseudo-Dionysius moves beyond these two languages 
into a place where the thinker enters way of thinking which comes from praise and prayer 
and this leads to a stuttering of God’s name(s) as one cannot “catch” the name of God, 
but only stutter over it in a way that one never completes the naming.180  Pseudo-
Dionysius would have the theologian in some sense “stuck,” oscillating between 
kataphatic and apophatic languages for God and, yet, caught in the inability to actually 
speak God.  However, the theologian is compelled to speak but cannot speak rightly.181  
The theologian simply stutters by having to “say something” but unable to really “say” 
anything.  While not everything uttered in the stutter is worthwhile, the stutter occurs as 
the theologian gets stuck having to “say something.”   
The stutter leads into understanding how theology is improvisational.  For Tracy, 
thinking God ultimately leads to praise, prayer, worship and contemplation.  In this, one 
does not speak a name of God purely; rather, there is an attempt to offer different names 
for God, hoping that one may “work.”  When one hits upon a name, it causes one to stop 
as this name interrupts one’s thinking.  The result is a moment where one must begin to 
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“play” the name, “riffing” on it, stuttering it.  The key is that theology does not just offer 
a set of names for God the way an orchestra plays a composition; rather, theology tries 
names, thinks through names, opens names to possibilities, hoping to catch one that “says 
something”.  In the same way, the jazz musician tries different possibilities, opening a 
piece to being heard otherwise.   
C.  The Gathering: Rethinking the “System” of Theology 
The problem with the form of fragments is how to bring them together to “say 
something” while allowing them to still be fragments.  In this vein, Kristin E. Heyer 
notices a shift in the thinking demonstrated by Tracy from his early work of Blessed Rage 
for Order to his more recent theological thinking, which seeks to analyze similarities-in-
difference based upon the radical contingency and ambiguity inherent in all discourse.182  
The problem of giving some coherence to the fragments often leads to a discourse that 
does not recognize this contingency and ambiguity of all discourse.  Rather, at times, the 
focus on the fragments tends to become one more way of offering a totalizing way of 
thinking God as these no longer are the fragments breaking the whole, but become a 
piece in a new system.183  This is unacceptable for Tracy.  The theologian needs a way of 
bringing the fragments together that does not seek to systematize or totalize them, but 
give them a certain coherence (although, this is, at times, quite loose) by thinking their 
similarities-in-difference.    
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Tracy turns to the idea of “gathering” for a way of collecting the fragments and 
giving them coherence.  He argues that the task of theology in the postmodern world 
revolves around the ability to gather and order the fragments.184  Tracy is aware of the 
fact that this gathering can turn into a totalizing discourse that place constraints upon the 
thinking and naming of God.  He argues that there must be a constant remembering of the 
fact that these religious expressions are in fact fragments which break the whole.185  
Tracy exemplifies this, saying, “Though you can’t have a totality of symbols, you do 
need to order and gather them without losing the sense that religious expressions are 
simply fragments.”186  The fragments themselves offer a constant interruption of any 
attempt at hegemonic discourse in relation to the thinking of God.  The focus on the 
fragments and their gathering allows theology to continue to resist while offering ways of 
thinking God that is consonant with the multiple and pluralistic nature of theological 
thinking.   
The conversation of theology becomes the place where the gathering can take 
place in the contemporary context of theology.  The reason that Tracy turns to the 
conversation is because the gathering is concerned with similarities-in-difference, 
bringing together those forms and ways of thinking that are other than each other.  The 
gathering allows a living-in-difference.  The gathering brings together the fragments and 
lets them critique each other.  The gathering offers a way of constantly calling into 
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question the very “system” that attempts to give coherence to the fragments, never 
allowing the fragments to be reified into a whole.  The coherence that the theologian 
gives to the fragments is always shaky and able to be changed due to the nature of the 
fragments as unsettling, disrupting, and interruptive of any whole. 
The gathering that Tracy turns to in order to think and name God is that of the 
“mystical-prophetic.”  The mystical-prophetic brings together the mystical rhetoric—
which thinks God as incomprehensible—with the prophetic rhetoric—which thinks God 
through hiddenness.  These two seem to be quite disparate ways of thinking God.  
However, they come together through the gathering which allows these two different 
discourses to live-together-in-difference.  Tracy brings the mystical and prophetic 
together in the gathering because each disrupts the modern way of thinking God, instead 
offering a way that is predicated upon the excessive and transgressive nature of the 
divine.187  The gathering of the forms offers a way into how theology is able to bring 
together its plurality of discourses to think God.  Theology does this by entering into the 
conversation around a given moment, event, or idea for God. 
In order to bring together the mystical and prophetic Tracy finds points of contact 
between them which allow an entry point into thinking God.  One of these points of 
contact is that of the impossible.  Tracy uses the idea of the Impossible as a way of 
gathering the fragments of the mystical and prophetic in a way that allows the theologian 
to think God.  Within mystical discourse God is understood as primarily 
incomprehensible and, thus, any thinking of God becomes an attempt at futility.  The 
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naming of God is not possible and, yet, still occurs.  The incomprehensibility of God 
disturbs all attempts at naming God; God then is thought through the impossible as that 
which cannot be named or thought but is still named and thought.  Likewise, the 
prophetic also looks to the impossible for a way of thinking God, but not as a way of 
disrupting language and thought.  Within prophetic discourse the impossible is a 
disruption of history that opens the way to justice by offering a breaking point with 
reality as currently constructed.  People are exhorted to do the impossible by working 
actively against current forms of oppression and marginalization.  The impossible is the 
embrace of this fight through the disruption of history by God.188   
Tracy also gathers together these two fragments by looking at how each assumes 
the other.  Turning to the mystical, he articulates how the incomprehensible God is found 
on the underside of theology in those deemed non-persons.  Likewise, the prophetic sees 
the Hidden-God in the useless suffering of those deemed non-persons through oppression 
and, here, God’s disclosure is in both the voices of the oppressed and the action taken on 
behalf of them.189  Thus, the mystical, like the prophetic, is rooted in the uptake of the 
voices of those put on the margins of society.  But, the prophetic is also rooted in the 
mystical as it locates its roots in reflection on the religion of the people it wants to 
liberate.  The prophetic then pushes the mystical into a place of action by showing how 
the spirituality associated with this leads to overcoming the system of oppression.190  
Thus, the prophetic is also rooted in the mystical because religion is practiced with a view 
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toward the Wholly Other.  Overall, one can see Tracy trying to bring these two disparate 
discourses together, allowing them to deconstruct and reconstruct each other.  This leads 
to the gathering which opens the various possibilities for thinking and naming God. 
The gathering brings together those forms of discourse that have oftentimes been 
kept separate within the Christian tradition.  This separation meant that they were not 
used together in order to think God.  Tracy says, “The Hidden-Revealed God and the 
Comprehensible-Incomprehensible God have never been closer in self-understanding.  It 
is this conjunction that may free both the prophetic and mystical trajectories of post-
modern theologies to find one another once again, and, in so doing, find anew a further 
disclosure of the unfathomable Mystery of God.”191  Thus, the concern of Tracy, through 
the advancement of the idea of the gathering, is that this helps the theologian think God 
in a way that brings out the mystery of God.   
Tracy furthers the idea of the gathering by pointing to multiple modes of 
discourse which bring together fragmented forms.  He sees three principal gathering 
forms used in Christian theology: narratives (in light of the Gospels), doctrines, and 
liturgy.192  Tracy’s tendency is to revert to the literary forms; however, the recourse to 
literary forms tends to limit him by not fully allowing for the full thrust of the nature of 
theology as conversation.  There is a temptation in his thinking to revert only to one form 
of gathering at a time instead of putting these three into conversation with each other.   
As a corrective, this project outlines a turn to a musical form of improvisation which 
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moves to the more performative aspects of theology.  While it may be easy only to see 
the performative aspect of theology in the liturgical form, this project picks up on this 
performative aspect in all moments of gathering as all participate in the conversation to 
allow theology to say something.  Through these moments of gathering theology shows 
its concern with finding the implicit rhythm of theology through the notion of 
attunement.193  Improvisation allows for a multitude of fragments to speak almost 
simultaneously.  Instead of offering three discourses, this musical metaphor allows for the 
turn to the idea of a chord, hitting three or more notes at the same time.  Theology as 
improvisation opens the possibility of a multitude of disparate discourses to resound 
simultaneously, calling each other into question, but still articulating a “whole” together.   
The doctrine of Christology shows a point where Tracy continues to bring 
together the various forms of gathering to think through a Christian doctrine.  Tracy does 
not spell out explicitly how his concept of the gathering works here, but it is evident that 
Christology allows Tracy a place to test his thinking.  Tracy admits as much in his early 
works.194  Tracy argues that in order to do Christology appropriately, the theologian 
needs to recognize the diversity of forms that work together to disclose the truth of Jesus 
Christ.195  He points to the multitude of different sources that speak to the nature of Jesus 
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Christ, from the four gospel accounts to the thoughts of Paul to the Christic hymns in 
Philippians and Colossians.196  All of these are different forms and speak differently to 
the reality of Jesus Christ.  However, Tracy can bring all of these together in a 
conversation that works with different conceptions of Jesus in order to come to some 
coherent whole.  Here, Tracy uses the gathering of fragments to think in a variety of ways 
about Christology.  He says that a focus on the event of Jesus helps develop ordered 
relationships of the whole of reality because Christology has a number of implications for 
how the theologian views both the self and the world.197  In a similar manner, Tracy 
argues that the event of Jesus Christ reveals that God is love and this helps theology 
rethink the nature of self and world.198  Taking a different approach, Tracy says that 
Christology answers the question “who is God?” in Christianity by pointing to the event 
of Jesus Christ.199  Thus, Tracy uses Christology as a theological doctrine which offers a 
place where multiple strands for thinking and naming God can come together in one 
coherent gathering. 
In light of the above, the gathering offers this project its most explicit example of 
a theology which works as improvisation.  This is because the gathering, like 
improvisation, is built upon the inherent conversation that takes place among theologians 
and their sources.  The gathering allows the theologian the opportunity to organize and 
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reorganize ways of thinking theologically. This process corresponds to the way that the 
musician is able to play with an idea in a piece of music.  The musician takes the 
fragments of the piece of music and begins to reorganize and play with these.  The 
theologian does this through the analysis of a way of thinking and reimagining its 
possibilities for thinking and naming God.  However, for both the theologian and 
musician the task is never complete.  They both avoid closure at almost all costs. 
D.  An Ethics of Resistance 
Tracy is aware of the consistent critique that his theological project does not offer 
a developed ethics.  Werner Jeanrond exhorts Tracy to develop a way of balancing his 
concerns with method and doctrine with a “search for principles and strategies for 
political action.”200  Jeanrond also poses the question, “What is the relationship between 
the obviously necessary place of conversation in Tracy’s theory of theology and the 
actuality of conversation in Tracy’s assessment of praxis?”201  In essence, Jeanrond is 
posing the question of what kind of response to the negatives of modernity arise in the 
action of ethics.  Tracy is aware of this, saying that postmodernity is often ethically 
underdeveloped and, thus, needs an ethical response to some of the problems inherited 
from modernity.202  This final section argues that Tracy develops an ethics of resistance, 
which says that religion “provides the ground for resistance and hope, resistance ‘to more 
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of the same,’ and hope in the future.”203  In order to flesh out how this ethics of resistance 
works, I supplement Tracy’s thought with that of Jacques Derrida. 
The reason that the question of ethics arises here is because of the impetus given 
through the gathering.  The gathering has been described as a living-in-difference.  The 
concern in the gathering is to be able to understand the other, however the other may 
appear.204  The embrace of the other in the gathering and the drive toward living-in-
difference offers an ethics of resistance that correlates to the type of ethics that arises in 
postmodernity.  Unlike the modern move to a universal ethics (á la Kant), the ethics 
pursued in postmodernity is an ethics of resistance to any system or theory that neglects 
difference and otherness.  The modern tended to focus on the need for a drive for an all-
encompassing totality of ethics (which always failed) while the postmodern is concerned 
with justice that actually destroys the nostalgia and drive for a totality.205  Thinking in the 
postmodern actually becomes an ethical move as it is a form of resistance against the 
totalizing and hegemonic forms inherent to modernity.206  Postmodern ethics always 
seeks to do justice to those on the underside of a system or structure.  
The ethics of resistance developed here comes by thinking the other.207  The way 
that this ethics is accomplished is through the deconstructive gestures of many 
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postmoderns, exhibiting the underside and neglected of modernity.  The postmodern 
embrace of the other means that those who were/ are oppressed and marginalized are now 
allowed to call into question the system: their voice is now allowed to be heard on their 
own terms.  One of the ways Tracy sees these voices being allowed to speak and be heard 
is through the notion of history that postmodern thinkers espouse, where the forgotten 
and repressed other of history, these “subjugated communities of resistance in the past 
and present are finally allowed to speak on their own terms.  Otherness, difference, 
transgression, excess become the alternatives to the deadening sameness, the totalizing 
systems, the false security of the modern self-grounding subject.”208  The way that Tracy 
encourages the thinker to find and take up these voices on the underside of modernity is 
through the act of listening which hears the oppressed and marginalized and also couples 
oneself in active solidarity with these people.209  Through listening to the oppressed and 
marginalized, Tracy offers a place of resistance to these totalizing forms.   
One place that Tracy finds explicitly picked up in the postmodern is that of 
religion in its transgressive and excessive forms.210  Religion offers a conceptual 
framework for resisting totalizations.  This actually makes it an exercise in resistance.  
The way that religions exercise resistance is by engaging in the same logic used in the 
classic.  Whereas the classic is a text that confronts a world and opens new possibilities, 
so also religion functions in a similar way by resisting the dominant thought and 
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confronting a broader culture with a series of other possibilities.211  Religions offer a 
vision or, better, a redescription, of reality as interpreted through a cluster of metaphors 
derived from the classics of the tradition.212  The place where these metaphors of 
resistance are most explicitly found is in the fragmenting voice of the mystics and the 
prophets.   The transgressive nature of the conversation with the classic begins with the 
interpreter throwing the self at risk in front of the transformations for which the classic 
calls.213  This conversation teaches the interpreter to move from self-centeredness to a 
Reality-centeredness.  This move comes through the classic as it challenges the reality 
one now inhabits.214  The conversation results in an openness to the possibilities for the 
transformation of the contemporary world opened by the religious classic.215  The result 
of this conversation is a hope built on the call to action from living a life of solidarity 
with those who need emancipation and/ or authentic liberation as God has granted both in 
the Exodus and Christ-event.216   
Religions, with their belief in world transformation, are an exercise of 
resistance.217  In Christianity, the resistance to totalization comes through the ultimate 
other—God, especially God’s “shattering otherness” which undoes any system or way of 
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thinking imposed upon God.218  The naming of God that takes place in religion and 
theology should be an action in resisting the temptation to totalize God.  The religious 
one acts against this by resisting the “-isms” that place God in some hegemonic form, like 
deism, pantheism, panentheism, etc.  Theology names God through a polyphonic naming 
that constantly deconstructs and reconstructs each name, not allowing any name to 
dominate, but to simply be devoted to and praising the Wholly Other.  The Wholly Other 
fragments each name attempted.  The practice of naming God ultimately teaches 
resistance as it shows the inability of any discourse to actually accomplish the task of 
explaining God and instead offers a multiplicity of forms which resist and interrupt this 
act of naming.   
When the theologian takes heed of the current situation, the realization is that the 
wholly other who calls into question the totalization and system of oppression is on the 
outside of the system through oppression and marginalization.219  This is not to say that 
the oppressed are to be glorified as “God” or their suffering meant to be redemptive.  
Rather, as the naming of God breaks any system that claims to “capture” God, so this 
naming of God leads to a confrontation with the contemporary reality that contains a 
plethora of systems that lead to the oppression of those who are other.  The logic of 
resistance at work here draws from the naming of God in stressing the otherness of the 
oppressed and marginalized and how this otherness opens the breaking of these systems, 
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fragmenting them.  The religious classic advocates this in the mystical and prophetic 
forms this study has already examined.220   
However, there is a seeming disconnect with the ethics promoted here and how it 
would actually work in a specific situation.  In response, Tracy makes clear that there is a 
practical response found within Christianity.  He turns to the christomorphic form, saying 
that “[t]here is…no theoretical solution to historical disaster and defeat, but through and 
in Christ there is a practical response for the Christian and for any theology faithful to a 
Christian practice of resistance to evil even in defeat.  And there is gracious joy in the 
struggle and in life itself.”221  While acknowledging the problems that arise in the actual 
history of oppression, Tracy gives an exhortation to find solidarity with the other through 
the sharing in the struggle that these peoples find themselves in.  This is a practical 
response for Tracy as it is an imitation of what Jesus Christ did and encouraged his 
followers to do.  The one who acts as an imitator of Christ ultimately undoes the 
hegemonic response of some ethical constructs by acting in a way that is always for the 
other. 
Through this pursuing of an ethics of resistance, Tracy becomes more connected 
to the thought of Derrida.  This ethics of resistance becomes most explicit in the idea of 
justice informed by deconstruction: ethics must be about doing justice and doing justice 
is about a transformation from being self-centered to being for the other.  This conception 
of justice follows Derrida’s discussion of law and justice in his article “Force of Law: 
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The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” and links it with the ethics of resistance that 
Tracy has implicitly developed.222  For Derrida, justice is a resistance to law because law 
is ultimately built upon an unjust, originary violence as the legal authority is almost 
always legitimated through the use of some violence to an/other.223  Deconstruction 
destabilizes the law by bringing to light the illegitimate legitimation of the law.  Justice, 
on the other hand, works to resist the hegemonic nature of law because justice is being 
open to the other through hospitality.  This causes the questioning of the very foundations 
of law, politics and morality.224  This is explicitly linked to the thought of Tracy because, 
through the questioning of the “norm” of the law, justice resists by turning to an attempt 
to be open to the other, for the other, letting the other to come to light.  The turn to the 
other is the act of resistance performed by justice.225 
As a form, improvisation opens a way where the goal is always to “hear” the 
other: it is not possible to improvise without hearing the others in one’s group.  Thus, 
improvisation is always about hearing the other and how, in hearing the other, one can 
both supplement and add to what the other is saying.  The conversation is about having a 
multiplicity of voices present in the improvisation, where there is a polyphonic nature to 
what occurs.  Thus, improvisation is a form explicitly concerned with doing justice to the 
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other.  And this justice for the other is pursued in a mutual resistance to any form that 
tries to set the parameters or dominate the conversation.  Rather, the musicians work 
together toward something other, something new, toward hearing and playing a piece 
otherwise.  Improvisation is a form of musical resistance to any attempt at a hegemonic 
composition and this is accomplished through doing justice to the other.   
If improvisation implies an ethics of resistance this also means that attunement 
has importance for the ethics of resistance, not only in improvisation but also within 
theology.  Attunement to the other (Other) is prevalent in both and becomes the 
fundamental place for both thinking and action.  It is the attunement to the other that 
allows one to hear this (these) other(s) in a multitude of places, whether music, religious 
texts or the contemporary situation.  Where there is attunement to the other there can be 
resistance against the hegemonic impulse of much thinking to reduce the other to the 
same.  Attunement resists sameness by allowing the other to come to the fore by doing 
justice to the other.  The result is a multitude of voices being used to show the otherness 
and difference prevalent in the contemporary world.  This opens into the necessity to 
gather these others in a way that creates a polyphony of voices.  
E. Conclusion 
In this chapter, my goal was to use David Tracy’s model of theology as 
conversation as a conceptual framework for understanding the possibilities of a theology 
as improvisation.  I did this because of the consonance of conversation within theology 
with the idea of conversation within improvisation.  Tracy advances a theological model 
advanced which opens the possibilities as to what a theology of improvisation may look 
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like.  This was advanced through the outlining of Tracy’s theological project in the first 
section of this chapter. 
The second section of the chapter sought to build upon Tracy’s model of 
conversation through his account of the fragments.  The reason that the notion of 
fragments is important in the model of theology as improvisation is because the 
improvising musician is consistently fragmenting the piece of music and playing upon a 
fragment to open new, interesting possibilities.  Tracy’s model shows a theological 
equivalence to this by taking up the fragments that undo the totalizing discourse for 
thinking and naming God.  Tracy allows the fragments to come to the fore in a way that 
consistently calls into question theology’s thinking of God and, thus, opens possibilities 
for what a language about God may entail.   
The gathering, as outlined in the third section of the chapter, becomes the place 
where the fragments are brought together in order to think God.  Theology brings 
together a plurality of fragments in the gathering.  The gathering allows the fragments to 
live together in difference through the conversation that takes place between these, 
calling each other into question, offering various possibilities, and keeping open the 
conversation.  The gathering acts as the place where theology can come to fruition in its 
attempts to think and name God by working through the conversation and exploring the 
possibilities opened up therein.  The gathering names and thinks God in the multitude of 
voices, through polyphonic nature of all communities.   
The gathering and its emphasis on living-in-difference ultimately results in an 
ethics of resistance.  This ethics of resistance comes directly out of both the theological 
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model Tracy adopts as well as the aesthetic of improvisational musicians.  In both, the 
goal is to keep the conversation going and open, avoiding closure.  In order to accomplish 
this, both theology and improvisation resist attempts at totalization or hegemony.  The 
ethics of resistance works to ensure that the gathering can take place with a number of 
voices able to join the conversation through the living-in-difference.  For both theology 
and improvisation this move to resistance of totalizing discourse is important as it frees 
the thinkers and gives them the ability and room to explore.  This move to exploration is 
important for both theology and improvisation since what they explore—whether God or 
music—cannot really be contained in a closed discourse.   
Through Tracy’s theological model the project of theology as improvisation finds 
a kindred spirit.  The next part of the project is to see how this fundamental theological 
position may open into an explicit improvisational theology.  Here, the project turns to St. 
Augustine of Hippo.  In Augustine, one finds a theologian who uses a multitude of forms 
and discourses, all working together to bring to the fore different understandings and 
ways of thinking about God.  This is all informed by his “musical” understanding of the 
world.  This gives Augustine a creative, constructive, and important way of doing 
theology that has been often neglected.   
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE THEOLOGICAL EXAMPLE:  
AUGUSTINE’S UNSTRUCTURING OF THEOLOGICAL FORM 
The last chapter of the project is an exposition of Augustine.  The turn to 
Augustine is made for two reasons.  First, he deals explicitly with a musically-influenced 
theology in his De Musica.  Second, Augustine employs multiple forms for thinking 
theologically, many of which point to the necessity of finding a nonconstraining form for 
the theological endeavor.  Thus, this project finds Augustine to be a kindred spirit as he is 
one who is concerned with being attuned to God and allowing this to shape and form 
theology.  The two texts I utilize in this regard are the classics De Doctrina Christiana 
and Confessions.  In these texts one can see Augustine’s use of different forms for 
thinking God.  Through his use of different forms, I argue that he embraces a way of 
thinking God that moves into a formlessness.  This formlessness comes from the very 
nature of God as the One who gives form but can never be contained or reduced to one 
form.  Thus, the argument moves into a way of thinking God that embraces the formless.  
The goal of this chapter is to tie together some of the strands that have been 
alluded to, but left untied throughout the other parts of the work.  The objective is to 
begin constructing a theological model which takes seriously the inconceivable nature of 
God.  For Augustine, the problem in theological language is that when humans think of 
God, there is the awareness that the language and thinking used are inadequate and 
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incapable of grasping God.  He says that although believers praise and bless God, “no 
words of ours are capable of expressing him…”1  Human speech for God is, in the view 
of Paul J. Griffiths, duplicitous as it never measures the divine correctly.2  Language must 
find a way out of the conceptual language which entraps God.3 
Augustine believes God escapes this purely conceptual nature of language.  He 
offers an understanding of God through the use of sound, where the notions of music, 
rhythm, psalms, and other musical elements become a key interpretive moment to 
thinking God.  For Charles T. Matthews, Augustine’s critique of theology here is also a 
critique leveled at ontotheology because there is no frame available for the theologian to 
use as a “‘backdrop’ against which to ‘foreground’ God…[because]… God is always 
‘behind’ supporting every horizon…”4  The fact that there is no horizon against which to 
think God does not mean that there is no ability to construct a language for God; on the 
contrary, Augustine is adamant about the “sheer necessity to say something” through the 
use of images and metaphors to think God with the realization and caveat that what is 
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said does not actually reveal God.5  The way that he will do this is by embracing a 
language where God is thought in terms of the formless. 
The doctrine of divine simplicity is one way of analyzing how Augustine 
constructs theological language.  He deals with the problem of divine simplicity in a way 
that foreshadows Thomas Aquinas.  For Aquinas, the concept of the simplicity of God 
requires that any language used for God be inadequate as is actually simple, meaning that 
no language is complete and whole in itself.  Thus, any language used for God does not 
give adequate signification to the one it is trying to signify.6  In City of God, Augustine 
says that “those things which are essentially and truly divine are called simple, because in 
them quality and substance are identical, and because they are divine, or wise, or blessed 
in themselves, and without extraneous supplement.”7  Augustine shows the need for a 
form to think God that speaks to God’s reality as simple.   
The new form that Augustine turns to in order to think God is that of sound.  The 
embrace of sound allows for a way into thinking through the inconceivable nature of 
God.  This project has turned to the musical form of improvisation as a way of dealing 
with the problem of the inconceivability of the nature of God.  This echoes an insight 
made by Catherine Pickstock, who argues that Augustine moves to a theological 
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approach that is more in line with Pythagoras than Plotinus.8  Augustine leaves Plotinus’ 
neo-Platonic system of the multiple arising from the One for a Pythagorean way of 
thinking that embraces the “musical” or “numerical” nature of the world.  This 
Pythagorean mode opens possibilities for thinking of the Creator.  Being, is not found in 
language alone, but is part of language which is part of the nature of sound.  The end 
result is a proposal for doing theology that tries to think God in God’s unconceivable 
nature through a series of forms that undo themselves, pushing the formlessness of God.   
In exploring the texts of Augustine, one notices the emphasis on a certain kind of 
formation for being able to hear the sound of God in the creation.9  One of the ways that 
this formation occurs is in Augustine’s attunement to God’s sound through the learning 
and repeating of the Psalms, specifically in singing them.    In Confessions Book IX 
Augustine recounts how his singing of the Psalms formed and shaped him in certain 
ways.  This leads him to think God “shuddering in awe” while “hope and joy surge up 
within him at [God’s] mercy.”10  For Augustine, the singing of the Psalms gives one’s life 
a certain rhythm that leads to true religion.  For him, true religion is a way of life that 
purges the mind and makes it capable of grasping “the one God, Father and Son and Holy 
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Spirit.”11  However, as Augustine says, a large part of learning true religions comes from 
the desire and ongoing cultivation of paying “pious and diligent attention.”12   
For Augustine, the goal of true religion is wisdom, or sapientia.13  The beginning 
of the task of theology is to be attuned to God in such a way that one is purified and made 
ready to contemplate and gain knowledge of God, which is wisdom.14  Wisdom does not 
allow a person to be separated from God as it binds both human and God together 
through the work of the Word of God, not only in the incarnation but also in the Word’s 
present ministry.15  Wisdom is the knowledge of God that is developed as one moves 
from knowledge of the creation—called scientia—to knowledge of what it is to dwell in 
the vision of God as one contemplates God.16   Rowan Williams develops this idea of 
wisdom further when he says, “For the mind to acquire sapientia is for the mind to see 
itself sustained and embraced by this self-communicating action of God; to see itself as 
being directly formed by this relation to God’s wisdom, not given an identity by its 
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relation to ‘lower’, transient objects (XIV.20).”17  The attainment of wisdom comes 
through the development of a “religious love of truth” which is only able to be pursued 
through the seeking of the good life “patiently and in all docility.”18  The cultivation of 
being a certain kind of person allows one to grow in wisdom which opens one to the 
cultivation of virtues which opens one to the ascent towards God in a continually deeper 
way.19 
A.  The Basis of Theology: An Examination of De Musica 
Before analyzing the actual text of De Musica, it is important to understand its 
importance in the Augustinian corpus.  This text begins the theological path that 
Augustine will pursue in his later years, especially after 396.20  This is one of the texts 
where Augustine sets out to put together an understanding of the liberal arts which 
Christians can use in order to think in a Christian manner.  While he does not finish his 
proposed analysis of all the liberal arts, he begins with De Musica.  This has certain 
significance as the kind of thinking, and the path he lays open in this text, will be pursued 
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by him in later texts.21    In fact, it seems that De Doctrina Christiana finishes the project 
begun with De Musica in giving Christians a way to interpret the secular world, 
especially the alternative histories and rhetorics offered by the ancient, non-Christian 
world.  Ultimately, this text helps Augustine open human thought patterns up to the 
various rhythms, harmonies, etc. played in creation through the study of rhythm and 
music.  He opens these patterns through his belief that “[rhythmic] pattern is an outward 
access to internal intrinsic emotional substance…”22  Thus, Augustine’s De Musica offers 
a good place to begin a study of his use of sound to explore the unconceivable nature of 
God through the use of music. 
The best way to begin a study of De Musica is to examine Augustine’s 
understanding of what counts as music.  The first point he makes is that music is different 
than grammar.  He does this by pointing to the fact that both are modes of signification; 
however, music differs from grammar in its use of rhythm and measures in how it 
signifies, whereas grammar only signifies in a semiotic way.23  Music is the science of 
rhythm and measure, or what he terms “mensuration.”24  Mensuration deals with “moving 
well.”25  He says, “Music is the science of moving well.  But that is because whatever 
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moves and keeps harmoniously the measuring of times and intervals can already be said 
to move well.  For it is already pleasing, and for this reason is already called 
mensuration.”26  Music is the science of the rhythm of movement.  The study of music 
deals with how one develops an understanding of the general rhythm of things.  This 
understanding of rhythm is not only limited to sounds but to all things that move.   
The place of rhythm in music is there to make connections.  Augustine 
understands rhythm as that which connects things.  So, the rhythm of an object deals with 
its own connection with itself, while an object’s rhythm with another object deals with 
the connection between the two.  Thus, the rhythm of something not only connects it 
internally but allows connections to be made between different things.  Part of what it 
means to develop as a musician is to form one’s “ear” so that one can adjudicate the 
various connections that exist through rhythm.27  The way that one begins to understand 
the nature of rhythm is through one’s innate sense of hearing.28  Augustine believes 
nature gives all people a sense of hearing that allows them to hear the music in all 
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things.29  Nature not only endows people with this natural “hearing” of rhythm, but also 
shows the nature of rhythm in the creation through various examples, like the song of the 
nightingale, the rhythm of the life of bears and elephants, and the general music at work 
in nature.  Besides, animals are moved by music while also being the creators of a certain 
rhythm.30    
Augustine says that the sense of hearing must be cultivated and developed in 
order to hear the complexity of the rhythm, melody, and harmony at play in creation.  
This sense of hearing is formed through two things: memory and imitation.31  He says 
that the formation comes through practice as it develops mastery through repetition and 
the subsequent shaping of one’s memory.32  Augustine believes that practice develops 
one’s hearing to both listen and play well so one can be a rhythmic person, which 
develops memory.33  The cultivation of memory comes when one is able to remember 
what one heard, how something was played, or if it was done well.  Memory allows for 
connections to be made.  The cultivation of memory leads to the second thing needed: 
imitation.  In imitation, the musician, through remembering, imitates what was heard 
before and tries to duplicate it, perhaps expounding upon it.  The musician develops the 
sense of hearing by explicitly recalling the memories of mensuration and trying to imitate 
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these.  Through the dual work of memory and imitation the formation of the self occurs 
in such a way that one is able to be a person of the rhythm of the world.34         
In developing this musical sense, one becomes attuned to the rhythm and 
harmony of all things.  This attunement allows one to hear the rhythm and harmony that 
rings throughout the creation.  For Augustine, the rhythm and harmony of the creation 
give it rationality.  The rational are those things that are proportional as commensurable 
with each other.35  Rationality adheres to a numerical measure.36  Rationality gives 
proportionality to creation.  An example that Augustine uses here is that of the number 
three.  This number exemplifies perfect harmony because it is the sum of the first two 
numbers while also being the next number after the first two.  So, three is both the sum of 
one and two while also being the next number to come after one and two.  The number 
three completes the harmony of the first two numbers.37  The harmony in the number 
three shows the proportion, or harmony, with which the universe is ordered, giving an 
example of the perfection underlying the nature of creation.38    
In Book I of De Musica Augustine elucidates the musical nature of the world.  In 
Books II-V, he goes about establishing how it is that one is formed in such a way as to be 
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able to hear this musical nature of the world.  This formation comes through the 
development of an ear to hear so that one can hear the proportional ordering by which 
God created.39  The ear that Augustine wants the person to develop is one that is based 
upon listening as this listening attunes one to hear the rhythm of God in creation.40  
Harmony and rhythm lead to a world of “unending flow.”41  Through the development of 
one’s ear to hear the music of the world one can be attuned to this unending flow of 
rhythm and harmony in all things.  
The mind is able to tap into the rhythm and harmony of the world through one’s 
attunement to the music of the world and this leads to the mind finding the ratio of the 
universe.42  The mind uses reason to find the rationality at the heart of creation because 
the rational part of the human person is able to tap into the rationality of the world 
because they are alike.43  Due to this rationality, Augustine concludes that music leaves a 
trace in both the physical world and in the soul in its giving proportion to things.  This 
ordering conjures a feeling in people and this feeling points to the trace of music through 
a sense of rhythm in all things.  It is the musician who develops this sense that taps into 
the great rhythm and harmony of the world.44  The theologian is the one able to move 
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beyond the rhythm and harmony of the world to find the One who has given the creation 
its rhythm and harmony.   
In Book VI of De Musica, Augustine shows that the goal of the treatise is to come 
to God that gives wisdom.45  Augustine moves from the discussion of music in light of 
rhythm, measure, and proportion to the way that one knows God.  He does this, as he 
says in De Trinitate, because “after practicing the mind’s gaze on the lower image we 
may be able to shift it from the illuminated creature to the unchangeable illuminating 
light.”46  Augustine is not ending the discussion of rhythm and harmony in creation.  
Instead, he says that one’s understanding of the world as musical allows one to move to 
the place of being able to contemplate God.  This contemplation is the goal of the treatise 
and all of the liberal arts.  The teaching of De Musica shows what it means to know God 
which begins with paying attention. 47  This knowledge of God builds on the corporeal 
knowledge gained through understanding the world.48  The one who knows God is both 
theologian and musician.  The musician/ theologian learns to practice the “music” of God 
through the knowledge of God gained through one’s knowledge of the harmonious and 
rhythmic universe.49   
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Augustine recognizes the problem that sin poses to this account.  Sin could mar 
one’s sense of rhythm and harmony.  To counter this, Augustine turns to the fact that God 
creates.  As Creator, God allows this goodness to continue to resonate throughout 
creation.50  The goodness of God points to God’s trace in the world.  Through creating, 
God gives all natures “a rank and species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony.”51  
In City of God Augustine relates that it is not nature that is contrary to God, but vice: the 
creation still maintains some good because it was created good, acting as a vestige which 
points to the Triune God.52  God’s goodness allows the listener to be attuned to God as 
long as one has cultivated a disposition that opens one to be able to hear rightly.  The 
problem of sin is not that one hears the wrong harmony or rhythm in creation, but that 
one is not in tune because one has not been tuned or is playing wrongly.53   
The knowledge of God moves from the corporeal to the incorporeal or from the 
creation to the Creator.  Creation acts as a reminder of the Creator through its “original 
beauty” which God has woven into its very fabric.54  From this interaction between 
knowledge of creation and the Creator, the idea of God as the Creator ex nihilo arises for 
Augustine.  Creatio ex nihilo points to the separateness of the Creator from creation, but 
also reinforces the idea that the One who creates does so through the giving of being 
through order, form, and beauty.  This leads Carol Harrison to say, “Creation is both the 
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work of grace and the way in which grace works.”55  The beginning of moving to 
knowledge of God in wisdom leads to the transformation of the person through the work 
of God’s grace.  The one who has not tuned one’s ear to hear God is stuck in the 
corporeal while the one who has been formed rightly has learned to hear God.  Hearing 
God rightly moves the soul further towards the incorporeal.56  Augustine makes this point 
more explicitly in De Trinitate where he talks of the transformation of the believer 
through contemplation.  The way that contemplation, leading to wisdom, works is to 
meditate upon the relationship of God to God’s creation.57  The contemplation of God’s 
relationship with the creation opens one to see that God overcomes the distance between 
Godself and creation while also endowing creation with the necessary ability to move to 
God.  One can know the hierarchy of being that exists and how the harmony of the 
universe operates, made apparent in the order, structure, and reason of creation.  One is 
able to hear this when attunement to God occurs for the person.58  
Augustine meditates upon the order of being in creation through the triadic 
relationship of the body, soul, and God.  He notices the harmony that exists between the 
three, talking of the relationship as a “harmonic structure.”59  When he evaluates the 
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relationship between the three, he begins with body and soul.  He says that the body and 
soul need to exist in a mutual harmony and rhythm to each other.  If the body and soul 
did not exist in this type of relationship then they would affect each other in negative 
ways.  The reason that the body and soul exist in such a relationship of mutuality, in 
rhythm and harmony with the each other, is because the being of the body comes from its 
form and the form comes from the soul.60  The relationship between the body and soul 
reflects the one between the soul and God.  The soul must exist in a proper harmony with 
God by finding the rhythm of God in the world.  For Augustine, when the soul is rightly 
tuned into God the life of the body is easier as it exists in its proper place.61   
The discussion of the relationship that exists between the body, soul, and God 
points to the harmony of creation for Augustine.  In all of creation there exists a “sensible 
harmony”; however, the question that Augustine asks is what it is that one loves in 
“sensible harmony.”62  The One to love in a sensible harmony is God, the One whose 
harmony is being played and heard throughout the creation.  Augustine makes this 
explicit in the following statement: “Thus there is beauty in every single thing, with 
[God] making it, and with [God] arranging them in regular order there is beauty in all 
things together.”63  God is the One who creates and, through this, gives form to the 
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creation.  This giving of form is the giving of existence and being, making form an 
ontological category.64  Form gives coherence to creation.  This coherence reflects its 
being in God and it is through this that one can begin to reflect upon God and move to a 
deeper knowledge of God.65  Thus, the trace of God in creation is its order and being 
which is what gives it its harmony and rhythm.     
The way that one learns to recognize the trace of the harmony and rhythm of God 
in the creation comes from a study of Scripture.  This study of scripture results in moving 
the soul and mind to dwell in the spiritual things of God by attuning one to God by a 
restoration of one’s delight in the reasonableness of the creation.66  Augustine uses the 
repetition of reciting scripture—specifically the Psalms in a musical manner—to orient 
him to the reality of God especially in the creation.  Attunement to God comes from 
listening to scripture and allowing scripture to form one so that one can tap into the trace 
of the sound of God.67  The study of scripture “exhorts us only to love our God and Lord 
with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our mind, and love our neighbor as 
ourself?  If, then, we refer all those motions and numbers of human action to this end, we 
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shall certainly be cleansed.”68  The study of scripture opens one to the reality of God and 
allows one to take delight in the goodness of creation.  
This attunement to God allows the soul to “soar” to God through the 
transformation of the soul.69 The transformation that happens in the inner soul comes 
through the ability of the soul to pay attention to those things encountered by the outer 
soul in the visible beauty of the creation.70  The result is an attunement to God that comes 
from the transformation of the whole self so that one can be rightly constituted within the 
beauty of the creation as ordered by God.71  From this constitution in the order of God’s 
creation, one can learn to love the true Beauty of God over the inferior, corporeal beauty 
of those things on earth.72  The result is a rightly ordered love which loves God above all 
things, even the self, and learns to love all lower things as they exist in the creation.73  
The soul learns to love God by being attuned to God through the love of God that comes 
initially from hearing the trace of God in creation.74   
This elucidation of De Musica offers the first step in the argument of this chapter.  
However, throughout this discussion, the problem of how one can conceive the 
inconceivable in God has persisted.  Augustine has consistently pressed the point that the 
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theologian can actually say something about God without destroying the nature of God.  
This comes to a head in Book VI with the discussion of how it is that humans can have 
knowledge of God.  Augustine is not sure how to deal with this problem.  This 
necessitates deepening the discussion by analyzing further forms for thinking God in the 
Augustinian corpus.  Here, I turn to De Doctrina Christiana and Confessions.  In these 
texts, Augustine works within theological forms that allow the Divine to irrupt and come 
to the fore by leaving room for that which is unthinkable in God.  The ineffable nature of 
God results in a denial of closure to any discourse on God.  For Augustine, this means 
that there arises a necessity to use a variety of forms to think God. 
B.  Finding the Groove: Rhetoric as Form in De Doctrina Christiana 
The turn to De Doctrina Christiana75 is natural after an exposition of De Musica 
as both develop a theology of liberal arts.76  Both texts offer a way of thinking God 
within the context of the liberal arts.  The taking up of De Doctrina Christiana at this 
point in the current project is to begin to probe the questions left unasked by De Musica 
but which are important to the scope of this project: mainly, “how can one think God in a 
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way that pays attention to the fact that God is inconceivable?” and “how does theology 
allow for something new to be put forth about God?”77  In what follows, I will analyze 
De Doctrina Christiana in order to see how Augustine explores these questions and how 
his thinking here is carried out in Confessions.  
A central insight that De Doctrina Christiana relies upon is that the text is meant 
to train the reader to hear/ see the Good and Beauty which only exist in God.78  In De 
Doctrina Christiana the argument is more concerned with finding the way in which to 
best interpret Scripture and then communicate that interpretation.79  Augustine relies on a 
logic of attunement that results in a hermeneutic of love.  Love is the key to Augustine’s 
approach to interpreting Scripture, leading David Tracy to say, “That key to a true 
interpretation is caritas: the transformation of our eros by God’s agape of grace.”80  
However, before one becomes attuned to interpret through love there needs to be a 
transformation through purification.81  This transformation results in a way of life and 
rhetoric which opens one to reading Scripture through the hermeneutic of love.  The 
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interpreter is formed in a way to practice the hermeneutic of love in all interpretation.  
The result is an understanding of the bible as a text of human words that are signs 
pointing to a reality beyond itself (the divine) but which never fully realize this reality 
and so a gap exists between the signs and the reality.82  The hermeneutic of love 
overcomes this through an interpretation that does not seek the right form but the correct 
way of speaking and being in light of one’s attunement to God through love.   
In order to approach De Doctrina Christiana in a way that most adequately deals 
with the questions just asked, I will begin with Book IV.  Augustine explicitly makes the 
move to rhetoric as what is most appropriate for using a hermeneutic of love to think 
God.   His concern is with a right interpretation of Scripture through the development of a 
way of life.  For Augustine, it does not matter how one interprets Scripture or the words 
one uses to point to God if one’s life does not reflect the transformation that has occurred 
because of one’s encounter with God.83  The life of the one claiming to be a Christian 
should also reflect the change that has taken place due to this conversion as the words one 
uses are not as meaningful as the life one leads.  As Augustine says, “…whatever the 
grandeur of the speaker’s utterances, his manner of life carries more weight.”84  
Augustine believes that a major part of the substance of any talk of God is the life of the 
one doing the saying.85  Book IV offers an account of how the Christian thinker 
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communicates the gospel through living one’s life, as the text is a “living text” which 
addresses the truth of God as it is found in Scripture and one’s life.86  Augustine believes 
this counters the possibility of one who composes a beautiful sermon but leads a life that 
does not give credence to the sermon.87  For Augustine, this person is trying to 
communicate something that this one does not know and trying to use a rhetoric that one 
cannot use.88  Thus, central to proclaiming the gospel is the disposition of the one who 
does the proclaiming.89  The role of the pastor, then, is to display Jesus Christ through an 
imitation of the life of Jesus.90   
The rhetoric that Augustine advocates is one that reflects this way of life, a way of 
being that pronounces the gospel as love with one’s mouth and one’s actions.  
Attunement is at the heart of this, as the rhetoric that lives in tune with God is rightly 
ordered, with the goal not so much understanding God through systematizations but 
being open to following God.  This results in wisdom (sapientia), not just knowledge 
(scientia).  The wisdom comes from the continued exploration of the multiple senses of 
Scripture, understanding not only the literal things that happened but the God behind 
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these and how Scripture always leads to love.91  When one can properly understand 
Scripture as moving one to love of God and neighbor at all times, then one moves into the 
place of actually practicing the rhetoric properly.92  The goal of rhetoric is to move 
people to act.  The interpreter sways people to action by giving them a love to imitate, 
which opens them up to how the love of God is expressed.93  The rhetoric Augustine 
intends wants to move people to love so that they may assent to God.94 
The center of this way of life for Augustine is prayer, not an ethical system or 
correct interpretation of God’s laws.  Prayer leads the believer to be able to practice this 
rhetoric rightly.95    Maschke says that Augustine’s theology of prayer lies in a “gracious 
conformation” which is “the humble restructuring or reforming of the Christian life to the 
divine will as empowered by the assurance of God’s grace.”96  Prayer is that activity that 
attunes one to God because it is an activity where one orients oneself to be with God.97   
For Augustine the person who is charged with speaking the gospel should be one who is 
first a pray-er rather than a speaker.  Prayer is that which allows one to say things that are 
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“good and holy” and which are also understood, enjoyed, and obeyed by listeners.98  
Thus, prayer is not so much a correct belief system as a crying out to God, a way of being 
open to God in such a way that the theologian can then hear God.  Prayer brings out the 
humility of the theologian by helping one recognize one’s place as creature in the 
creation with all goods coming from the Creator.99  
The language that the theologian uses for thinking God comes from the practice 
of prayer.  The rhetoric the theologian uses is that of praise out of love. 100  The language 
used reflects the beauty and order of the One loved.  The prayer that attunes the 
theologian to God results in a theology that praises God through the language of love.  It 
is a theology that seeks to praise God, as well, not only in one’s speaking, but also in the 
life of the theologian through love.  This life becomes not just the basis for the proper 
Christian rhetoric, but the rhetoric itself. 101     
The theo-logical reason that Augustine advocates this kind of rhetoric in love 
through prayer is found in Book I of De Doctrina Christiana.  In Book I the basis for this 
rhetoric is put forth by opening the way in which the theologian can be formed and 
attuned in such a way as to be able to “speak” a rhetoric like this.  This attunement is 
twofold, encompassing an attunement to God while also being attuned to the people to 
whom one is trying to communicate the gospel.102  The attunement necessary for 
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performing this kind of rhetoric comes from the ability to see to what a sign may point 
back, which is only possible if one has a rightly ordered love.103  A rightly ordered love 
allows one to practice the hermeneutic of love; Book I shows the impetus for this 
hermeneutic of love.  This rhetoric opens theology up to becoming a (de)centered, 
unstructured form. 
Here, a brief exposition of Augustine’s discussion of signs/things and use/enjoy 
becomes quite helpful.104  This discussion should provide a bit of an overview to the kind 
of thinking that Augustine embraces here while also setting the parameters of the 
discussion of what the nature of creation is like in order for something like the 
incarnation of the Word to occur.105  Augustine uses his conception of “signs” to talk 
about how one understands the “invisible things” of God.106  The discussion of signs/ 
things is necessary because if one is ignorant of the things to which scripture and creation 
point, then one cannot read these signs correctly.107  Thus, all creation is a series of signs 
that humanity is to use to attune itself to the ultimate thing to be enjoyed—the Triune 
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God.  The sign of creation can point to the Thing (God) because “the distinguishing 
characteristic of the useful sign is that it is not either literal or figurative, but both literal 
and figurative.”108  God can be called a thing because a thing is “something whose being 
is not determined by the function or meaning of something else.”109  Thus, God is the 
only thing as God alone is not determined by anything else.110 From this, Augustine 
determines that God alone is to be enjoyed because God is the only proper thing while 
everything else is to be used to grow in knowledge so that one may contemplate God.   
The contemplation of the signs leads humanity to be able to see the truth of 
creation as that which leads to a contemplation of God and attunement to God.111  For 
Augustine, in the incarnation the Word is “tuned” to humanity and humanity is “tuned” to 
God.112  Rowan Williams underscores this interpretation of Augustine, saying that “…the 
incarnation manifests the essential quality of the world itself as ‘sign’ or trace of its 
maker.”113  The incarnation of the Word offers Augustine a theological site that allows 
him to begin thinking how it is that the person can look at and contemplate creation and 
begin to move from here into a deeper wisdom of God.   
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The contemplation necessary to move to wisdom comes in being attuned to God 
through a process of purification.  This process of purification comes through the 
imitation of Jesus, the One who attuned humanity to God so that humanity could come to 
wisdom and live the life of love.114  The imitation of Jesus leads to the good life because 
the imitation of Jesus is a form of contemplation which makes one capable of living a 
godly life that speaks to the reality of God’s love.115  Living the good life opens one to 
being united to God in love, where one’s life shows the enjoyment of God and this allows 
the theologian to apprehend God in and through love.116  Thus, the life of Jesus Christ 
becomes that which opens up the contemplation of God leading to wisdom, but this 
contemplation is done through the imitation of Jesus in one’s life.  By doing this, one 
lives the life of love that allows the kind of thinking necessary for exploring the nature of 
the Word and how the Word’s incarnation endows the creation as the sign leading to 
further, deeper contemplation of God in wisdom.   
The reason that an imitation of Jesus leads to wisdom is because of the nature of 
the incarnation of the Word.  What teaches one to hear, know, and love God is the 
incarnation where Jesus Christ, as Wisdom, adopts human form and communicates 
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Godself to humanity without losing the essence of God.117  In order to further articulate 
how it is that the Word takes on full humanity, Augustine draws on Phil. 2.  He points to 
Paul’s assertion in Phil. 2 that the Word takes on the form of the servant.  Augustine 
shows how the Word, as the Second Person of the Triune God, takes on human 
personhood and so enters the economy of being human.118  There now is able to be a 
harmony between Creator and created as the incarnate Word makes possible the perfect 
existing together of the full natures of the human and divine.  There is a harmony that 
now exists within creation as it relates to itself—the Word seems to bring harmony to the 
whole of creation.119  Since God has come into the world through the Incarnation, the 
world has been “baptized” by God in a way that all things contain the trace of God.  This 
trace comes from the Wisdom of God who creates and inhabits the world.120  The 
Incarnation leaves the trace of God in all of creation so that the one attuned rightly to 
God can hear this trace and use these things as signs that point to God.   
Augustine’s thought is christomorphic and theocentric especially as it practices 
the hermeneutic of love.121  Since the hermeneutic of love is central to the entire 
theological project pursued by Augustine, it becomes quite apparent that the doctrine of 
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the incarnation—and the type of theological thinking that arises from this doctrine—sets 
the way in which theology is done.122  In imitation of Christ, the theologian is a mediator 
and should open others to God through his or her right attunement to God.123  The reason 
that this is possible for the theologian is because of the incarnation.  The doctrine of the 
incarnation acts as the theological site for attuning people, and creation, to God because 
this is the place where the ultimate revelation takes place from God to humanity.  Thus, 
the incarnation is the place where people are able to be attuned to God as it in this act that 
God heals the disease that is sin so that people may dwell with God.124   
The incarnation makes possible this attunement to God and that results in the 
healing of sin through the right ordering of love, loving God above all else and loving all 
other things because they bring one closer to God.125  A rightly ordered love leads the 
person to enjoy only God.  This single enjoyment comes from the fact that God alone is 
to be enjoyed as all other things are signs pointing to God.126  From this, one loves all 
things, in the love of God, because God “flows” through all things—all of creation—with 
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no-thing being separate from the love of God.127  The result of the incarnation is the 
created being “glued”—or attuned—to God through the life of Jesus Christ, who was 
equal to God the Father and an equal of humanity.  It is Jesus Christ’s taking on of both 
natures that humanity can be attuned to God and “may abide forever in that supreme and 
unchangeable good.”128  The incarnation teaches the Christian how it is that God 
disseminates grace, as a gift in and through love.129  The response of the theologian is to 
reflect upon this and begin to pursue a similar way of responding to God through love. 
Drawing from the nature of thinking that arises when one begins doing theology 
from the incarnation, Augustine argues that love is the key to a right interpretation of 
Scripture.  In fact, love is the unifying theme of De Doctrina Christiana.130  Any correct 
interpretation of Scripture begins from a hermeneutic of love since this way of 
interpreting gives credence to the fact that all interpretations must point to love of God 
and love of neighbor.131  This love of God and love of neighbor “becomes the means by 
which a new wisdom is born…[This love] becomes the means to discover the true 
meaning (and thereby the true arguments) from the new classics—the Scriptures.”132  The 
real importance of the hermeneutic of love is that it opens the possibility of correctly 
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interpreting Scripture and forming a properly Christian rhetoric in light of this 
interpretation.  One can hear this advocated when Augustine says, “So if it seems to you 
that you have understood the divine scriptures, or any part of them, in such a way that by 
this understanding you do not build up this twin love of God and neighbor, then you have 
not understood them.”133  His argument for the necessity of all of Scripture leading to the 
life of love gives Augustine the ability to argue that all of Scripture, even figurative 
expressions, must be interpreted as encouraging love of God and neighbor because 
scripture “commands nothing but charity, or love, and censures nothing but cupidity, or 
greed, and that is the way it gives shape and form to human morals.”134  This interpretive 
paradigm does not dominate thinking on God but leads to a rightly ordered love.  To 
reach this conclusion Augustine has drawn on 1 Tim 1:5 which says, partly, that “the end 
of the commandment is love.”135  The end of interpreting Scripture is the twofold love—
first of God and second of the neighbor.   
Part of developing the ability to perform this hermeneutic of love is to properly 
practice the love of one’s neighbor.  Augustine extends the love of neighbor to all people, 
saying, “All people are to be loved equally; but since you cannot be of service to 
everyone, you have to take greater care of those who are more closely joined to you by a 
turn, so to say, of fortune’s wheel, whether by occasion of place or time, or any other 
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such circumstance.”136  Augustine then says that love of neighbor is really an extension 
of the love of God, that a person cannot enjoy another person as a thing, but should love 
the person to grow closer to God.  Part of this loving is also to help the other person learn 
to love God.137  It seems here that Augustine devalues the person for God by making love 
of the neighbor more concerned with increasing one’s own love of God rather than 
actually loving the neighbor as neighbor.  However, as both John C. Cavadini and Oliver 
O’Donovan make apparent, for Augustine to love one’s neighbor for God’s sake is to 
love them as other and not use them for some sort of ends, to embrace them as they are 
instead of trying to make the neighbor into someone the same as “me.”138  The love of 
neighbor is extended to the neighbor as neighbor without the intention of overcoming 
their otherness to make them the same.139  This practice of the love of neighbor extends 
to enemies as well, without worrying about what the enemy may do because this enemy 
can never rob one of what one loves.140   Thus, it is the love of God that leads to love of 
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neighbor, but the love of neighbor is just as important, opening the theologian to 
remember all those others who are not accounted for.  In fact, while love of God is first in 
the order of being commanded, love of neighbor is first in order of performing with 
“authentic love of neighbor [as] the first realization of our love of God.”141   
Love is the form that theological thinking follows in order to properly execute the 
rhetoric Augustine promulgates.  Love opens avenues for thinking God that are 
concerned with being rightly attuned to God.  Love does not seek to dominate or control 
the thinking of God, but to be in a dynamic state due to the dynamic nature of 
attunement.  As Rowan Williams makes clear in his commentary on De Doctrina 
Christiana, part of the task of this text is to resist premature closure of the interpretation 
of scripture, instead opting for a hermeneutic “which indefinitely postpones 
fulfillment…”142  This is the hermeneutic of love.  Thus, the concern of Augustine is 
similar to that of Derrida—to resist closure of discourse especially discourse about 
God.143  Theology that takes the form of love as its basis then seeks to follow God in 
God’s love for neighbor, to follow God in God’s desire for a rightly ordered creation, and 
to follow God in God’s overall movement.  The result is an attunement to God that opens 
one to think and contemplate God through the nature of love.  Thus, De Doctrina 
Christiana opens further the questions advanced earlier—namely what form is available 
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for thinking God and how it is that the theologian can say something new—through a 
turn to rhetoric as pursued through the hermeneutic of love.   
C. Improvising Freely: The Form of the Confessions144 
Augustine’s Confessions continues the hermeneutic of love pursued in De 
Doctrina Christiana.  However, the Confessions does not seek a form of rhetoric, but 
develops the form of the formless, or the form of trans-formation.145  In Confessions 
Augustine moves the type of theology necessary for thinking God into a place that takes 
seriously the formless, or unstructured, nature of God.  Augustine wants to trace the 
movement of love and how it trans-forms him in the first nine books and then in the last 
four books, he examines how this reciprocal love trans-forms the way one views the 
world.  Augustine offers a way of orienting the self so that one can begin to move into a 
trans-formed way of thinking God that is predicated upon love.146  This love puts the self 
back together in a way that allows the person to attune oneself to God, relearning the 
rhythm and tempos life that were broken when one was outside this love.147    
Book I of Confessions orients the reader to what Augustine hopes to accomplish 
in the subsequent twelve books by offering an overview of the story of love that he will 
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narrate.148  The text gives a way for Augustine to orient his entire existence around God 
because God gives intelligibility to his life.  By using narrative, Augustine allows others 
to read how God gives intelligibility to live so that they may learn how it happens.149  The 
ground of Augustine’s theology here is his experience of the love of God and how he 
responds to this.  He sees God leading him back to God as every movement away from 
God is actually bringing Augustine back to God.  This ground does not act as a 
dominating factor but as the beginning of Augustine’s attunement to God.  The 
possibility of attunement comes from Augustine asking God to “open the ears of [his] 
heart.”150  When he finally learns to love through the encounter with God, he then is 
attuned to God and is able to improvise upon theology, moving into the formless through 
a meditation upon God’s action in creation.  The step into the formless is why Augustine 
uses “sound” language to discuss this encounter with God as love is the only response 
possible because it is a non-forming, non-dominating approach to God.   
Augustine narrates his movement in the first seven books to the place where he 
actually learns to love God.  He moves from ideology and worldview to ideology and 
worldview in a search for a philosophy of life because he cannot find a view of God that 
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is reasonable and rational.151  He goes from astrology to Manicheism (Confessions IV-V) 
to Skepticism (Confessions V.19) to Stoicism and Neo-Platonism (Confessions VII) and, 
finally, to being a Christian (Confessions VIII).  This retelling of the story opens 
Augustine to the love that God had for him in that God never left or abandoned him, even 
though he was dealing in false ideologies that were seemingly leading away from God.  
Further, these different philosophies embraced by him made him an “enigma” to himself 
because he was lost, out of tune and step with the rest of creation because he was away 
from the grace of God that truly gives a person his or her humanity.152  Each one brings 
Augustine closer to the garden in Book VIII, where he has an encounter with God 
through the reading of Paul.153  This encounter finally opens Augustine up to the love of 
God and allows him to embrace this love while also reciprocating the love.  The whole 
confession is a movement to this embrace with God in love, finally giving Augustine an 
attunement to the Triune God.   
The attunement to God in Augustine’s narrative is introduced in Book VII and 
completed in Book VIII.  In Book VII, Augustine gains the theoretical apparatuses he 
deems necessary in order to believe that the Christian God may well be real.  He moves 
from the discussion of the problem of evil to freeing himself from the astrology of 
Firminus to finally finding guidance in the “books of the Platonists.”154  Neo-Platonism 
plays the most significant role in his “intellectual conversion” as this philosophy gives a 
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framework within which the Word may be born wholly from God and not coming from 
the desire, lust, and flesh of humanity, again allowing Augustine to keep separate the 
nature of God from the created.155   However, this theoretical idea of God is not yet an 
attuned, transformed faith, resulting in God giving “new form to [his] deformity.”156   
The result of Book VII is epistemological, not mystical/ontological, giving Augustine a 
knowledge (scientia) but not through wisdom (sapientia) which brings trans-formation.157  
Since the result is not a trans-formation, Neo-Platonism ultimately does not satisfy his 
spiritual desire.158  This desire could not be fulfilled until he embraced Jesus Christ, as 
the Word, as the mediator between God and humanity.159   
Book VIII completes Book VII by telling the story of when Augustine is 
converted in an ontological or mystical way to Christianity.  This conversion is a 
reconciliation with Christianity.160  This reconciliation is very powerful, though, as the 
Latin term conversio makes apparent—conversio means something akin to “turning 
around” or “change.”161  Augustine’s conversion through a reconciliation of himself with 
Christianity is a turning from the life that led away from the Christian God to the embrace 
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of Christianity through the experience of Christ as mediator.162  Through the 
(re)embracing of Christianity in an ontological manner Augustine reorients his life 
around the love of God.  This leads to a deeper attunement to God in and through this 
love.  The conversion of Augustine is not concerned with finding a “greater certainty” but 
wants to cultivate oneself so that one can have “a more steadfast abiding in [God].”163  
There is a trans-formation of one’s deepest desire as Augustine shows that there is a 
complete reorientation of himself from being a person who was not at peace because of a 
set of wrongly ordered desires to a person who has the one desire to love God and 
neighbor.164  Margaret Miles sees the conversion of Augustine as a transformation of 
pleasure.  She says that Book VIII ultimately tells the story of how Augustine gives up 
seeking pleasure in either sex or knowledge outside of God because all of his desires are 
fulfilled in God and God alone.  The reading of Paul in the garden trans-forms Augustine 
by getting rid of the voices that drive his desire for sexual pleasure by filling this space 
with the happiness that comes from being loved by and loving God.165   
The trans-formation that Augustine narrates begins with a series of conversations 
that he has with others around him.  These are concerned with what the right philosophy 
is or how to lead one’s life and similar topics.  For Augustine, these conversations raise 
                                                 
 
162
 José Oroz Reta, O.R.A. reinforces this when he says, “The whole focus of Christian conversion 
is the return to God…from which the soul has distanced itself through sin.  However, the ‘return to self’ is 
also a return to God, from whom disobedience and sin have caused such distance…” (José Oroz Reta, 
O.A.R., “Conversion,” trans. Augustine Esposito, O.S.A. in Augustine through the Ages, ed. Allan D. 
Fitzgerald, O.S.A. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 239.   
 
163
 Augustine, Confessions, VIII.1, 184.  
 
164Ibid., VIII.1-3, 184-87.  
 
165
 Margaret R. Miles, Desire and Delight: A New Reading of Augustine’s Confessions, 32-35.  
303 
 
an internal conflict.166  This inner conflict ultimately leads him to the garden, where he 
hears the voice of God and picks up the book of Paul sitting on the bench, reads and has 
his ears opened to the music of God.167  At this moment, Augustine realizes that God has 
been with him throughout his life and was bringing him to this point to be reoriented into 
the life of love as led by the Christian.168  In this conversion, Augustine becomes tuned to 
the trace of God in the creation in sound.  In fact, even in this scene, Augustine does not 
have a vision of God telling him to pick up the book but hears the voice of God and then 
also hears God speaking through the singing of children, exhorting him to “Pick it up and 
read, pick it up and read” (referring to the book of Paul).169  The importance of sound 
inside the narrative of the Confessions shows Augustine’s attunement to God and 
detailing how this attunement leads to orienting oneself differently, leading to a different 
way of seeing oneself as part of the creation.170  The trans-formation opens the converted 
up to the divine in creation so that one can move to a deeper attunement to God through a 
contemplation of the divine in creation. 
After Book VIII he makes a fundamental change, no longer articulating his 
embrace of Christianity and the attunement to God in love. 171  In this last part of 
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Confessions, the move is toward a deeper love of God aroused through a meditation upon 
God’s creation.  This meditation comes with the realization that the human person must 
find a home as created and find one’s image solely in the activity of God as Creator.172 
Augustine begins to view the events of his life through the lens of Scripture.173  
Augustine looks to improvise with the way to think God in creation by playing upon the 
words “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”  He does not get past this line.  
The improvisation is a theology that plays on this line and opens theological thinking into 
a formlessness. 
The ability to think theologically in this manner comes from his continued 
personal formation through the singing of Psalms.174  Paul Burns suggests that it is 
Augustine’s immersion in the Psalms through daily recitation and singing that leads to his 
somewhat unique use of these texts in the Confessions: Augustine uses the texts to shape 
his memory by changing the form and style of the Psalms.175  The singing of the Psalms 
allows Augustine to be so immersed in the text that he feels comfortable enough to trans-
form them so that they work appropriately in his theological writing.  He discusses how 
the words being “sung sensitively by a tuneful voice” does something to him, moving 
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him to a desire for a deeper piety.176  However, Augustine struggles with this desire, 
feeling a sense of guilt from the effect that this singing has on him.  This guilt comes 
from the fact that this is not the way that ideas are usually expressed or pursued; 
however, Augustine is moved by the music.  Eventually, he comes to the point of 
realizing that the singing of the Psalms and the hearing of other people singing 
beautifully are formational and evocative elements that attune him deeper to the trace of 
God in the creation.  Thus, the guilt subsides by the time that Augustine begins Book 
XIII, where he begins with a quoting of the Psalms to orient his thoughts and open the 
topic he wishes to cover, the nature of creation.177  The recitation through song of the 
Psalms acts as a formational practice for Augustine.  Through this practice Augustine can 
contemplate the nature of the unchangeable God, the One who gives existence and form 
to all of creation.178  This practice of recitation leads Augustine into a deeper 
contemplation of God as formless in that what distinguishes the creation from the Creator 
is the fact that the creation has a fixed form while God is without such form: the 
unchangeable is not subject to the changeable nature of the form. 
Augustine can now move to a discussion of how attunement to God leads to a 
contemplation of the work of God in creation.  In narrating how he comes to embrace the 
work of God in creation, he begins by establishing the nature of God as immanently 
involved in creation.  He does so through a discussion of how God has attuned Godself to 
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Augustine by listening to him and embracing him so that Augustine may have faith and 
be attuned to God.179  This immanent work of God leads Augustine to begin meditating 
upon the nature of this God, the One who encountered him in the here and now.  
Augustine says that this God is the Creator.180  The move that Augustine makes here is to 
meditate upon God and God’s work in creation by searching for how God has been 
revealed in and through elements of creation.  As Augustine meditates upon the nature of 
God as Creator, he begins to embrace a more evocative language over conceptual 
language.181  The evocation comes from the place of memory, actively engaged in 
opening old moments and now seeing these through the lens of one attuned to God by 
seeing God as involved in one’s life and, by extension, in creation.182  Evocative 
language is the way that Augustine thinks through this. Memory, then, becomes the way 
that Augustine can begin to hear the work of God in creation as this faculty acts as a 
place for these experiences to come together.183   
The way that Augustine opens his thinking on how God reveals Godself in 
creation is through a turn to the implications of Jesus Christ as the mediator between God 
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and creation.184  Jesus Christ is the One who attunes humanity and God, reconciling these 
two through the incarnation where the Word takes on the full nature of both the human 
person and the divine.  Thus, in the person of Jesus the two are able to be attuned to each 
other.185  The attunement of humanity and God through Christ comes about because the 
Word first attunes the divine to the human, taking on the form of humanity in the form of 
a servant (Phil. 2).186  As Christ attunes the divine to the human he brings about the 
actuality of God taking on human flesh, even though the flesh of the human person is not 
mixed with the divine.187  The ability to tune the divine and created into each other comes 
from the fact that the Word confers “perfection on creation by calling it back to himself, 
so that it may be given form by adhering to the creator, and by imitating in its own 
measure the form which adheres eternally and unchangeably to the Father, and which 
instantly gets from him to be the same thing as he is.”188  It is the love of God that is the 
cause of this attunement, as God reaches beyond Godself to humanity through his love 
for creation.  This love of God heals the infirmities of the human person so that one may 
overcome sin and lay down one’s life to God.189   
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As God heals the infirmities of creation the result is its transformation.  Creation 
is now different because of God’s reaching out through the incarnation and touching the 
creation.  Augustine sees this transformation happening, ultimately, in the crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus.  He believes that the work of Christ on the cross is to make peace 
between God and creation, alluding to Col. 1.19-20.190  Christ’s resurrection reconciles 
the believer to God so that one may partake in the resurrection, not the resurrection of 
Jesus at Golgotha but the resurrection toward eternal life.191  The result of the cross and 
resurrection is that creation has been touched by the divine, with the divine then 
reverberating throughout all parts of the creation.   
The goal of Augustine’s foray into Christology is to arouse him to a deeper love 
of God.192  It is this desire to love God more and follow God in God’s work through this 
love that opens theology in a way so as to be able to be uncentered and formless.  In fact, 
as Augustine says in Confessions XIII, the result of his continued contemplation of God 
is to find rest in the Gift that God has given in the Word and creation.  This opens one to 
moving towards God through a sort of gravitation: the person is drawn towards the divine 
trace in creation and, through the incarnation, can now recognize this trace through the 
mutual attuning of God to humanity and humanity to God in the person of Jesus Christ.  
The meditation on God as Creator has led him to an ascent in love toward God.  The 
evidence of such an ascent is in the “singing” of the songs that accompany one in the 
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ascent to God.  These songs are those of one’s transformation, of the divine trace 
reverberating throughout creation, of one’s attunement to God.193  The center of theology 
is now love—the love God has for humanity and how God’s love encourages the 
responding love of humanity for God.  Augustine’s goal is to avoid the closure of any 
thinking or language of God because of the fact that love never ends but is always re-born 
and renewed through one’s attunement to God.  The theological end of this love is a form 
for thinking God that follows God by turning to a nonconstraining structure or form.  In 
fact, John Cavadini shows how Augustine’s conviction of the emptiness of human 
language about God in Book II is meant to keep God-language open since there is always 
a void to be explored as God is never known fully.194  
With the establishment of love as the center for doing theology, thinking 
theologically is reconstituted around the response to God and the paths that this response 
opens for the theologian.  There is no form or structure that constrains how a theologian 
responds to God as long as it is in love.  The result is that theology is only to be open to 
responding in whatever way is most appropriate at that moment, in that time.  Through 
this response the theologian can “say something” about God that can be heard freshly and 
anew, opening interesting and different ways for actually thinking God.  
In Book XI, as he enters into the attempt to think the nature of creation, Augustine 
begins by exhorting himself—and, by extension, the reader—to be patient and simply to 
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listen.195  What does one listen to or for?  The listening that Augustine advances is a 
disposition of being open to the presence of God in the world.  For Augustine, God’s 
trace reverberates throughout creation and, due to this, creation is able to then reflect the 
divine trace and reverberate it back to God.196  Rowan Williams makes a similar 
observation, saying that for Augustine “God actively preserves the equilibrium of 
creation, activating those particular potentialities for harmony that will actually guarantee 
harmony at this or that specific moment…”197  Augustine also says that the whole of 
creation sings praise to God and in this praise all of creation, including humanity, praises 
God.198  The way that Augustine thinks through the way that one can become aware of 
the trace of God in the harmony of creation is through an analysis of Wis. 11:21.  From 
this scriptural passage, Augustine says that the harmony of God in creation is seen 
through measure (mensura), number (numerus), and order (pondus or ordo).  Measure 
refers to the limit of possibilities extended to creation, while number refers to the form 
and harmony or proportionality of creation, as to be created is to have a certain stability.  
Order refers to creation’s movement towards its appropriate goals.199  The theologian 
hears God in creation by listening to the way that creation reflects these different 
characteristics; this reflects divinity.  Augustine is playing on the auditory nature of one’s 
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attunement to God.  He is trying to get the reader to think outside of those conceptual 
frameworks that only entrench God in a concept instead of opening the idea of God up to 
the multiplicity of forms and modes of thinking available for the theologian.   
Augustine turns to the idea of creation through the Word as a way to think 
through the nature of the divine trace in creation more thoroughly.  Augustine holds that 
the Word that created all resonates in all things throughout the creation.200  The Word of 
God, as the voice of God, is heard in the existence of all things in heaven and earth, 
pointing all towards the Creator.201  The person who can hear this is the one who has been 
attuned to God through the development of the “inner ear” to hear the eternal Word in the 
creation.202  However, in this discussion of the Word and creation, Paul Ricoeur offers an 
interesting insight into the analogy of God being an artisan when God creates.  Ricoeur 
says that to talk of things being made through the Word is to deny God the idea of being 
an artisan.  This denial comes from the fact that an artisan always starts from something 
else.  However, God does not begin from anything but God, creating out of Godself.  Due 
to this, the Word (verbum) cannot be like a human voice (vox), but must be thought 
differently.  The Word, he notes, receives and transmits eternally as the Creator—without 
the voice of God creation would cease—while the human vox begins and ceases and 
eventually dies away.203   
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The question that still needs answering for Augustine is how God creates and 
from what God creates.  He begins with the question of the “what” in the process of 
creation.  Augustine argues that God creates from a formless void, that the “stuff” out of 
which God creates was neither visible nor organized but was “an abyss of inconceivable 
depth.”204  He also quotes Wisdom 11:17, which says “You who made the world from 
formless matter.”205  Augustine gleans from the biblical witness that the “what” that God 
uses for creation is almost akin to a nothingness, that the earth was totally formless and 
God creates out of this “invisible and unorganized” “formless matter.”206  This 
nothingness out of which God creates leads Augustine to talk of creation out of nothing 
(creation ex nihilo),207 saying there was “nothing at all…for there was some kind of 
formlessness with no differentiation.”208  The reason that God creates out of nothing is so 
all creation bears the image of God and not the substance of God.  For Augustine, if 
creation bore the substance of God then it would be, in some way, co-equal with God.  
However, in being given the image of God, creation bears the divine imprint without 
being of the same substance as God.209  Not only does God give form to those things that 
God creates in those first moments but God also gives the potential for all things that may 
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be.210   Thus, God’s action in creating comes from giving order to the material that was 
formless and non-differentiated, nothingness.211   
The way that God goes about giving form to the creation is twofold.  First, God 
creates a “heaven’s heaven.”212  “Heaven’s heaven” is an “intellectual creation” which 
participates in eternity—although, as created, it is not eternal as God is eternal.  The 
“heaven’s heaven” acts as what gives order and form to creation.213  There is a “created 
wisdom” here that brings an “intellectual order of being.”214  Before God gives order and 
form to the “stuff” of creation, God has fashioned a rational creation in the Word of God 
giving a Wisdom and order to what is to be created and this occurs in the “heaven’s 
heaven.”  Here God orders the hierarchy of being while endowing the universe with 
harmony and giving form to the void.215  To some scholars, like Roland Teske, this 
“heaven’s heaven” shows the Neo-Platonic bent of Augustine, arguing that he ultimately 
believes that the only way to understand something is to have contact with the divine 
ideas in a place like the “heaven’s heaven.”216  However, there are two problems with 
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such an understanding.  The first is that this view fails to take into account that Augustine 
is, in a sense, using a somewhat more Aristotelian idea of substance—as a thing that 
contains form and matter.  In the “heaven’s heaven” Augustine lays out the forms that 
will connect with the matter of the “stuff” of creation: both are necessary for the moment 
of creation.  Second, Teske fails to take into account the fact that Augustine proposes the 
“heaven’s heaven” as a way of keeping the Creator/ created distinction, arguing that there 
needs to be some “place” where God can create forms and which humanity can know, but 
that does not actually result in the human person being able to reach out and touch God.  
Augustine’s concern in the “heaven’s heaven” is to offer a beginning of creation, to show 
that God had an “idea” of what was going to be created and how this plan was to be 
executed.217 
When God comes to actually creating “stuff” outside of the “heaven’s heaven”, 
Augustine posits that what God does in creation is to give form to the creature.218  The 
nature of creation is the giving of form by God to the other.219  In City of God Augustine 
talks of how God creates in originating and giving being to all things220 and in Faith and 
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the Creed he says that God has a “well-ordered design” out of which comes the “capacity 
for receiving forms” and “what was subsequently destined to receive forms…”221  
However, Augustine leaves God without a form.  God is formless.  God’s formlessness, 
though, is pre-existent and other than the formlessness of the void and nothingness out of 
which God creates.  Rather, God’s formlessness is being beyond form, not without form, 
as God can encompass an infinite number of forms.  So, God is not a form because God 
is incomprehensible, ineffable and infinite.  This leads Augustine to an understanding that 
the theologian cannot seek a form for God, but must be attuned to God by developing 
one’s “inner ear” through the recitation and singing of Psalms.  It is through this attuned 
ear that God “speaks” (or sings) through the creation.222   
This attunement to God allows the theologian to look at all things that have a 
form and realize that they only have a form because there was One who gave them form; 
this allows them the opportunity to think through the One who did create by giving form.  
Augustine talks of how understanding how things are made directs one’s gaze to the 
creator which subsequently allows people to see the trace of God in the created.223  
Creation is the only way available for humanity to know God since God cannot be known 
by humanity as God knows God but only through the knowledge that God has bestowed 
upon and within creation which can help humanity move to contemplation and 
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wisdom.224  In the Confessions, Augustine echoes this, saying that the knowledge of God 
can be made available to people as they are attuned to the Spirit of God that dwells in all 
that was created.  Augustine says that one only knows God in the Spirit of God, with the 
Spirit being the One who makes possible such knowledge as it is not human 
knowledge.225  Human knowledge comes through a contemplation of creation which is 
only possible through the reality communicated in the Spirit who opens up the 
possibilities of God as Creator.  One such possibility is that in hearing “And God saw that 
it was good,” one realizes the goodness extended by God in the act of making creation, 
but also the goodness of God in the sustaining of creation.226   
Even in this discussion, Augustine refuses to place a form upon God as this would 
close thought upon God and also lead to idolatry.  Augustine proposes this idea of a God 
with no form in a discussion of Jesus sitting at the right hand of the Father; he makes the 
point that this is figurative because God has no form, but that conceptions of God should 
evoke and press people on to “where justice, peace, and joy are to be found.”227  The 
forms used to think God are meant more to be evocative rather than an attempt to name 
the substance of God.  God is not bound by a form but is formless and this formlessness 
necessitates a theological thinking that gives rise to this (non)reality.  God is formless 
matter and God never takes on form because God, as God, is able to give form and so 
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cannot be limited to only one form.228  The only response to this reality of the divine is a 
theology that is based upon love, leading to praise.229  
In Confessions XI, Augustine uses the singing of the Psalms as a way of thinking 
about eternity and time230 and, subsequently, God.  Through this he notices a “hymnic” 
aspect to creation.231  For him, the song carries within it the completeness of time in 
eternity and yet still opens the possibility of thinking eternity.  Music is also a non-
conceptual mode of going about thinking something that can only exist in God, like 
eternity.  Time also reflects God in that no one can actually “pin down” the mensuration 
of time, with no absolute conception of time ever coming to the fore because of the fact 
that time is slippery and always varying.232  This aspect of time—always varying, never 
settled—is also enhanced by the numerous “beautiful rhythms” that are part of creation.  
Part of the human understanding of God as Creator comes from seeing time as full of 
“beautiful rhythms” which makes the soul long for its Creator.233  The discussion of time 
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argues that any attempt to try and understand the nature of God as Creator cannot attempt 
to take hold of the concept of Creator and “peg it down.”234  Augustine is using the 
concept of time, partly, to think God in a way that avoids closure and is still open to the 
infinite possibilities which arise when taking seriously the nature of God as non-
conceivable.     
The issue arises as to what the theologian can say in relation to God if God is 
formless.  The answer that Augustine gives is that theology is a response to God in love 
“for it is only through love that we are reconciled to God…”235  Augustine asks God to 
increase his love so that he can in turn understand God more deeply.236  When it comes to 
being able to interpret, not only creation but even Scripture, the hermeneutic must be that 
of love.  The theologian must be an interpreter who works in charity.237  The theology 
that takes place is an improvisation that responds through the love of God shaped in one’s 
attunement to God.  This improvisation through love is based on the fact that thinking 
God always undoes or unstructures any concept of God because God is non-conceivable 
due to God’s infinite, ineffable nature.238  Charity acts as that piece that allows the 
theologian to interpret correctly by appropriately responding to God through the 
attunement that comes through love.  The result of his meditation upon creation and the 
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way that God works here is to have his love increased, so that he can respond in love to 
both God and neighbor, which is the goal of theology.239  Thus, the theologian loves.  It is 
this love that allows the theologian to improvise in one’s thinking of God.   
The goal of Augustine’s theology is that one loves and that this love increases 
knowledge of God since to know God is to love God and to love God is to know God.240  
When Augustine rhetorically asks why he has written this—with the question addressed 
explicitly to God and implicitly to a reader—the answer is to arouse devotion and love 
for God, not only in himself but also in his readers, that they all can attain the hope of 
finding beatitude in God.241  For Augustine, this is the happy life that brings one’s 
fulfillment as a human person.242   The theology he advances is one that loves God and 
follows that love.  It opens theological thinking to the love of God in an originary way by 
giving rise to the multitude of forms that are necessary to think through the idea of God.  
Through his turn to love, Augustine opens the ability for the theologian to find the 
unstructured, nonconstraining nature of theology.  A theology that gives credence to the 
unstructured, nonconstraining nature of thinking God begins and ends through the 
formation of a disposition of attunement and an understanding of a relation to its object—
God—that always exceeds human grasp while also affecting the theologian in profound 
ways.  The connection the theologian can possess is through love.  The only option is to 
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be open and welcoming to God in and through love.  Thus, for Augustine, an 
improvisational theology is only built upon the nonconstraining, formless, unstructured 
nature of love, which does not dominate or totalize God, but responds through the 
creation’s evocation. 
D. Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter has been to sketch the way that theology might proceed in 
the face of the inconceivable, ineffable nature of God.  Augustine offers a theological 
vision concerned with using a multiplicity of forms to speak to the reality that is God.  He 
does so because no one form could possibly be the “right” form for thinking God.  As 
Augustine shows, the forms used to think God need to be those that actively avoid 
closure while opening up the possibilities for thinking God in unique and other ways.  
Throughout his career, Augustine uses a number of forms to think God, whether doctrinal 
treatises, sermons, letters, polemics, or the liberal arts.  In this chapter, the focus has been 
on Augustine’s use of the forms of music, rhetoric, and love. 
The first form the chapter examined was music, as exemplified in Augustine’s 
treatise De Musica.  This is a text that was written near the time of Augustine’s 
conversion.  As such, it offers a unique glance in the way that he initially sees the world 
as a Christian and how this view stays the same and changes throughout the entirety of 
his thinking.  The turn to music allows Augustine to view creation as containing a trace 
of the divine.  This divine trace comes through in the rhythm and harmony that exists 
within creation.  The knowledge of God comes from contemplating the harmony and 
rhythm of God as it occurs in creation.  One’s knowledge of God is cultivated as one 
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learns to hear the rhythm and harmony of God in creation.  This knowledge comes 
through one’s formation into the type of person that is able to hear the music of God.  
This formation into one who hears the music of God should result in one’s attunement to 
God which gives one the ability to notice the divine trace throughout creation. 
The second form examined by the chapter is that of rhetoric, specifically as it is 
spelled out in De Doctrina Christiana.  Augustine’s discussion of rhetoric is built upon 
the work he did in De Musica, especially the idea of the formation of the thinker and the 
inconceivable nature of God.  In Book IV he shows the importance of one being formed 
correctly in order to speak God correctly.  For Augustine, the one who is formed 
correctly speaks with one’s entire existence. This existence is built upon prayer and this 
activity of prayer leads one to be attuned to God.  When one is attuned, one can rightly 
love God and neighbor in a way that speaks the Christian religion rightly.  Book I shows 
the basis of this life to be the incarnation.  The incarnation allows the attunement of God 
to humanity and that of humanity to God.  The possibility of attunement comes from 
God’s taking on full humanity while remaining fully God.  In doing this, God baptizes 
the whole of creation in the divine so that it has the divine trace.  The one who is rightly 
attuned in love through prayer is able to hear this divine trace.  Through hearing the 
divine in all things, one loves all as God is in all.  This love allows one to live the rhetoric 
that Augustine puts forward in Book IV. 
The last form examined in this chapter was that of confession.  The Confessions 
begin by introducing the form of narrative.  Augustine uses the confession as an 
opportunity to show how God has been attuned to him and that his life has been an 
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attempt to become reconciled to God.  The importance of the confession as a form for 
thinking God is that it takes seriously the story of God as Creator.  This is seen in the last 
books of Confessions, where Augustine is taken up with the first chapter of Genesis.  In 
his meditation, he shows the difference between created and Creator to be that between 
what has a fixed form and what is formless.  The creation has a form and must have form, 
while the Creator has a multiplicity of forms in which God is revealed.  For Augustine, 
the Creator is formless as God does not have a set form and does not have to inhabit 
form.  God unstructures every form in which God comes because no form can think God 
completely.  Rather, as is exemplified in Augustine’s corpus, the necessity is for the 
theologian to use a plurality of forms in order to begin to think God rightly.  
For the purposes of the argument of this project, Augustine’s thought shows one 
who actually uses a multiplicity of forms for thinking God.  Augustine offers an example 
of one who actually practices theology in a way that God avoids all form.  Augustine’s 
thought also shows a way for actively avoiding the closure of any discourse on God.  
Augustine’s work does this through his take up of ways of thinking that are not set but 
embrace a malleable nature.  This is specifically seen in his taking up of the forms of 
music, rhetoric, and love. 
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CONCLUSION 
The goal of the conclusion is twofold.  The first is to offer a summation of the 
argument.  This will help tie together any “loose ends” as well as show the nature of 
argument that theology is improvisation.  The second goal is to offer a few constructive 
conclusions in light of the argument.  In offering these, the conclusion points to possible 
places where theology is affected in light of the current proposal. 
A.  Rehearsing the Argument 
The thesis of this project is that theology is improvisation.  I have argued this by 
showing the shared ways of thinking within theology and improvisation around the 
notion of attunement.  I also used the idea of attunement to show how theology can be 
done in an improvisatory way through the fragmenting and unstructuring of theological 
forms.  This argument shows the improvisatory nature of theological thinking.  The 
argument takes three steps: first, I offered an account of attunement through an analysis 
of the work of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida; second, I connected the account of 
attunement with how attunement works in the ways of thinking in improvisation; and 
third, I focused on the fragmenting and dislocation of form that takes place in theology.  
The first part of this project outlines an understanding of attunement through an 
engagement with the philosophers Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida.  The first 
chapter outlines Heidegger’s Destruktion of Western metaphysics.  I outlined how this 
way of thinking is reliant upon and leads to a new understanding of attunement.  The 
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chapter makes three basic moves.  First, it follows Heidegger in pursuing a path that 
reorients thinking away from onto-theological and totalizing forms.  Instead, the project 
takes up a way of thinking that is concerned with understanding one’s involvement in 
one’s thinking.  This places a great emphasis on the role that disposition plays for 
thinking in the Heideggerian sense.  Second, the chapter relies upon an elucidation of the 
“step back.”  The step back is move out of metaphysics and into a path of thinking 
inaugurated by the Pre-Socratic Greeks.  The step back avoids philosophizing in a way 
that endorses closure and offers “full” explanations.  Heidegger embraces a way of 
thinking that begins with astonishment and ends with astonishment.  Third, the chapter 
opens the path for thinking by analyzing how Heidegger understands thinking as 
attunement.  This section follows the progression of Heidegger’s thought on attunement 
from Being and Time to What is Philosophy?  Through this analysis, one can see the 
centrality of attunement for thinking rightly.  Through these three moves, this chapter 
clears the conceptual ground which this project traverses and allows a thinking of the 
originary moment that begins theology. 
The second chapter continues the account of attunement by turning to Jacques 
Derrida.  This account of Derrida argues that his notion of deconstruction is predicated 
upon attunement.  This chapter makes its argument in three steps.  The first outlines the 
idea of deconstruction as attunement through an analysis of the use of “rhythm” within 
Derrida’s corpus, most notably Psyche and “Différance.”  Derrida’s idea of reading is 
predicated upon one finding and being in rhythm with the text.  Finding this rhythm is 
predicated upon attunement.  The second section uses the idea of hospitality in Derrida to 
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further his understanding of attunement.  For Derrida, hospitality is attunement because 
of its concern to be for the other.  This welcome is only able to occur if one is attuned to 
the other.  Thus, hospitality is built upon attunement.  When one is open to the other in 
the text then one notices the deconstruction taking place in texts.  The third section deals 
with Derrida’s notion of translation.  Translation is the outcome of one’s attunement as it 
not only welcomes the other but also wants to speak with the other.  Translation 
transforms a text and risks an interpretation.  For Derrida, deconstruction must translate 
as this is part and parcel of what happens in interpretation.  The translation is a trans-
formation of the text or concept from one context to another.  The chapter on Derrida 
further solidifies the understanding of attunement at work within this project as well as 
projecting the way that the argument will take place in the final three chapters. 
The third chapter focuses on expanding the understanding of attunement through 
an analysis of improvisation by showing how attunement is the way of thinking practiced 
in improvisation.  The chapter builds upon the idea of listening and how this leads to 
attunement.  Listening is the central practice at the heart of attunement because it is both 
passive and active, allowing one not only to take in but also to respond.  Listening also 
keeps open the possibilities available for thinking.  This listening is then brought to bear 
on the way attunement works in music through the interaction that occurs between piece 
and musician, musician and tradition, musician and other musicians, and musician and 
audience.  In order for improvisation to occur, attunement must be at the heart of each 
one of these relationships.  The third section makes the case that improvisation is 
concerned with transformation through the breaking of musical form.  This section 
326 
 
follows the thought of Derrida by arguing that interpretation requires translation or 
transformation of the form.  Improvisation does this through the move not to allow 
closure, never ending a piece.  Improvisation leads to the piece always being heard anew 
in different ways through different contexts and situations.   
The fourth chapter focuses on David Tracy.  This chapter begins by outlining 
Tracy’s overall project of thinking theology as conversation.  Tracy believes that he is 
able to counter two problems that he thinks plague theology: the problem of totality and 
that of plurality.  By turning to conversation he puts forward a way of thinking that is 
able to deal with both problems: first, a conversation is never closed so it should not slip 
into a totalizing form; and, second, a conversation includes a plurality of voices.  The 
question that arises is how one names and thinks God in this conversation.  Focusing on 
his later work, the chapter argues that his embrace of the form of fragments is what gives 
the ability to think God in and through conversation.  Tracy’s use of the form of 
fragments helps theology think God in a way that is non-totalizing as well as one that 
deals with the plurality of forms available for thinking God.  Tracy deals with the 
plurality of forms available for thinking God by turning to the notion of the gathering.  In 
order to think through how one goes about bringing the forms together, Tracy turns to the 
idea of the gathering.  The gathering is the place where disparate discourses and forms 
can come together and critique each other while still being together.  This turn to the 
gathering opens a way of thinking ethics.  Tracy uses the gathering to show the 
importance of ethics within his thought.  In a manner similar to Derrida, Tracy offers an 
ethics of resistance.  This chapter ultimately shows the need in theology for a non-
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totalizing discourse and a thinking of forms for naming and thinking God that are based 
upon the fragment. 
 The last chapter is on Augustine of Hippo.  I turn to Augustine to show how he 
sees the necessity of using multiple forms to think and name God.  The three forms dealt 
with in this chapter are music in De Musica, rhetoric in De Doctrina Christiana, and 
narrative/ autobiography in Confessions.  The first section outlines his use of music in 
constructing his theology.  The importance of music to him is that it offers a way of 
viewing the world and God’s interaction with the world.  The second section deals with 
the rhetoric he puts forward in De Doctrina Christiana.  This text shows the importance 
of one’s disposition and orientation for thinking theologically.  In this text, Augustine 
shows the necessity of attunement to God to do theology.  He thinks this through a 
hermeneutic of love.  The last section deals with the use of narrative and autobiography 
in Confessions.  Augustine uses narrative to unstructure any forms that dominate thinking 
on God.  He does this through a meditation upon how God creates by giving form, but 
consistently stays formless.  In so doing, Augustine shows the unstructured form of 
theology.  In his use of multiple discourses, Augustine shows the need for theology to 
engage a multiplicity of ways of thinking God, with no “one” way dominating in order to 
think God in a way that actually correlates to the belief in God.     
The argument of the project is to first lay out an understanding of attunement as a 
way of thinking.  This leads to the use of improvisational music for thinking the way that 
attunement works in thinking.  This has implications for the task of theology.  The last 
two chapters explore the improvisation that is at the heart of theology, furthering the 
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thesis that theology is improvisation.  This is done by showing how David Tracy and 
Augustine fragment and unstructur forms so that they may be used and thought 
otherwise, especially when one tries to think God.  The rest of this conclusion will be 
used to point to various places where this project may provide constructive insights for 
theology.  
B.  Constructive Conclusions 
The first constructive conclusion I make has to do with the importance of the 
incomprehensibility of God for theology.  This project arises out of a concern as to how 
theology speaks and thinks God.  Part of this concern stems from the fact that theology 
attempts to say something about God, which is that about which nothing can be said.  
And, in a typically Augustinian dilemma, theology still talks about God because it must 
say something.  This project takes very seriously this dilemma and tries to navigate 
through it.  Focusing on the incomprehensibility of God, foremost, drives the way that 
theology can think through this seeming problem. 
Within the discussion on the incomprehensibility of God, theology should begin 
by focusing on that aspect of God that is unsayable.  This aspect of God defies language.  
Because the idea of God actually works against language, theology finds itself using 
something—language—to think something—God—that actually works against this.  
Theology needs to find a language that allows the unsayable aspect of God to come out.  
In this project, part of that language was found in the ideas of the formless or 
unstructured form as elucidated by both David Tracy and Augustine.  These chapters 
point in the direction of a way of thinking that not only takes seriously the unsayable in 
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God but searches for an “unsayable” language.  Tracy does this in the turn to 
conversation which evokes a language that is multiple and contains many languages.  
Augustine finds the unsayable language for God in those forms—like music—that resist 
being placed in a language.  He also takes those overly linguistic forms—like rhetoric 
and confession—and pushes them to show that at their heart there is something that is 
unspeakable, so that, for example, rhetoric emanates from the whole of one’s life.    
Tracy and Augustine, then, show a theology that works against a language that 
tries to overly conceptualize God.  When one examines the discipline, one notices that 
theology tends to utilize metaphors of sight to think God.  One can see this in almost all 
aspects of theological thinking from the creation that is seen to the eschaton that results in 
the vision of God.  The theologian can notice this in systematic theology as well as 
mystical theologies.  Systematic theologies tend to rely on vision metaphors as a 
conceptual language and apparatus for thinking God.  Mystical theologians resort to 
vision metaphors in order to feel the closeness of God that is associated with one’s vision.  
In both cases, the idea of God is reduced to something that humanity can comprehend and 
the incomprehensible, ineffable nature of God is lost (even thought it may be paid lip 
service). 
This project counters this use of metaphors of vision by suggesting that sound and 
hearing are also metaphors for understanding God and may even be more appropriate to 
the unsayable, incomprehensible nature of God.  The attempt to move language about 
God from sight to hearing opens possibilities for thinking God in a non-visual way that is 
more in line with how theology should actually think God.  Theology should think God in 
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a way that allows the incomprehensible, unsayable nature of God to arise.  This project 
does so by introducing the language of music into the theological lexicon.1  One such 
way is to introduce the idea of “groove” as a place of attunement.  When one grooves, 
one is in-tune rhythmically and harmonically—there is “just something about it.”  The 
goal of theology would be to “groove” with God.  Or, one could follow the attempts on 
the part of improvisational musicians to “say something” in a way that introduces 
newness into old ideas and compositions.  Or, one could look at the creation as the place 
where God plays, with God’s melody and harmony ringing throughout the cosmos.  The 
commonality in all of these possibilities is that these all are ways of thinking that resist 
closure and, in so doing, leave open the possibilities for thinking the God who is 
incomprehensible, unsayable, and ineffable. 
The second constructive conclusion I want to make is the contribution toward is 
the role of form in thinking God.  The “forms” that are used within this project to think 
and name God are those that deal with sound and hearing.  In doing this, the project looks 
to forms that are formless and unstructured.  By preferring those forms, I look for ways of 
thinking theologically that consistently unravel and undo themselves.  These forms avoid 
closure due to the incomprehensible, unsayable nature of God.  The idiom of jazz offers 
ways of thinking forms that are always unstructuring themselves.  In fact, the tradition of 
jazz is built upon the rethinking and replaying of various compositions so that they are 
never closed but open always to interpretation.   
                                                 
1
 This is not to say that this project is the only one that does so, but that there is a definitive turn to 
a musical logic that relies on listening and hearing over and against the use of visual metaphors.  However, 
visual metaphors are still prominent because they are a prominent part of the tradition this project comes 
from.  
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The attempt to reorient theology around metaphors of hearing and away from 
conceptual language to sounds moves into the realm of attunement.  This move, though, 
is not into a more thoroughgoing “hearing of the Word” in revelation.  This move is 
rather to think about what gives rise to allow the ability even to hear the Word.  Then the 
task is set to explain what happens in this originary moment of the Word coming and 
being received.  Thus, part of what the turn to sounds does is to evoke someone/ 
something to respond.  Thus, the project moves beyond being an attempt to offer a certain 
way that theology comments upon creeds and scripture.  The proposal here looks for 
forms that broaden the horizons of theological thinking beyond the creeds and scripture 
so that theology is not strictly a commentary on “words.”  Rather, in this, theology 
becomes a response to the melody and harmony of God that comes when one grooves 
with God.   
From this proposal, theology is a discipline that gathers together a number of 
disparate discourses and sounds in order to think God.  What is needed are places where 
one can think this gathering.  One such place is in the work of Mark C. Taylor on 
emergent networks and complexity theory.2  Taylor uses the vast amount of connection 
that exists in the world to think about what it means to think, especially thinking God.  
He takes up the vast amount of information available and explores how this multiplies 
constantly.  Taylor uses this to think how there is no set center for a way of thinking; 
rather, one just enters thinking and can follow it where it may go.  This is similar to the 
                                                 
 
2
 See Mark C. Taylor, The Moment of Complexity: Emergent Network Culture (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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way that one may do research on the internet.  Here, one does a search, finds a website on 
a topic, this website links to another and that one to another, and so on and so on.  The 
result is a path of thought but one that is not concretized.  This way of thinking could go 
differently depending upon where one started, what search engine was used, or even how 
quotations were placed.  And, this search could look differently a week later because of 
the amount of information available.  Thus, this way of thinking has a direction, but the 
form is a center-less web that shifts and moves with the path that one follows or how one 
moves thought.     
A way of thinking similar to what happens in Taylor’s emergent networks is the 
example of the DJ.  The DJ being discussed here is not the disc jockey on the radio who 
simply plays recordings.  This is the DJ who takes a piece of music and changes it in 
some way.  Oftentimes the DJ will take a another piece of music and “sample” it by 
playing only a part or a famous riff.  The DJ will then do something different with it, 
changing it in some way.  The DJ also may “mash” up two different samples or albums.  
An example of this is Danger Mouse, who mashed The Beatles’ album The Beatles 
(referred to as the White Album) and Jay-Z’s Black Album.  The result was not a Beatles 
album or Jay-Z album.  It was something other, something different.  Other DJs will use 
other musicians’ recordings to make their own by layering and looping the material in 
such a way that, while still recognizable, makes something different than the pieces being 
used.3  Theology may look like this when it takes many, seemingly disparate views and 
                                                 
3
 See the documentary “Rip! A Remix Manifesto” for multiple examples of DJs doing this.  This is 
available at http://ripremix.com 
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discourses and “mashes” them together to think differently about a given doctrine.  The 
theologian, as DJ, may also take sources that are not traditionally used and play with 
them, manipulating them to hear something different at work in theology.    
If one is not willing to go the route of Taylor’s emergent networks or the 
theologian as DJ, then one could turn the theologian as one who performs “covers.”  The 
cover song is a reinterpretation of someone else’s song.  Usually, for good covers, the 
song is still recognizable and carries the same general form.  The covering person/ group, 
though, change(s) something about the original so that it is not a repetition of the original 
but is something new.  An example of this would be the cover of Aerosmith’s “Walk This 
Way” by the rap group Run DMC.  The song by Aerosmith is a typical Aerosmith song 
with loud, bluesy guitars, straight ahead rhythms, and the vocal of Steven Tyler.  Run 
DMC does something quite different by rapping the verses and driving the rhythm in a 
more deliberate way.  Run DMC transforms the song into their own, even though it was 
first Aerosmith’s.  Another example is the cover of Bob Dylan’s “All Along the 
Watchtower” by Jimi Hendrix.  Dylan’s version contains elements of folk and is more 
subdued.  Hendrix plays the song with a strong blues emphasis and uses it as a vehicle for 
improvisation on his guitar.  Hendrix’ version, though, was so good and popular that 
many people associate the song with him instead of Dylan.  This is an example of a cover 
that opens the possibilities of the song.  A cover, while relying on repetition, still 
transforms the piece.  The theologian working in this way should do the same.  The 
sources that one uses should be transformed in some way so that they can be heard 
differently. 
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The last example of the type of form that may be used in theology through this 
project is the “mixtape” (or “burned CD” or “Playlist”).  The mixtape is an example of a 
gathering together of several pieces that were not meant to go together and, yet, still fit.  
The mixtape is usually put together on some occasion or for some event.  Sometimes this 
can be a mixtape for a road trip or one for a lover; the mixtape can be for one’s exercise 
or just to mellow out to.  The mixtape offers a place where one can think how many 
different pieces can be gathered together in a coherent, but non-totalizing way.  Because 
the mixtape is put together for some event, it has a certain “feel” to it with a logic that 
one wants to convey.  The mixtape is usually not put together randomly, but has a 
structure that gives some meaning.  As such, the mixtape offers a way of thinking that 
theology can use.  Specifically, the mixtape offers a logic to be used by those who are 
gathering together fragments into some form(s).  This gathering is a whole but is not a 
totalizing way of thinking.  Rather, like the mixtape, it is a collection that is given a 
structure to convey meaning but this does not preclude the fact that the same material 
could be structured differently at another time to convey a different meaning.     
The difficulty that arises from this constructive conclusion is saying something 
about these musical forms for theological thinking.  This project has described and said 
something, but the something said was that saying something is, at best, problematic and, 
at worst, impossible.  This is the aporetic nature of theological thinking.  The goal of the 
above forms is to spur and open possibilities for thinking.  As forms, their purpose is to 
keep open thinking while giving a direction to thought.  In giving direction, though, these 
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forms do not dominate but they open a space wherein the theologian can dwell and try 
possibilities for theology.    
The third constructive conclusion that arises from this project is the idea that 
theology is affective and responsive.  Theology begins from what affects one whether 
that is a feeling of absolute dependence or ultimate concern.  The theologian is one who 
responds to that which places a call on one’s life.  This is why attunement is important to 
this project: it points to the moments that give a rise to the affections of the theologian.  
Theology becomes the reflection of these affections.  This conclusion points to how the 
theologian is formed in order to be attuned as well as the place the evocation plays in 
theology. 
This project brings to the fore the issue of how the theologian is formed.  The 
argument made within this project relies on the idea that a person is formed in a certain 
way in order to do theology.  This notion of the theologian’s formation springs from the 
idea of attunement that is at work throughout the project.  In order to be attuned, one 
must have a certain disposition.  The theologian then needs a disposition that leads to 
attunement.  This disposition includes being open to the coming of the other, listening, 
welcoming, responding, and, generally, being in such a way as be hospitable.  This 
disposition comes from one’s immersion in a tradition that opens up one’s thinking about 
God while also teaching openness.  It is learned through the various ways that one 
engages the other.  This learning may take place in the church as one listens to a sermon 
or mass; it may take place in one’s room in prayer as one opens oneself to the Wholly 
Other; it may take place in a classroom as one learns to listen to the other in a way that 
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facilitates thinking.  The importance is that the theologian learns a disposition of 
welcoming the other in a way that affects and opens one up to receive and respond.  
One is able to respond when one is disposed in a way that opens one up to 
attunement.  This response comes from the calling of the other.  The calling of the other 
evokes something in the theologian—it affects.  This evocation is at the center of how a 
theologian works.  The theologian is evoked by some form in some way.  Oftentimes the 
theologian then goes on to write or think in a way that does not evoke anything of 
anyone, nor does it even acknowledge this evocation.  I want to place the evocation of the 
theologian by the other—and to the other—at the center of what it means to do theology.  
The attunement that theology embraces comes from this originary moment of evocation.  
Theology then responds.  The response should be one that points to this evocation while 
moving past it.  The goal is not to get caught in the originary moment of being evoked 
but to understand how this projects the theologian into certain ways of thinking.  The end 
result is a theology that is based upon one’s attunement which comes in an originary way 
when one is evoked. 
The last constructive conclusion offered is the role of listening in theology.  
Listening stems from the formational process of the theologian.  Part of this process is to 
teach and form the theologian into one who listens.  Listening leads to attunement.  It is 
both passive and active.  Listening is passive as it simply receives something from 
somewhere else.  There is no possibility of listening happening if there is no noise or 
communication in some way.  Listening, though, is also active in that what it gives is 
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actively taken in and processed in some way.  Listening goes out searching for something 
that will give itself so that listening will take place.   
Listening is important for theology.  In fact, one could say that the basis for 
theology is listening, due to its active-passive nature.  The theologian is one who actively 
pursues God by searching for God in different places.  However, the theologian is also 
aware that the divine only comes in giving itself over to the person.  One cannot force 
God to do something so the theologian passively waits for God to give Godself.  This 
passivity is aware and active, but passive nonetheless.  When God does give Godself and 
the theologian listens, both taking in and responding, then one can begin thinking 
theologically.  This thinking comes not only in listening for God, but also searching other 
places for the divine trace and listening for God in these places.  This may come as one 
reads the creeds or scripture but may also occur as one views creation or watches a 
movie, listens to music, or reads the newspaper.  The theologian actively engages all of 
these (and more) in a way that allows God to call and evoke through these.  The 
theologian can use these various mediums as forms for thinking God as places that open 
up the possibilities of thinking the God who is unsayable and incomprehensible. 
The result of this listening is an approach to theology that takes seriously its 
character as a conversation or dialogue.  Improvisation is viewed by many musicians as a 
conversation.  This conversation is predicated upon the musicians listening to each other.  
If they do not listen they cannot “say something.”  This way of thinking extends into 
theology.  However, instead of a group of theologians interacting immediately one has 
centuries of theological thought as well as numerous other venues where religion has 
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been discussed.  There are also other places that give rise to theological reflection.  The 
theologian is the one who puts all of these into conversation with one another in order to 
“say something.”  In doing this, the theologian is conducting a conversation around 
whatever topic has been presented.  The theologian mediates the dialogue in a way that 
allows critique and endorsement as well as putting forth an argument.  Through this 
theology says something.   
I offer these four constructive conclusions as places for further theological 
thinking in light of this project.  The goal has not been to be comprehensive but to point 
to avenues that could be explored in more detail.  The “next step” after the dissertation is 
to engage these and other ways of thinking in order to offer improvisations upon and 
within theology.
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